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On July 6, 2001, in Rite Aid Corporation v. United States,1 the Federal 
Circuit invalidated all or a portion of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20, 
concluding that it was outside the broad authority delegated by 
Congress to Treasury under I.R.C. § 1502.2  In practically every 
respect the decision was misguided. 
Broadly speaking, Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20 disallowed a consolidated 
group’s loss on its sale of subsidiary stock.3  Not surprisingly, 
taxpayers complained loudly when Treasury introduced this “loss 
disallowance” rule in 1990, but applauded vigorously when Treasury 
backed off the rule in Rite Aid’s aftermath.4 
                                                          
 1. 255 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001), reh’g denied, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 23207 
(Oct. 3, 2001). 
 2. This Article generally uses “Treasury” to refer to the personnel in the 
Department of Treasury, including the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”), who 
work on Treasury regulations.  It also uses “Treasury” to refer to those people who 
litigate tax cases on behalf of the Commissioner or Department of Justice.  Finally, it 
uses “IRS” to also refer to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which is what the federal 
tax administrator was called until 1954, and uses the “Code” as shorthand for the 
relevant federal income tax law. 
Note that while at the Internal Revenue Service, I worked on aspects of Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1502-20, although the basic policy calls on the regulation were made before I did 
that work. 
 3. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20(a) (2002).  A consolidated group is an affiliated 
group of corporations that elects to file consolidated returns, combining the income 
and loss of each group member.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-1(h) (2002); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1502-11 (2002).  An affiliated group has a common parent and subsidiary 
members, and the common parent directly or indirectly owns a significant stock 
interest in each subsidiary.  See I.R.C. § 1504(a)(2) (2002) (defining a significant 
stock interest, broadly speaking, as at least eighty percent of the voting power and 
value of the subsidiary). 
 4. See, e.g., Lawrence Axelrod, Rite Aid—Prescription for Reversal, 520 PLI/tax 
797, 801 n.5 (2001) (listing articles by a number of commentators questioning the 
validity of the loss disallowance rule); Irving Salem, Judicial Deference, Consolidated 
Returns, and Loss Disallowance: Could LDR Survive a Court Challenge?, 43 TAX EXECUTIVE 
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Rite Aid is a stunning opinion, not only because it could cost 
billions in tax revenue but also because the Federal Circuit gave little 
apparent deference to Treasury in invalidating the regulation.5  In its 
brief opinion, the court embraced the taxpayer’s arguments without 
apparent qualification, missing relevant precedent and substantial 
arguments that supported the regulation’s validity.  The court’s 
reasoning was sparse, its proposed test vague, and its conclusion 
somewhat ambiguous, threatening the validity of other consolidated 
return regulations and creating added uncertainty in an already 
complex area of the tax law.6  It is almost certain that Rite Aid will 
prompt legislation to restrict its possible reach.7 
                                                          
167 (1991) [hereinafter Salem I] (also arguing that the loss disallowance rule was 
invalid); Mark J. Silverman & Lisa M. Zarlenga, Rite Aid: A Tough Pill for the 
Government to Swallow, 556 PLI/tax 437, 449 (2002) (also noting that the loss 
duplication rule was one of the regulation’s most criticized features); see also Irving 
Salem, Rite Aid: Potentially Historic, 556 PLI/tax 423, 427 (2002) [hereinafter Salem 
II] (praising Treasury for taking “bold, decisive steps”). 
The loss disallowance rule was developed over a short span in three regulatory 
packages.  On March 9, 1990, Treasury issued Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20T, T.D. 8294, 
1990-1 C.B. 66.  On November 19, 1990, it withdrew Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20T and 
proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20.  See CO-93-90, 1990-2 C.B. 696.  It finalized the 
proposed regulations on September 13, 1991.  See T.D. 8364, 1991-2 C.B. 43. 
With modest modifications, that loss disallowance rule remained in place until 
replaced by Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-2T and Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20T.  See T.D. 8984, 
67 Fed. Reg. 11034 (2002), 2002-12 I.R.B. 668; see also T.D. 8998, 67 Fed. Reg. 37998 
(2002) (clarifying and amending T.D. 8984).  The replacement still requires loss 
disallowance, but allows a group to take a subsidiary stock loss to the extent the 
group proves it is an “economic” loss.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-2T(a)(1) (providing 
that the loss is generally disallowed); id. § 1.337(d)-2T(c)(2) (providing that the loss 
is allowed “to the extent the taxpayer establishes that the loss . . . is not attributable 
to the recognition of built-in gain on the disposition of an asset (including stock or 
securities)”); see also Don Leatherman, Current Developments for Consolidated Groups, 
555 PLI/tax 793, 803-12 (2002) (for a discussion of Treas. Reg. § 1.337(d)-2T). 
The 1990 loss disallowance rule was promulgated by the administration of 
President George H. Bush.  Ironically, perhaps, his son’s administration defended 
the rule in the Federal Circuit and ultimately replaced it.  Perhaps, the sins of the 
father are visited on the son. 
 5. To support its August 3, 2001 petition for rehearing in Rite Aid, the 
government surveyed 1,600 of 60,000 consolidated groups, and the survey uncovered 
at least thirty three audits over the past three years with “loss disallowance” issues.  
Those issues involved about $1.2 billion of tax.  See Government Seeks Rehearing En Banc 
in Rite Aid Case, 176 TAX NOTES TODAY 20, ¶ 10, Sept. 31, 2001, available at 2001 TNT 
176-20.  Following Rite Aid, that dollar amount at stake will grow as additional groups 
file refund claims.  Although too much could be read into the government survey, it 
seems certain that “loss disallowance” involves billions of potential tax dollars. 
 6. See also Silverman & Zarlenga, supra note 4, at 443 (stating that the Federal 
Circuit decision “use[d] very broad language to invalidate a legislative regulation 
and . . . provide[d] little analysis”); Irving Salem, A Proposal to Resolve the Rite Aid 
Legislative War, 98 TAX NOTES 599, 600-01 (2003) (calling the reasoning of the 
Federal Circuit “flawed” and also stating “[m]y conclusion is that the ‘reasoning of 
Rite Aid’ is unadministrable, and we are likely to go brain dead before we can 
articulate what it means”). 
 7. See, e.g., CARE Act of 2002, S. 1924, 107th Cong., § 631 (2002) (proposed 
legislation prompted by Rite Aid).  That proposed legislation would add the following 
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Part I of this Article sets out background, giving an overview of the 
consolidated return regulations, exploring the standards courts use 
to test the validity of administrative regulations, and discussing how 
those standards have been adapted for the consolidated return 
regulations.  Part II describes the loss disallowance rule of Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1502-20 (“LDR”), including Treasury’s justifications for the rule 
and how it applied to the Rite Aid facts.  Part III analyzes Rite Aid, 
describing the decisions of the Federal Circuit and lower court and 
setting out the arguments for and against invalidating at least part of 
LDR.  I conclude that although the question is perhaps close, the 
Federal Circuit should have found the regulation valid.  Finally, Part 
IV points out the likely impact of Rite Aid, including other 
consolidated return regulations that may be threatened by the case. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. An Overview of the Consolidated Return Regulations  
For federal income tax purposes, a consolidated group is treated 
sometimes like a single entity and sometimes like a collection of 
separate corporations.8  This “hybrid” approach is intended “clearly 
to reflect” the income tax liability of the group and each member, 
both during and after affiliation and to “prevent avoidance” of that 
tax liability.9  Although “clear reflection” and “avoidance prevention” 
are vague standards at best, they serve as the only statutory guides 
Congress offered in granting Treasury its broad authority to craft the 
consolidated return regulations.10 
                                                          
sentence to I.R.C. § 1502: 
In prescribing such regulations, the Secretary may prescribe rules applicable 
to corporations filing consolidated returns under section 1501 that are 
different from other provisions of this title that would apply if such 
corporations filed consolidated returns. 
The proposed legislation would apply to all taxable years.  See Irving Salem, supra 
note 6, at 601-03 (criticizing the proposal). 
 8. See Don Leatherman, Are Separate Liability Losses Separate for Consolidated 
Groups?, 52 TAX LAW. 663, 665-70 (1999) (for a similar discussion). 
 9. See I.R.C. § 1502 (2002). 
 10. That grant reads as follows: 
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem necessary in 
order that the tax liability of any affiliated group of corporations making a 
consolidated return and of each corporation in the group, both during and 
after the period of affiliation, may be returned, determined, computed, 
assessed, collected, and adjusted, in such manner as clearly to reflect the 
income tax liability and the various factors necessary for the determination 
of such liability, and in order to prevent avoidance of such tax liability. 
I.R.C. § 1502. 
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The regulations do not articulate principles to apply these statutory 
guides, but a careful review reveals that the regulations promote the 
following two policies of tax-neutrality.11  First, a consolidated group 
should be neither penalized nor advantaged for federal income tax 
purposes in forming a new member or transferring assets between 
members.  Second, the group should have no tax incentive or 
disincentive to acquire a prospective member or dispose of an 
existing member.  The regulations reflect the first policy by 
sometimes treating a group like a single entity and reflect the second 
by sometimes treating group members as separate corporations. 
Increasingly, the regulations adopt a single-entity approach.12  
Critically, the gross income, gain, loss, and deductions of each 
member are combined to compute a group’s consolidated taxable 
income (“CTI”),13 and a group uses CTI to determine its federal 
income tax.14  A consolidated group also uses a single-entity approach 
to compute many components of its CTI, including its net capital 
gain,15 net § 1231 gain or loss,16 charitable deduction,17 and dividends 
received deduction.18  Further, the group adjusts its basis in subsidiary 
stock to achieve the following single-entity effect: preventing the 
subsidiary’s income, gain, loss, and deductions “from being taken 
into account a second time on [the group’s] disposition of [the 
subsidiary’s] stock.”19  By treating the group like a single entity, the 
regulations reduce the significance of each member’s separate 
                                                          
 11. See United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 837 (2001) 
(suggesting that a policy of tax neutrality may be relevant in applying the “avoidance 
prevention” guide).  The Court cited Leatherman, supra note 8, at 681 and in a 
parenthetical to the cite the Court quoted language that justified applying a single-
entity approach in United Dominion because of tax-neutrality.  Id. 
 12. Andrew J. Dubroff & John Broadbent, Consolidated Returns: Evolving Single and 
Separate Entity Themes, 72 TAXES 743, 747-50, 760, 765-66 (1994) (“The new 
regulations enhance single entity treatment by treating the members more uniformly 
as divisions of a single corporation”); see also Bryan P. Collins et al., Calculation of 
Consolidated Taxable Income: The Treatment of Specified Liability Losses, 25 J. CORP. TAX’N 
58, 68 (1998). 
 13. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-11 and 1.1502-12 (as amended in 1999); see also 
Dubroff & Broadbent, supra note 12, at 763 (describing the ability to combine tax 
items as the essence of the consolidated return regulations). 
 14. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-2 (as amended in 1999). 
 15. Id. § 1.1502-22. 
 16. Id. § 1.1502-23. 
 17. Id. § 1.1502-24. 
 18. Id. § 1.1502-26. 
 19. See id. § 1.1502-32(a)(1) (explaining that the purpose of the basis adjustment 
rules is to treat the subsidiary member and owning member as a single entity); see also 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-19 (as amended in 1997) (allowing “negative” basis); cf. I.R.C. 
§ 705 (2000) (providing similar adjustments to determine partner’s outside basis but 
not allowing “negative” basis). 
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existence and make the group’s decision to incorporate a business or 
transfer assets between members more tax-neutral. 
Despite the alluring simplicity of a pure single-entity approach, the 
regulations treat members in some ways like separate corporations.20  
This hybrid approach was likely embraced for two major reasons.  
First (and important for any analysis of Rite Aid), under a pure single-
entity approach, a group would lose the benefit of a cost basis in 
acquired member stock, instead taking a stock basis equal to the net 
inside basis of the acquired member’s assets.21  Second, Congress 
allows a subsidiary member to have non-member shareholders,22 an 
allowance better accommodated by sometimes using a separate-
corporation approach. 
Thus, the consolidated return regulations respect the separate 
existence of each member in several fundamental ways.  For example, 
an acquired member generally retains its pre-consolidation tax 
attributes.  Further, a member recognizes gain or loss on an asset sale 
to another member, although the group generally takes those items 
into account using a single-entity approach.23  In addition, subject to 
an anti-avoidance rule, each member determines its method of 
accounting as if it filed a separate return.24  Finally, losses may be 
carried between separate return and consolidated return years, and 
that carryover or carryback is limited under a separate-corporation 
approach.25 
                                                          
 20. Because the regulations adopt neither a “pure” single-entity nor separate-
corporation approach, the dispute in Rite Aid (and most other consolidated 
questions) cannot be resolved merely by saying that a consolidated group is treated 
like a single entity or like a collection of separate corporations.  The consolidated 
return regulations treat groups both ways, so that either approach describes nothing 
more than a result under the regulations, not a principle that underlies them.  See 
Axelrod, supra note 4, at 812 (arguing that the single-entity effect is a result under 
the consolidated return regulations, not a principle of the regulations). 
 21. A corporation’s net inside basis is the aggregate adjusted basis of its assets less 
its aggregate liabilities. 
 22. See I.R.C. § 1504(a)(2) and (4) (2002). 
 23. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(c) (describing the “matching” rule for 
intercompany transactions, consistent with a single-entity approach).  But see id. 
§ 1.1502-13(f)(4) (gain on member stock may be recovered under a separate-
corporation approach).  See generally id. § 1.1502-13(a)(2) (providing that the 
amount and location of a member’s items are determined on a separate-corporation 
basis, while the timing, character, source, and other attributes are determined on a 
single-entity basis). 
 24. See id. § 1.1502-17(a) (providing the general rule); id. § 1.1502-17(c) 
(providing the anti-avoidance rule).  As a corollary, special-status members, such as 
banks and insurance companies, determine their status separately; see also  ANDREW J. 
DUBROFF ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS FILING CONSOLIDATED 
RETURNS, § 41.01 n.1 (2d ed. 2002). 
 25. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2002) (dealing with 
losses apportioned to a subsidiary and carried to separate return years) and § 1.1502-
21(c) (providing that losses carried from separate return years generally can offset 
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The separate-corporation approach makes more tax-neutral the 
group’s choice to acquire a prospective member or dispose of an 
existing member.  Because the regulations preserve a member’s 
attributes distinct from group attributes, the acquisition of a 
subsidiary is less likely to affect the character of distributions to the 
subsidiary’s non-member shareholders.  Further, by limiting the 
carryover or carryback of losses between separate-return and 
consolidated-return years, the regulations limit the opportunity for 
loss trafficking, making a group’s choice to buy or sell a subsidiary 
more tax-neutral.26 
In gauging the validity of a consolidated return regulation, it is not 
always clear how a court should balance the separate-corporation and 
single-entity approaches.  The balance is most difficult when the two 
policies of tax neutrality conflict, a conflict arguably presented by Rite 
Aid. 
B. Testing the Validity of a Consolidated Return Regulation 
Because of that possible conflict, the standard of review employed 
by the Rite Aid court was critically important, particularly the extent to 
which the court must defer to the Treasury’s policy choices in 
promulgating the regulation in question.  This portion of the Article 
discusses the appropriate standard of review for consolidated return 
regulations and then analyzes cases that have considered the validity 
of those regulations. 
1. The standard of review 
A court’s standard of review for regulations may differ for 
“interpretive” and “legislative” regulations, with courts giving greater 
deference to legislative regulations.27  The consolidated return 
                                                          
income only of the subsidiary).  But see id. § 1.1502-21(g) (providing a special rule for 
cases in which I.R.C. § 382 also applies to the loss).  A “separate return year” of a 
member is a year in which the member filed a separate return or joined in filing a 
consolidated return with another group.  See id. § 1.1502-1(e).  A “consolidated 
return year” is any year that is not a separate return year.  See id. § 1.1502-1(d). 
 26. See CO-078-90, 1991-1 C.B. 757, 759 (stating in a slightly different context that 
these loss rules should be “neutral”). 
 27. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 (1984) (stating that “legislative regulations are given controlling weight, unless 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”); Schuler Indus. 
Inc. v. United States, 109 F.3d 753, 755 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Chevron and stating 
that legislative regulations should be given more deference than interpretive 
regulations); Wolter Constr. Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 634 F.2d 1029, 1035 (6th Cir. 1980) 
(noting that those challenging legislative regulations bear a greater burden than 
those challenging interpretive regulations); Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 
790, 801 (1975) (providing that legislative regulations are overturned only for 
“weighty reasons” (quoting Comm’r v. S. Tex. Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948))); 
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regulations are legislative regulations, because  they are issued under 
a Code section (I.R.C. § 1502) that grants Treasury broad discretion 
to craft rules for consolidated groups to compute their federal tax 
items and income tax.28  Under that grant, Treasury prescribes the 
consolidated return regulations, which specify how a particular Code 
section should apply to consolidated groups.29  Because those 
                                                          
Carboloy Co. v. Comm’r, 18 T.C. 1028, 1031 (1952) (stating that “Congress placed in 
[Treasury] more than ordinary discretion”); cf. United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 
526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999) (applying Chevron in a non-tax case and noting that it would 
give “controlling weight” to an agency’s reasonable interpretation that filled a gap in 
a statute). 
Commentators generally agree that courts give more deference to legislative tax 
regulations.  See Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 
FLA. TAX REV. 51, 59 (1996) (stating that courts give legislative tax regulations more 
deference than interpretive ones); John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations 
and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 44 (1995) (noting 
that courts historically deferred to an agency’s policy choice in a legislative 
regulation, unless that choice clearly conflicted with the statute or was arbitrary and 
capricious).  But see Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 
TEMP. L. REV. 445, 464 (1993) (arguing that Chevron made the standard of review for 
legislative and interpretive regulations the same); Salem I, supra note 4, at 171 
(arguing that the theoretical difference between legislative and interpretive 
regulations has been eroded). 
 28. See, e.g., Wolter Constr. Co., 634 F.2d at 1035 (concluding that the consolidated 
return regulations were legislative regulations); Am. Standard, Inc. v. United States, 
602 F.2d 256, 261 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (reaching the same conclusion); Garvey v. United 
States, 1 Cl. Ct. 108, 113 (1983) (reaching the same conclusion); see also Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 843-44 (describing legislative regulations as “an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation” 
where “Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill”). 
Current I.R.C. § 1502 and its 1928 statutory predecessor contain practically the 
same grant of regulatory authority, and the 1928 grant authorized legislative 
regulations, as the following excerpt from relevant legislative history shows: 
Many difficult and complicated problems, however, have arisen in the 
administration of the provisions permitting the filing of consolidated 
returns.  It is obviously of utmost importance that these questions be 
answered with certainty and a definite rule be prescribed.  Frequently, the 
particular policy is immaterial, so long as the rule to be applied is known.  
The committee believes it to be impracticable to attempt by legislation to prescribe the 
various detailed and complicated rules necessary to meet the many differing and 
complicated situations.  Accordingly, it has found it necessary to delegate power to the 
commissioner to prescribe regulations legislative in character covering them. 
S. REP. NO. 70-760, at 15 (1928) (emphasis added).  Since the 1928 grant authorized 
legislative regulations, the substantially similar current grant should do so as well. 
 29. Occasionally, however, Congress has specified how a consolidated (or 
affiliated) group should be treated.  Congress has provided: 
(i)  For certain purposes that a consolidated must use a single-entity 
approach (see I.R.C. §§ 29(d)(7), 45(d)(4), 168(i)(7)(B)(ii), 
172(h)(4)(C), 197(f)(2)(B)(ii), 441(i)(2), 860E(a)(2), 860J(d), and 
1092(d)(4)(B)(ii) (2003)); 
(ii)  For certain purposes that an affiliated group must use a single-entity 
approach (see I.R.C. §§ 163(j)(6)(C), 280G(d)(5), 355(b), 367(a)(5), 
384(c)(6) 465(c)(7)(F), 543(d)(6), 584(a), 864(e)(1), and 
1092(d)(3)(C)(ii) (2003)); 
(iii) Special rules for consolidated groups to apply the provisions on 
personal holding companies and the accumulated earnings tax (see 
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regulations fill in the gaps left by Congress, they are legislative 
regulations and merit significant deference. 
Courts have stated that a legislative regulation is valid unless it 
is ”arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”30  They 
also have tested such a regulation’s validity by considering whether it 
was “unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the statute.”31  The 
two tests seem nearly identical, particularly since a regulation should 
be “unreasonable,” “arbitrary,” or “capricious” only if it is 
insufficiently moored to the relevant Code provisions.32  At the very 
least, if a regulation reasonably applies the Code, it must be valid, 
because it cannot then be “manifestly contrary” or “plainly 
inconsistent” with the statute or otherwise “arbitrary,” “capricious,” or 
“unreasonable.” 
                                                          
I.R.C. §§ 542(b) and 562(d) (2003)); 
(iv)  Rules for life/non-life consolidated groups (see I.R.C. §§ 818(e) and 
1504(c)); 
(v)    A rule to treat stock of a subsidiary member of a consolidated group as 
a depreciable asset under § 1017 (see I.R.C. § 1017(d)(3)(D) (2003)); 
and 
(vi)  Special rules targeted at perceived abuses (see I.R.C. § 1503(d)-(f) 
(2003)). 
 30. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (articulating this standard); see also Schuler Indus., 109 
F.3d at 755 (applying the Chevron standard); Nichols v. United States, 260 F.3d 637, 
644-45 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying the Chevron standard); Square D Co. v. Comm’r, 188 
T.C. 299, 307 (2002) (applying the Chevron standard); cf. Rite Aid Corp. v. United 
States, 255 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (articulating but not appearing to strictly 
apply the Chevron standard). 
 31. See, e.g., Wolter Constr., 634 F.2d at 1035 (applying this standard); Georgia-Pac. 
Corp., 63 T.C. at 801 (applying this standard); Regal, Inc. v. Comm’r, 53 T.C. 261, 263 
(1969) (applying this standard), aff’d per curiam, 435 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1970); see also 
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 136, 149 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding a 
consolidated return regulation, stating that it was “not so unreasonable to be 
invalidated by the court on policy grounds”); First Chi. Corp. v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 
421, 439 (1991) (stating that a consolidated return regulations were valid “[t]o the 
extent they are not proven to be beyond the scope of the authority delegated, 
inconsistent with the statute, or unreasonable”); Garvey, 1 Cl. Ct. at 113 (stating that 
the consolidated return regulation in question would be upheld  “unless clearly 
unreasonable”); Corner Broadway-Maiden Lane, Inc. v. Comm’r, 76 F.2d 106, 108 
(2d Cir. 1935) (concluding that a group does not consent to consolidated return 
regulations that are “inconsistent with the statute”); Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. 
v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979) (concluding that an interpretive 
regulation was valid, because it implemented the congressional mandate in a 
reasonable manner); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 252-53 (1981) 
(applying the same standard to determine the validity of interpretive regulations); 
Cottage Sav. Assoc. v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991) (applying the same 
standard to determine the validity of interpretive regulations, saying it would “defer 
to [the Commissioner’s] regulatory interpretation of the Code as long as [it was] 
reasonable”). 
 32. See Coverdale, supra note 27, at 45-46 n.66 (1995) (concluding that there is 
little difference between the two tests); cf. Cent. Pa. Sav. Assoc. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 
384, 392 (1995) (asserting that Chevron merely “restated” the traditional standard of 
review for interpretive regulations). 
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Further, a legislative regulation should reasonably apply relevant 
Code provisions if it is consistent with the language and purposes of 
those provisions.33  In testing reasonableness, courts have also 
considered the following factors, among others: 
(i) Whether the regulation was a substantially contemporaneous 
interpretation of the statute; 
(ii) The length of time the regulation has been in effect; 
(iii) The reliance placed on the regulation; 
(iv) The consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation of the 
regulation; and 
(v) The degree of scrutiny that Congress has devoted to the 
regulation in subsequent reenactments of the statute.
34
 
Note, however, that in preparing a regulation, Treasury often 
chooses among several alternatives to apply the Code.  In testing the 
validity of the regulation, a court must decide whether Treasury’s 
choice is reasonable, not whether it made the best possible choice.35 
2. A review of the relevant cases 
Courts have struggled to devise a talisman describing when a 
consolidated return regulation is reasonable (i.e., sufficiently 
consistent with the Code).  In testing the validity of regulations, they 
have said that: 
The consolidated return regulations cannot “deny . . . . deductions 
from income [that] have the effect of increasing taxable income.”36 
                                                          
 33. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, 440 U.S. at 477 (concluding that a valid 
interpretive regulation must “harmonize[] with the plain language of the statute, its 
origin, and its purpose”); Walton v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 589, 597-98 (2000) (applying 
the same standard to interpretive regulations); Cent. Pa. Savings Assoc., 104 T.C. at 
390 (applying the same standard).  In essence, then, I suggest that the standard of 
review primarily involves an examination of the language and purposes of the 
relevant Code provisions; see also Carboloy Co. v. Comm’r, 18 T.C. 1028, 1031 (1952) 
(stating that Treasury must exercise its regulatory power for consolidated return 
regulations to achieve the overriding purpose of the applicable Code provisions 
while eliminating distortions of income). 
 34. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, 440 U.S. at 477 (describing these considerations 
as part of the Court’s consideration of an interpretive regulation).  Although 
National Muffler considered interpretive regulations, those factors should also aid a 
court in considering the validity of legislative regulations. 
 35. See Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382, 389 (1998) (stating that “the 
task that confronts us is to decide, not whether the Treasury Regulation represents 
the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents a reasonable one”); 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (stating that a court must consider whether the 
administrator’s view that [a regulation] is appropriate in the [relevant context] is a 
reasonable one”); Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, 440 U.S. at 489 (noting that the choice 
among reasonable interpretations is for the Treasury, not the courts); Am. Standard, 
Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 261 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (noting that in promulgating 
regulations, Treasury may choose among reasonable methods). 
 36. Gen. Mach. Corp. v. Comm’r, 33 B.T.A. 1215, 1219 (1936).  See Comm’r v. 
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Although consolidated groups must consent to the regulations, 




The regulations should “conform the applicable income tax law of 
the Code to the special myriad problems resulting from the filing 
of consolidated income tax returns.”
39
 
Although these verbal formulae capture facets of valid consolidated 
return regulations, they do not precisely describe how a court should 
test a regulation’s validity.  Stripped of their context, they wither to 
slogans or mantras, incomplete at best, generally ineffectual, and 
often misleading.40 
                                                          
Gen. Mach. Corp., 95 F.2d 759, 761 (6th Cir. 1938) (stating that the regulations 
cannot “amend the [Code] or to require surrender of any part of the statutory 
privilege as a condition to the grant of permission to file a consolidated return”); 
Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc. v. Comm’r, 32 T.C. 1222, 1242 (1959) (stating that the 
consolidated return regulations cannot “impose a tax on income that would not 
otherwise be taxed”); see also Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 261 (citing to and quoting the 
language noted above from Weidenhoff); Kanawha Gas & Util. Co. v. Comm’r, 214 
F.2d 685, 691 n.7 (5th Cir. 1954) (noting that a regulation cannot invalidate a basic 
concept of tax law). 
Correspondingly, the consolidated return regulations should not exempt income 
or permit deductions that would decrease taxable income.  For obvious reasons, 
groups have not litigated cases where the regulations decrease taxable income. 
 37. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 790, 802 (1975).  See S. Slater & Sons, 
Inc. v. White, 119 F.2d 839, 845 (1st Cir. 1941) (noting that the regulation at issue 
“will sometimes work to the advantage of taxpayers and sometimes to their 
disadvantage”); see also Covil Insulation Co. v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 364, 375 (1975) 
(stating that “[t]he burden of the excess loss account provisions [under the 
consolidated return regulations] must be accepted with the benefit of unlimited 
access to the subsidiary’s losses.”). 
 38. Gen. Mach. Corp., 33 B.T.A. at 1219. 
 39. Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 261; First Chi. Corp. v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 421, 440 
(1991) (citing to American Standard and quoting the same language); cf. Regal, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 53 T.C. 261, 267 (1969), aff’d per curiam, 435 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(noting that Congress gave Treasury discretion to deal with unforeseen problems). 
 40. For example, Treasury could justify any regulatory approach by saying that a 
consolidated group must take the “bitter with the sweet.”  Although the phrase 
accurately reflects that a consolidated group may pay more or less tax than a similar 
affiliated, non-consolidated group, it fails to describe how a consolidated group 
should be treated in a particular case or why it should be treated that way. 
Further, although it may be true that a consolidated return regulation cannot 
“impose a tax on income that would not otherwise be taxed” or “deny deductions 
from income that have the effect of increasing taxable income,” these related 
formulae each presume a comparative model.  Typically, however, a court is 
searching for a reasonable model (i.e., a single-entity, separate-corporation, or hybrid 
model) when it tests the validity of a consolidated return regulation.  Because these 
formulae require one model as the standard for comparison, their use essentially 
assumes the conclusion. 
A court may also need a comparative model to test whether a regulation is 
“inconsistent with the Code” or whether it “conforms” the Code to the “special 
myriad problems resulting from the filing of consolidated income tax returns.”  If 
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Weak formulae notwithstanding, courts rarely invalidate 
consolidated return regulations, recognizing that Treasury needs 
significant flexibility to respond to the unique issues raised by 
consolidated returns.41  The courts generally rely on Treasury to 
describe “the nuts and bolts of computing income of consolidated 
corporations.”42  Further, they look with favor on longstanding 
interpretations43 but accept that Treasury must sometimes alter its 
approach in light of its experience.44  Finally, they acknowledge that 
the regulations must be of general application and that even a valid 
regulation may produce inequitable outcomes in some cases.45 
An examination of the few pre-Rite Aid cases that invalidate 
consolidated return regulations reveals that those regulations have 
the following flaws: they were not tax neutral and Treasury provided 
no justification for the regulations.  The discussion reviews these and 
                                                          
the court does, these formulae suffer from the same flaw noted in the previous 
paragraph.  In any event, neither formula helps answer when a regulation is 
inconsistent with the Code or otherwise unreasonable, likely the critical question. 
 41. See S. REP. NO. 70-760, at 15 (1928) (in the legislative history to the original 
grant of regulatory authority for the consolidated return regulations, providing in 
part that Congress “believe[d] it to be impracticable to attempt by legislation to 
prescribe the various detailed and complicated rules necessary to meet the many 
differing and complicated situations,” and therefore, authorized the consolidated 
return regulations); see also Regal, 53 T.C. at 267 (noting that Congress gave Treasury 
the authority to deal with unforeseen problems in the consolidated return 
regulations). 
 42. Wolter Constr. Co. v. Comm’r, 634 F.2d 1029, 1037 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 43. For example, one case involved a regulation that required a consolidated 
group to continue to file a consolidated return unless certain conditions were met.  
See Regal, 53 T.C. 261.  The court concluded that the continued-filing requirement 
was a valid exercise of regulatory authority, in large part because it had been a 
requirement almost since consolidated returns were first authorized.  Id. at 264-66, 
269; see also Salem Packing Co. v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 131, 141 (1971) (finding valid a 
consolidated return regulation that required group members to adopt the same 
accounting method “[f]or much the same reasons stated in Regal, Inc.”). 
 44. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 485 
(1979).  Of course, Treasury would also have to change the regulations to respond to 
legislative change. 
 45. See Nichols v. United States, 260 F.3d 637, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that “equity and policy arguments are insufficient to invalidate a regulation that 
[was] otherwise property enacted”); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 
136, 149 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the regulation was “not so unreasonable to be 
invalidated by the court on policy grounds”); Garvey v. United States, 726 F.2d 1569, 
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (concluding that a regulation was valid, but noting the 
“incongruity in [its] across-the-board application”); Carboloy Co. v. Comm’r, 18 T.C. 
1028, 1031 (1952) (in concluding that a consolidated return regulation concerning 
inventory was valid, the court stated that the consolidated return regulations “are 
designed to be of general applicability”); Wolter Constr., 634 F.2d at 1039 (refusing to 
overrule a regulation “based only on a generalized policy distilled from the 
regulations and symbiotic Code provisions”); see also First Chi. Corp. v. Comm’r, 96 
T.C. 421 (1991) (concluding that without regulatory authority, a consolidated group 
could not aggregate its stock ownership of a foreign corporation to apply the ten 
percent requirement of I.R.C. § 902, even though that aggregation would better 
achieve a single-entity effect). 
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other significant cases that considered the validity of consolidated 
return regulations.46 
a. Unfettered discretion—Weidenhoff 
In Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc., a 1959 case, the Tax Court overturned a 
regulation that appeared to give Treasury absolute discretion to 
compute an aspect of a consolidated group’s excess profits tax.47  The 
regulation limited the excess profits tax credit for a consolidated 
group formed after March 14, 1941, unless the Commissioner 
concluded that removing the limitation would: 
(i) “better serve” the “general purpose” of the regulation,
48
 or 
(ii) “not serve to distort the excess profits tax liability of the group 
or any of its members.”
49
 
The Weidenhoff consolidated group, formed after March 14, 1941, 
computed its excess profits tax credit assuming that the regulatory 
limitation did not apply.  However, the Commissioner applied the 
limitation, but he explained neither its purpose nor why it should be 
applied to the Weidenhoff group.50 
Not surprisingly, the court invalidated the limitation, since 
apparently at his whim, the Commissioner could increase or decrease 
the excess profits tax of a consolidated group like the Weidenhoff 
group.51  That discretion dampened the incentive for a group to 
acquire new members, hampering tax neutrality, and the court 
cautioned that: 
Congress did not intend that the Commissioner could arbitrarily 
interpret or apply his regulations contrary to the provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code.  This is particularly true in a case like the 
                                                          
 46. In two cases not discussed in the text, courts have invalidated a consolidated 
return regulation, but neither case appears relevant in analyzing Rite Aid.  See Colson 
Co. v. Comm’r, 37 B.T.A. 1031 (1938) (invalidating a regulation that required a 
group filing a consolidated income tax return to also file a consolidated excess 
profits tax return, because no statute expressly authorized the filing of a consolidated 
excess profits tax return); Cmty. Water Serv. Co. v. Comm’r, 32 B.T.A. 164 (1935) 
(invalidating a portion of Art. 16(b) of Reg. 75, which provided that the common 
parent was the sole agent for a consolidated group in litigation before the Board of 
Tax Appeals, because it conflicted with the Board’s rules of practice and procedure). 
 47. Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc. v. Comm’r, 32 T.C. 1222 (1959).  See generally 
§ 24.31(b)(24) of Reg. 29, 26 Fed. Reg. 6301-02 (1951). 
 48. See id. at 24.31(b)(24)(ii)(e) (effectively allowing the limitation to be lifted to 
serve the “general purpose” of the regulation; the limitation was lifted by postponing 
the effective date of the provision). 
 49. See id. at 24.31(b)(24)(ii)(d) (allowing the limitation to be lifted if the 
Commissioner found no distortion). 
 50. Joseph Weidenhoff, 32 T.C. at 1240. 
 51. Thus, similarly situated groups could be treated differently, raising significant 
issues of horizontal equity. 
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present one where the regulations would permit the Commissioner 
to determine in his own discretion what may or may not serve to 
distort the excess profits tax liability . . . .52 
Although the court also noted that the consolidated return 
regulations could not impose a tax on income not otherwise subject 
to tax,53 Weidenhoff’s hallmark is the following principle: the 
consolidated return regulations cannot give the Commissioner 
complete discretion to increase a group’s tax.  Because few 
regulations offer the Commissioner similar discretion, the Weidenhoff 
principle is rarely implicated. 
b. Carryforward of losses 
Of broader application are General Machinery54 and S. Slater & 
Sons.55  Each case involved a regulation limiting the loss that could be 
carried forward to a group’s consolidated return year.  One 
regulation defined what constituted a taxable year to which a loss was 
carried, and it was invalidated; the second measured the extent to 
which a loss carryover was absorbed in a taxable year, and it was 
approved. 
In General Machinery, the Board of Tax Appeals and Sixth Circuit 
each invalidated a consolidated return regulation that limited the 
carryover period of a pre-affiliation loss when a subsidiary joined a 
consolidated group.  The subsidiary, a calendar-year taxpayer, was 
acquired by a calendar-year consolidated group on March 27, 1929.56  
Although the subsidiary could carry its pre-affiliation, 1927 loss 
                                                          
 52. Id. at 1241; see also Covil Insulation Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 364, 376 
(1975) (noting that a regulation does not give the Commissioner too much 
discretion merely because it requires him or her to make a factual finding about 
worthlessness, noting that findings of that sort are required by many Code 
provisions).  The Commissioner’s discretion also made the regulation’s application 
highly uncertain, a quality fundamentally inconsistent with the grant of authority 
under which the regulation was issued.  S. REP. NO. 70-760, at 15 (1928) (stating that 
“[i]t is obviously of utmost importance that . . . questions be answered with certainty 
and a definite rule be prescribed [in the regulations]”). 
 53. Joseph Weidenhoff, 32 T.C. at 1242 (providing that a consolidated return 
regulation cannot “impose a tax on income that would not otherwise be taxed . . . 
simply because the taxpayers exercise the privilege of filing consolidated returns, 
unless it is to prevent tax avoidance”) (emphasis added); cf. Garvey v. United States, 1 Cl. 
Ct. 108, 116 (1983) (stating that in making this statement Weidenhoff was merely 
expressing its “frustration over its inability to understand the purpose of a 
regulation . . . and the failure of both the regulations and Commissioner to explain 
such purpose”). 
 54. See Comm’r v. Gen. Mach. Corp., 95 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1938); Gen. Mach. 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 33 B.T.A. 1215 (1936). 
 55. S. Slater & Sons, Inc. v. White, 119 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1941). 
 56. Gen. Mach. Corp., 95 F.2d at 760. 
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forward two taxable years,57 the Commissioner asserted that the 
carryforward period for the loss expired on March 26, 1929.58  He 
relied on a consolidated return regulation that for this purpose 
treated the subsidiary as having two taxable years during the 1929 
calendar year, one for its pre-affiliation period and one for its post-
affiliation period.59  If the regulation was valid, the Commissioner was 
correct because the subsidiary’s second taxable year after 1927 would 
end on March 26, 1929. 
In invalidating the regulation, both courts relied on a rationale 
enunciated in Morgan’s Inc., a 1934 Supreme Court case.60  
Considering a similar issue under pre-1928 law, the Court concluded 
that when Congress provided that a net operating loss is carried 
forward two taxable years, it intended that the loss be carried forward 
two full twelve-month periods.61  Although Morgan’s Inc. considered 
earlier law, Congress had not thereafter changed the loss carryover 
rule or the Code’s definition of “taxable year.”  Thus, the Board of 
Tax Appeals and Sixth Circuit in General Machinery each concluded 
that the consolidated return regulation generally was invalid when it 
limited the loss carryover to less than two twelve-month periods, 
because it violated Congressional intent.62 
                                                          
 57. See Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 206(b), 44 Stat. 17. 
 58. Gen. Mach. Corp., 95 F.2d at 760. 
 59. Art. 41(d) of Reg. 75, reprinted in 138 Internal Revenue Acts of the United 
States 1909-1950 Legislative Histories, Laws, and Administrative Documents (Bernard 
D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979) [hereinafter Reg. 75]. 
 60. Helvering v. Morgan’s Inc., 293 U.S. 121 (1934). 
 61. Id. at 126-27. 
 62. Gen. Mach. Corp., 95 F.2d at 761 (concluding that the purpose of the loss 
carryover provision was to “stabilize income over three year periods”); Gen. Mach. 
Corp., 33 B.T.A. at 1219-21; cf. Valley Paperback Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1359 (1975) (concluding that when a consolidated group acquired a 
subsidiary during the middle of a year, the subsidiary’s pre- and post-acquisition 
periods during the year were separate taxable years for purposes of the relevant loss-
carryover provision; the Tax Court noted a 1942 Code change that defined a taxable 
year to mean a period of less than twelve months if a tax return was required for that 
period); Palomas Land & Cattle Co. v. Comm’r, 91 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1937) 
(concluding that when the common parent of a consolidated group sold its only 
subsidiary in the middle of a year, the parent’s post-acquisition net loss for the year 
could offset the group’s pre-acquisition net income, because the assessment of tax 
was based on an annual twelve-month period); Comm’r v. Hughes Tool Co., 118 F.2d 
474 (5th Cir. 1941) (following Palomas); Corner Broadway-Maiden Lane, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 76 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1935) (invalidating a regulation that defined affiliation 
inconsistent with the Code’s definition of affiliation). 
Despite Morgan’s Inc. and contrary to General Machinery, the D.C. Circuit concluded 
that a period of less than twelve months could be a taxable year for purposes of the 
loss carryover provision.  See Wishnick-Tumpeer, Inc. v. Helvering, 77 F.2d 774 (D.C. 
Cir. 1935).  In Wishnick-Tumpeer, an affiliated group began filing consolidated returns 
on January 1, 1929 and each group member also changed its accounting period to a 
June 30 fiscal year, including a subsidiary that had previously used an October 31 
fiscal year.  The subsidiary, which had a loss carryover from its 1927 year, filed a 
FINALLEATHERMAN.DOC 8/15/2003  1:38 PM 
826 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:811 
The regulation in General Machinery suffers from the two flaws of 
invalid consolidated return regulations noted above.  It was not tax 
neutral, because it made it likely that a consolidated group’s midyear 
purchase of a loss subsidiary would limit the period over which the 
subsidiary’s loss carryforward could be used, thereby curbing those 
purchases.  Further, Treasury never appeared to explain the purpose 
of the regulation.63 
General Machinery plays as an uncertain counterpoint to S. Slater & 
Sons.64  In the latter case, the First Circuit considered how a group 
should carry forward and absorb its pre-1929 losses.  The court 
endorsed the relevant provision in Reg. 75, even though the 
provision changed the law and, in effect, retroactively reduced a loss 
carryforward.65 
Under Art. 41 of Reg. 75, a consolidated group’s net loss was 
carried forward and absorbed as if the group were a single taxpayer.  
For any consolidated return year, a group offset its members’ income 
and expense items for the year before using any available loss 
carryforward.66  If, overall, the group had positive taxable income for 
                                                          
separate tax return for the period between November 1 and December 31, 1928 and 
joined in the group’s consolidated return for the period from January 1 through 
June 30, 1929.  Id.  The Fifth Circuit concluded that the subsidiary could carry its 
1927 loss to its 1928 fiscal-year return and its 1928 short-period return, but not to the 
group’s 1929 short-period return, even though the latter two returns covered a total 
of only eight months.  To reach that ultimate conclusion, the court concluded that 
the short 1928 period was a “taxable year,” relying on Art. 41(d) of Reg. 75, the 
provision invalidated by General Machinery.  Id. at 775-77 (also concluding that Art. 
41(d) did not violate congressional intent). 
Both General Machinery courts distinguished Wishnick-Tumpeer, because group 
members in Wishnick-Tumpeer changed their accounting periods.  Gen. Mach. Corp., 95 
F.2d at 761; Gen. Mach. Corp., 33 B.T.A. at 1220.  Their distinction seems flawed 
because the subsidiary’s short-period separate return and the group’s immediately 
succeeding consolidated return covered, in the aggregate, less than twelve months.  
If Wishnick-Tumpeer were consistent with General Machinery, it should have permitted 
the loss carryover to the short-period consolidated return, to more closely achieve 
the congressional intent, articulated in Morgan’s Inc., of permitting loss carryovers to 
two full twelve-month periods. 
 63. Treasury apparently asserted that the regulation was intended to prevent tax 
avoidance, but the court rejected that assertion (at least if no member changed its 
accounting period).  See Gen. Mach. Corp., 95 F.2d at 761 (stating that “it is difficult to 
see” how the regulation aids that purpose, adding that “[t]he stabilizing of corporate 
income over a three year period is not served by stabilizing income over a shorter 
[period] for if such is the purpose of the affiliation[,] the corporations need only to 
affiliate at the beginning of the calendar or fiscal year”); see also Wolter Constr. Co. v. 
Comm’r, 634 F.2d 1029, 1036 (6th Cir. 1980) (stating that the General Machinery 
court “found the Commissioner’s proffered explanation illusory”). 
 64. Both cases involved the same two-year loss carryforward provision.  See 
Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 206(b), 44 Stat. 17. 
 65. See generally S. Slater & Sons, Inc. v. White, 119 F.2d 839, 843-45 (1st Cir. 
1941). 
 66. See Reg. 75, supra note 59. 
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the year, the loss carryforward could offset that income, even if the 
income and loss were attributable to different members.67 
Although Art. 41 changed the law, the fact of the change was not 
established until after the regulation was issued.68  The prior law, as 
fully developed, used the following two-step approach to carry 
forward a consolidated group’s loss: 
(i)  A member’s net loss for a consolidated return year offset the 
net income of other members for the year.  For this purpose, a 
member’s net income for the year was computed by first taking loss 
carryforwards to the year into account. 
(ii)  If a member had a net loss remaining after the first step, the 
group could carry that remaining loss forward, but the loss could 
offset only the member’s separate income in future years.
69
 
EXAMPLE 1—COMPARING ART. 41 AND PRIOR LAW 
P and its subsidiary S filed consolidated returns for 1926 through 
1929.  During those years, they had the following separate income 
and losses:70 
Corporation 1926  1927   1928 1929 
       P                 ($600,000)   $400,000     $200,000         $0 
       S                        $0         ($400,000) ($200,000)  $600,00071 
Under pre-Reg. 75 law, the P group would not pay federal income 
tax or have net positive taxable income for any year between 1926 
and 1929.  Its $600,000 net loss from 1926, attributable to P, would 
fully offset P’s income in 1927 and 1928.72  As a consequence, the P 
group would have a $400,000 net loss in 1927 and a $200,000 net loss 
in 1928.  These net losses, attributable to S, would be carried forward 
to 1929, fully offsetting S’s $600,000 income in that year.73 
                                                          
 67. Id. 
 68. See S. Slater & Sons, 119 F.2d at 841 (citing to a series of post-1929 cases 
concluding that a group carried over and absorbed its loss carryover using a separate-
corporation approach); Gen. Couns. Mem. 15,595, XIV-2 C.B. 237, 238 (1935) 
(stating the conclusion of those post-1929 courts was contrary to the “well-established 
practice” of the IRS, in effect when the regulation was issued, to treat the group as a 
single entity for this purpose); cf. L.O. 1113, III-2 C.B. 36, 39-40 (1924) (concluding 
that a consolidated group applied the single-entity approach described in the 
preceding paragraph to carry over and absorb a consolidated net operating loss). 
 69. S. Slater & Sons, 119 F.2d at 841 (describing this approach). 
 70. Those amounts are determined before taking any carryforwards into account.  
Losses are in parentheses. 
 71. In S. Slater & Sons, Inc., the common parent was a stand-alone corporation in 
1926 but filed consolidated returns with two subsidiaries in 1927 through 1929.  
Although the common parent was not a member of a consolidated group in 1926, 
the results described in the example are consistent with the case.  See id. at 841. 
 72. A 1926 net loss could be carried forward only two years.  See supra note 57 
(citing to the relevant provision). 
 73. See  Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 117(b), 45 Stat. (pt. 1) 791, 
825 (providing for a two-year loss carryforward for 1928 losses). 
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Under Art. 41 of Reg. 75, however, the P group had net income 
and incurred federal income tax in 1929.  In 1927 and 1928, S’s loss 
offset P’s income before the group could use its 1926 loss carryover, 
so the loss carryover expired unused.  Because the group did not 
generate a net loss in 1927 or 1928, it had $600,000 of net income in 
1929.  Thus, Art. 41 of Reg. 75 retroactively eliminated the benefit of 
a $600,000 loss carryforward.74 
S. Slater & Sons concluded that Art. 41 of Reg. 75 “constitute[d] a 
proper exercise of the Commissioner’s delegated power,”75 but the 
court’s conclusion should not be read as carte blanche for Treasury to 
eliminate an otherwise available loss through the consolidated return 
regulations.  Although Art. 41 could retroactively eliminate the 
benefit of a loss carryforward, it followed the apparent state of the law 
when the regulation was issued, a fact that probably influenced the 
court and may distinguish S. Slater & Sons from, for example, Rite 
Aid.76 
Still, S. Slater & Sons is not irrelevant to a Rite Aid analysis, since the 
First Circuit’s conclusion did not rest on the apparent state of the law 
when Art. 41 was issued.  Instead, the court labeled Art. 41 as a 
“marked departure” from prior law and concluded that the 
regulation was valid because a consolidated group “cannot in logic 
object to a result which follows from a consistent application of the 
                                                          
 74. Art. 41 of Reg. 75 could also retroactively reduce income subject to tax.  
Consider the following income and loss profile for P and S: 
  Corporation       1926          1927          1928          1929 
  P                   ($600,000)       $0              $0         $600,000 
  S                          $0         $600,000  ($600,000)      $0 
Under the single-entity approach of Reg. 75, the P group’s $600,000 net losses in 
1926 and 1928 would offset its $600,000 net income in the succeeding years.  
Consequently, the P group would not pay federal income tax or have net income for 
any year between 1926 and 1929. 
Under pre-Reg. 75 law, however, the group would have $600,000 of net income in 
each of 1927 and 1929.  Its $600,000 1926 net loss, attributable to P, would expire 
unused, because P has no net income in 1927 or 1928.  Further, its 1928 loss, 
attributable to S, could not be used in 1929, because S has no net income in that 
year. 
 75. See S. Slater & Sons, 119 F.2d at 845 (stating that Reg. 75 did not involve a 
retroactive redetermination of loss “in any invidious sense” and that the 
redetermination was “a matter of extreme simplicity, involving merely a reshuffling 
of figures”); see also id. at 843 (stating that “[t]he single-taxpayer theory has the merit 
of simplicity, and it also conforms to business reality”).  Note that prospectively, Art. 
41 promoted tax neutrality, because its single-entity approach made it more likely 
that a group’s use of its loss carryovers would be unaffected by the formation or 
liquidation of a member. 
 76. See supra note 68 (describing the state of the law at that time).  The court 
could readily determine that Congress authorized Treasury to prescribe Art. 41, 
because that article continued what appeared to be applicable law. 
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single-entity theory.”77  By allowing Treasury to depart from prior law, 
the Fifth Circuit revealed the broad discretion Treasury may have to 
craft the consolidated return regulations, discretion that may permit 
the elimination of loss in an appropriate case. 
Of course, the question is when a loss may appropriately be 
eliminated, and Wolter Construction provides more hints,78 amplifying 
S. Slater & Sons and distinguishing General Machinery.  In Wolter 
Construction, the Sixth Circuit considered the validity of the “SRLY” 
rule,79 which applied when a subsidiary of a consolidated group had a 
loss carryforward from a pre-affiliation year.80  The rule limited the 
portion of the loss carryforward that the group could absorb in the 
carryforward year to the subsidiary’s separate income for that year.81  
Because it made it less likely that the group’s acquisition of a loss 
corporation could increase the pace at which the corporation’s losses 
were used, the SRLY rule promoted tax neutrality.82 
Despite that sound purpose, the Wolter group argued that the 
SRLY rule was invalid as it applied to the group, because the common 
parent and loss subsidiary were commonly controlled (though not 
affiliated) in the loss year.83  Because of that common control, the 
group asserted, its acquisition of the loss subsidiary did not raise a 
loss trafficking concern.84 
By its terms, however, the SRLY rule applied to corporations that 
were commonly controlled but not affiliated during the loss year.85  
Calling the distinction between affiliation and common control 
“formalistic,” the group urged that, under General Machinery, the 
SRLY rule was invalid.86  The Sixth Circuit disagreed, stating that: 
Conspicuously absent in the consolidated return area is some 
guidance from Congress as to the nuts and bolts for computing the 
                                                          
 77. S. Slater & Sons, 119 F.2d at 845. 
 78. Wolter Constr. Co. v. Comm’r,  634 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 79. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(c)(1) (containing the current version of that rule, 
and in relevant part, it is the same as the version considered in Wolter Construction). 
 80. More precisely, the rule limited the subsidiary’s loss carryforward from a 
separate return limitation year or “SRLY.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(c)(1).  A SRLY 
includes a taxable year of the subsidiary for which it filed a separate return, unless it 
was a group member (i.e., affiliated with the group) on every day of that year.  Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1502-1(e) (defining separate return year) and (f)(1) and (2)(ii) (defining 
SRLY). 
 81. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(c)(1) (as amended in 1999). 
 82. See Wolter Constr. Co., 634 F.2d at 1034 (acknowledging this point by stating 
that the SRLY rule “prevents the affiliated group from obtaining any advantage from 
the carryover losses”); see also id. at 1037 (also noting that the regulations are 
“designed to prevent ‘trafficking’ in loss corporations”). 
 83. Id. at 1034. 
 84. Id. at 1034-36. 
 85. See id. at 1036 (describing the application of the SRLY rule). 
 86. Id. 
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income of consolidated corporations.  Unlike [the relevant Code 
provision]87 which the General Machinery court used as a measuring 
rod, Wolter cites no consolidated return Code provision with which 
the instant regulations conflict.88 
Without an expressly conflicting Code provision, the court refused 
to overturn the SRLY rule based on general equitable considerations 
or a possibly inconsistent policy gleaned from the Code and 
consolidated return regulations.89  It also gave Treasury latitude to 
attack loss trafficking without being confined by the Code’s loss 
trafficking rules.90  Because the SRLY rule reasonably attacked loss 
trafficking, the court concluded that it was a valid rule, even though it 
may not have been the best one.91 
Thus, the Sixth Circuit in Wolter Construction gave Treasury broad 
discretion to craft consolidated return regulations to compute a 
group’s income.  It let Treasury choose among reasonable 
alternatives, affirming that a choice may be reasonable (and 
therefore valid) even if it may not reach equitable results in a 
particular case. 
c. Investment adjustments and ELAs 
The same themes also resonated in cases that considered the 
validity of the “investment adjustment” and “excess loss account” 
rules under the consolidated return regulations.  Those cases share 
                                                          
 87. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (for a description of that Code 
provision). 
 88. Wolter Constr. Co., 634 F.2d at 1037; see also id. at 1038 (in which the court 
cautioned that “consolidated return computations are not, however, based on a 
consolidated accounting” of the group’s tax items and that “the filing of a 
consolidated return is not the functional equivalent of a merger” of all members into 
a single corporation). 
 89. See id. at 1037, 1039-40 (noting, among other things, that a deduction does 
not depend on equitable considerations but is a matter of “legislative grace”); see also 
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 1999) (refusing to follow 
an implication that when a regulation reserved a section for rules specifically relating 
to acquired groups, the regulation’s general provisions did not apply to acquired 
groups). 
 90. Wolter Constr. Co., 634 F.2d at 1041 (stating that “the consolidated return 
regulations may be applied to disallow a deduction even though that deduction is 
not disallowed under Section 269”); see also Regal, Inc. v. Comm’r, 53 T.C. 261, 267 
(1969) (stating that “we think it hardly likely that Congress, in its concern about 
avoidance and the clear reflection of income, intended to limit the Commissioner in 
his choice of remedies merely because there might be a possible overlap”), aff’d per 
curiam, 435 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 91. See Wolter Constr. Co., 634 F.2d at 1044 (in which the court concluded that the 
SRLY rule was reasonable, even though it acknowledged that applying the rule to 
commonly controlled corporations was “somewhat incongruous when compared with 
related Code provisions”). 
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an affinity with Rite Aid, because they contemplated how a 
consolidated group treats its disposition of subsidiary stock. 
Excess loss accounts are a byproduct of the investment adjustment 
rules.  Under those rules, a consolidated group increases or decreases 
its basis in subsidiary stock to account for the subsidiary’s profits, 
losses, and distributions.92  Investment adjustments are intended to 
prevent the group from taking the subsidiary’s profits or losses into 
account a second time when it disposes of its subsidiary stock.93 
When a subsidiary’s losses and distributions exceed the group’s 
basis in subsidiary stock, the consolidated return regulations may 
require the group to reduce the basis in its subsidiary stock below 
zero, and the regulations call that negative basis amount an “excess 
loss account.”94  A group treats an excess loss account (or “ELA”) on 
subsidiary stock as income when the group disposes of its subsidiary 
stock.95 
The investment adjustment and ELA rules arguably violate the 
basic tax precept that an asset may not have a negative basis, and that 
issue was aired in Covil Insulation.96  The Tax Court dismissed the 
argument with dispatch, noting that the rules prevented a group’s tax 
loss from exceeding its economic loss.97  The dynamic making the 
ELA rule necessary was the keynote of tax consolidation—that one 
member’s loss may offset another member’s income.98  Because of 
loss sharing, a subsidiary could generate a net tax loss for the group 
                                                          
 92. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b) (as amended in 2002). 
 93. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(a)(1) (describing the purpose of the investment 
adjustment rules); see also Garvey v. United States, 726 F.2d 1569, 1570 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (stating that the purpose of the investment adjustments is to prevent tax 
avoidance); Covil Insulation Co. v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 364, 370 (1975) (noting that 
there may otherwise be a distortion if the group’s tax losses exceed its economic 
losses).  By preventing duplicate gain or loss, these rules promote tax neutrality, 
making it less likely that a group will form or acquire a member for tax reasons. 
 94. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2002).  The consolidated 
return regulations first provided for this negative basis amount in 1966.  See 31 Fed. 
Reg. 16694, 16694, 16699 (Dec. 30, 1966) (introducing this negative-basis concept in 
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-14(a)(2) and 1.1502-32(e)(1) (in force as of Dec. 15, 1967). 
 95. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-19 (as amended in 1997). 
 96. Covil Insulation Co., 65 T.C. at 375 (noting that the taxpayer argued that the 
ELA provision was “inconsistent with other Code provisions and the ‘common law’ of 
taxation which denies that property can have a negative basis”).  Note that between 
1986 and 1995, I.R.C. § 1059 provided, in effect, for a negative-basis result.  See Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 614(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2252 (providing 
that result by using a suspended-gain account). 
 97. See Covil Insulation Co., 65 T.C. at 370 (calling the circumstance where a 
group’s tax losses exceeded its economic losses a “distortion”).  The Tax Court 
measured those economic losses with reference to the group’s investment in its 
subsidiary stock, a measurement of at least some relevance in any Rite Aid analysis. 
 98. Id.; see also id. at 374 (stating that “[t]he burden of the excess loss account 
provisions must be accepted with the benefit of unlimited access to the subsidiary’s 
losses”). 
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exceeding the group’s investment in the subsidiary.99  That fact 
distinguished a consolidated group from other taxpayers and justified 
the investment adjustment and ELA rules to resolve “a problem 
created by the filing of consolidated returns.”100  Thus, the Tax Court 
endorsed the single-entity approach of the investment adjustment 
and ELA rules, inextricably tying a group’s basis in subsidiary stock to 
the subsidiary’s profits and losses.101 
Those rules were also challenged in Garvey, where a subsidiary 
member distributed pre-affiliation profits to another member.102  The 
Garvey group argued that the investment adjustment rules were 
inconsistent with I.R.C. § 243 (which authorized a dividends received 
deduction), impermissibly increasing the group’s tax contrary to 
Weidenhoff.103  The Garvey court distinguished Weidenhoff, finding that 
the investment adjustment and ELA rules had the “obvious purpose” 
to prevent tax avoidance.104  It also noted how difficult it may be to 
                                                          
 99. That excess loss may be borne, for example, by the subsidiary’s creditors.  Id. 
at 376. 
 100. Id. at 373, 375-76 (distinguishing consolidated groups from partners and 
shareholders in S corporations, because the passthrough of a partnership’s or S 
corporation’s losses to an owner was limited to the owner’s adjusted basis in the 
entity). 
 101. Limiting a group’s tax loss to its economic loss also promoted tax neutrality, 
because it make it less likely that a group would form or acquire a subsidiary for tax 
reasons. 
 102. See Garvey v. United States, 726 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Garvey v. United 
States, 1 Cl. Ct. 108 (1983). 
 103. The argument presumed that the group would sell the distributing member’s 
stock.  If it did, the consolidated return regulations would increase the group’s 
overall income by eighty-five percent of the distribution, an increase that could be 
indirectly tied to the regulations’ not applying the eighty-five percent dividends-
received deduction then permitted under I.R.C. § 243.  Thus, on an overall basis, the 
group’s tax could increase because it filed consolidated returns; see Garvey, 726 F.2d 
at 1572 n.12 (concluding that it could consider this argument as it applied to the 
particular facts of the case, but not as a general attack on the validity of the 
investment adjustment rules); Garvey, 1 Cl. Ct. at 116-18; supra notes 47-53 and 
accompanying text (for a discussion of Weidenhoff).  Note, however, that on a present-
value basis, a consolidated group’s tax could be lower or higher, because the 
consolidated return regulations would also defer income and tax. 
The Garvey group made two other arguments.  First, it attacked the rules as they 
applied to subsidiary stock acquired in a carryover-basis transaction.  The group 
complained that it should not reduce its basis in such subsidiary stock by the full 
amount of a distribution out of pre-affiliation profits, as the regulations required, 
because its stock basis did not fully reflect those profits.  Both courts dismissed the 
argument, principally because any “phantom gain” the group recognized resulted 
from the carryover-basis rule, not the consolidated return regulations. Garvey, 726 
F.2d at 1571; Garvey, 1 Cl. Ct. at 113-15. 
Second, the group suggested that it should be entitled to rely on a proposed 
regulation that would have accounted for the “phantom gain” noted above but that 
was contrary to the existing regulation and never adopted.  Each court readily 
rejected that suggestion. Garvey, 726 F.2d at 1571-72; Garvey, 1 Cl. Ct. at 118-19. 
 104. Garvey, 1 Cl. Ct. at 116; Garvey, 726 F.2d at 1572 n.12 (endorsing the lower 
court’s analysis). 
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harmonize I.R.C. § 243 with the consolidated return rules, 
applauding the “wisdom of allowing such an issue to be addressed 
first by [Treasury] rather than the court.”105 
Like Wolter Construction, the investment adjustment and ELA cases 
show the great deference courts traditionally give to the consolidated 
return regulations.  They also show how reluctant courts have been to 
invalidate a consolidated return regulation because it strays from a 
Code rule or general tax principle.106 
d. Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations 
In one set of pre-Rite Aid cases, which involved Western 
Hemisphere Trade Corporations (“WHTCs”), courts invalidated a 
consolidated return regulation because it directly conflicted with the 
Code and Congressional intent.107  The regulation suffered the twin 
vices of the other invalid consolidated return regulations: it was not 
tax neutral and Treasury did not explain its purpose. 
In the years at issue, the Code offered a WHTC a special deduction 
equal to a fraction of its taxable income (computed without regard to 
the deduction).108 The deduction was intended to alleviate the 
“competitive disadvantage” that Congress believed U.S. corporations 
faced trading in foreign countries within the Western Hemisphere.109  
                                                          
 105. Garvey, 1 Cl. Ct. at 117-18; Garvey, 726 F.2d at 1572 n. 12 (endorsing the lower 
court’s analysis); see also Axelrod, supra note 4, at 811 (supporting the conclusion in 
Garvey). 
 106. See also Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 790, 803 (1975) (considering 
the investment adjustment rule and concluding that Treasury has discretion to 
choose among reasonable alternatives). 
 107. See Am. Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Allied 
Corp. v. United States, 685 F.2d 396 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (following American Standard); see 
also Union Carbide Corp. v. United States, 612 F.2d 558 (Ct. Cl. 1979)  (following 
American Standard in a slightly different context). 
 108. I.R.C. §§ 921 and 922 (1968); see also Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
455, § 1052(b), 90 Stat. 1647 (repealing the special deduction for taxable years 
beginning on or after January 1, 1980). 
The fraction equaled fourteen percent divided by the sum of the normal and 
surtax tax rates in I.R.C. § 11.  I.R.C. § 922(2) (1968); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.922-1(a) 
(in force as of December 15, 1967) (providing that the fraction in I.R.C. § 922(2) is 
the same “whether the corporation’s taxable income is sufficient to subject it to the 
combined normal tax and surtax, or only to the normal tax”).  A WHTC was a 
domestic corporation that: 
(i)  Did all of its business (except for incidental purchases) in the Western 
Hemisphere; 
(ii)  Derived at least 95 percent of its gross income from sources outside the 
United States during the three-year period preceding the close of the 
taxable year; and 
(iii) Derived at least 90 percent of its gross income from the active conduct 
of a trade or business during that same period. 
I.R.C. § 921 (1968). 
 109. S. REP. NO. 77-1631, at 32 (1942). 
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Because WHTCs could join with other non-WHTCs in a consolidated 
group, Treasury somehow had to shoehorn the WHTC deduction 
into a consolidated world. 
Treasury faced the same difficult task in accommodating a special 
deduction for dividends paid by public utilities on “qualified” 
preferred stock.110  Similar to the WHTC deduction, this special 
dividends paid deduction was tied to a fraction of the public utility’s 
taxable income (computed without regard to the deduction).111  Each 
special deduction effectively reduced the tax rate for the favored 
corporation by up to fourteen percentage points.112 
In American Standard, the Federal Circuit considered whether 
Treasury’s regulatory method to “consolidate” the WHTC deduction 
passed muster.113  The method reflected three policy choices and, 
although the court approved the first two choices, it rejected the 
third.  Consequently, the court invalidated the method, finding that 
it defeated Congressional intent and inexplicably departed from not 
only past practice but also the consolidated scheme for the public 
utility deduction.114 
As its first policy choice, Treasury had to decide how a consolidated 
group computed the taxable-income component of the WHTC 
deduction.115  It concluded that the group followed the methodology 
it used to compute a member’s contribution to CTI, and the Federal 
Circuit approved.116 
                                                          
 110. See I.R.C. § 247(a) (2003) (providing for this “public utilities” deduction); id. 
§ 247(b)(1) (defining a public utility); id. § 247(b)(2) (generally defining “qualified” 
preferred stock as stock issued before October 1, 1942, the dividends on which for 
the taxable year were cumulative, limited, and preferred). 
 111. In the years in question, the fraction equaled fourteen percent divided by the 
sum of the normal and surtax tax rates in I.R.C. § 11.  I.R.C. § 247(a)(2)(B) (1968); 
cf. id. § 247(a)(2)(B) (currently providing that the denominator of the fraction is the 
“percentage which equals the highest rate of tax specified in I.R.C. § 11(b)).  The 
deduction equaled that fraction multiplied by the smaller of: 
(i)  The amount of dividends that the public utility paid during the taxable 
year on “qualified” preferred stock; or 
(ii) The public utility’s taxable income for the year (computed without 
regard to the § 247 deduction). 
Id. § 247(a)(1) (1968); see also id. § 247(a)(1) (currently the same rule). 
 112. See Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 262 (noting that the special deductions had “the 
effect of a tax rate reduction”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 264-65.  In testing the regulation, the court referred to each of the 
verbal formulae noted above, although none was central to its analysis.  See supra 
notes 36-39 and accompanying text (describing these formulae). 
 115. See I.R.C. § 922(2) (1968) (providing that the WHTC deduction was a 
fraction of the WHTC’s taxable income (determined without regard to the 
deduction)). 
 116. See Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 262 (finding that this first policy choice by 
Treasury was “clearly a reasonable answer” because, except for their special 
deduction, a WHTC computed its taxable income like a typical corporation). 
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CTI was (and is) computed by combining each member’s “separate 
taxable income” and certain consolidated items (e.g., capital gains 
and losses).117  The group computes the tax items that comprise each 
member’s “separate taxable income” generally using a separate-
corporation approach,118 while computing certain “consolidated” 
items using a single-entity approach.119  This methodology promotes 
tax neutrality, because it makes the location of assets within the 
group less relevant.120 
EXAMPLE 2—COMPUTING CTI 
P and S are members of a consolidated group.  In a taxable year, P 
sells Asset A, recognizing a $200 capital loss, and S sells Asset B, 
recognizing a $200 capital gain.  Although a corporation can use a 
capital loss only to the extent of its capital gain,121 the regulations 
apply this limitation by treating the group as a single entity.122  Thus, 
in computing the P group’s CTI, its capital loss offsets its capital gain, 
a result unaffected by the location of the gain or loss within the 
group. 
Location would matter if the regulations applied this limitation 
using a pure separate-corporation approach.  Then, P’s capital loss 
could not offset S’s capital gain, because the capital-loss limitation 
would apply separately to each member and P had no capital gain.  
The loss could have offset the gain, however, if P had transferred 
Asset A to S in a § 351 exchange before the group sold Asset A.123 
                                                          
 117. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11(a) (in force as of 
December 15, 1967).  Although the group computed “separate taxable income” for 
each member under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12, that amount “could not alone be used 
as a base for the [WHTC] deduction because it [was] only a component of the 
corporation’s taxable income.” Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 263. 
 118. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-12 (as amended in 1999) (providing that “[t]he 
separate taxable income of a member . . . is computed in accordance with the 
provisions of the Code covering the determination of taxable income of separate 
corporations” with modification for consolidated items); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-
12 (in force as of December 15, 1967) (to the same effect). 
 119. See  sources cited supra notes 15-18. 
 120. See Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 262-63 (obliquely acknowledging that the 
method promoted tax neutrality, stating that “[t]hough such treatment can change 
the character and/or amount of income and deductions because of consolidation of 
certain items, this is the treatment all corporations are subject to when they elect the 
privilege of filing consolidated returns.”). 
 121. I.R.C. § 1211(a) (2003). 
 122. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-22(a) (as amended in 1999( (providing that the 
capital gain and loss for the group is “determined for the group as a whole”); see also 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-22(b)(1)(i) (in force as of December 15, 1967) (also providing 
that the group combines the members’ capital gains and losses). 
 123. Then, the group would have shifted the $200 loss to S, so that under the 
separate-corporation approach, the group could offset the gain and loss.  See I.R.C. 
§ 362(a)(1) (2003) (providing that the controlled corporation (like S) takes a 
transferred basis in an asset received in a § 351 exchange). 
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Treasury followed the CTI methodology to determine the 
character and amount of a WHTC member’s tax items in the group’s 
computation of its WHTC deduction.  The two methodologies 
complemented one another and together promoted tax neutrality. 
EXAMPLE 3—THE WHTC DEDUCTION 
In 1968 (a year at issue in American Standard), P, S, and T were 
members of a consolidated group, and P and S were WHTCs.  During 
that year, each member had $1,000 of ordinary income, P sold Asset 
A, recognizing a $200 capital loss, and S sold Asset B, recognizing a 
$200 capital gain.  As in EXAMPLE 2, the P group computed its CTI by 
offsetting S’s capital gain with P’s capital loss.  Thus, its CTI was 
$3,000 minus its WHTC deduction.124 
Under the regulations, the group’s WHTC deduction equaled 
14/48 of its CTI attributable to its WHTC members,125 and that CTI 
component equaled $2,000 because the capital loss was treated as a 
deductible item.126  Thus, its WHTC deduction equaled 14/48 of 
$2,000 or $583.33.  That result would be unaffected by whether or 
not P shifted its capital loss to S through an asset transfer. 
Under a separate-corporation approach, however, the WHTC 
deduction would depend on whether P or S recognized the capital 
                                                          
 124. The $3,000 amount equals the aggregate ordinary income of P, S, and T. 
 125. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-25(a) (in force as of December 15, 1967) (providing 
that the group’s WHTC deduction equaled its taxable income attributable to WHTC 
members multiplied by the fraction specified in § 922(2)); see also I.R.C. § 922(2) 
(providing that the fraction equals fourteen divided by the normal and surtax rate 
for the year under § 11); id. § 11(a), (b)(2), (c)(3) (1968) (providing for a 
combined normal and surtax rate of forty-eight percent). 
 126. The attributable CTI was computed in three steps.  First, the group 
computed the taxable income of each member, and in this computation, the capital 
loss of a member was deductible to the extent it was absorbed by the group.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-25(c)(2)(iii) (in force as of December 15, 1967) (providing that 
the taxable income of a member is adjusted for the member’s net capital loss that is 
absorbed by the group).  Thus, P had taxable income of $800 ($1,000 ordinary 
income minus $200 capital loss), S had taxable income of $1,200 ($1,000 ordinary 
income plus $200 capital gain), and T had taxable income of $1,000 ($1,000 of 
ordinary income). 
Second, the group identified each member that had positive taxable income 
(without regard to the WHTC or public utilities deductions) and totaled those 
amounts for all WHTC members (“WHTC PTI”) and for all group members (“Group 
PTI”).  Id. § 1.1502-25(c)(1).  Thus, the P group’s WHTC PTI was $2,000 ($800 for P 
plus $1,200 for S), and its Group PTI was $3,000 ($800 for P plus $1,200 for S plus 
$1,000 for T). 
Finally, the group computed the CTI attributable to WHTC members under the 
following formula: 
(WHTC PTI/Group PTI)  X CTI  (determined without regard to the WHTC 
deduction). 
Id.  Because the group took exactly the same items into account in computing the 
CTI amount and the Group PTI, those two amounts were identical, and the group’s 
CTI attributable to WHTCs equaled its WHTC PTI or $2,000. 
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loss.  If P did, the deduction would be $601.56,127 while if S did, the 
deduction would be $583.33.128  Thus, under this approach, the 
group’s WHTC deduction could depend on the location of its assets 
within the WHTC subgroup, impeding tax neutrality. 
By making location less relevant, the methodologies to compute 
CTI and the WHTC deduction made more neutral the group’s 
choice to form a new member or transfer assets between members. 
Treasury’s second policy choice also furthered tax neutrality.  It 
had to decide whether (i) separate WHTC deductions were 
computed for each WHTC member and then combined or (ii) a 
single deduction was computed on the combined income of all 
WHTC members.  It chose the latter approach, a choice the Federal 
Circuit endorsed without much discussion.129  The choice made a 
difference if at least one WHTC member had a net loss. 
EXAMPLE 4—THE SECOND POLICY CHOICE 
In 1968, WHTCs P and S were members of a consolidated group.  P 
had $2,000 of ordinary income, while S had a $200 ordinary loss.  
Under the regulations, P and S combined their tax items before the 
group computed its WHTC deduction,130 and the P group’s WHTC 
deduction equaled $525.131  That result would be unaffected by which 
WHTC took the income or loss into account. 
If, instead, the WHTC deduction were computed separately for 
each WHTC member and then combined, the P group would have a 
$583.33 deduction, equal P’s separate deduction.132  However, if P 
                                                          
 127. In computing the CTI attributable to the WHTC members, the taxable 
income amounts would be $1,000 for P (because the capital loss would not be 
deductible), $1,200 for S, and $1,000 for T.  Thus, the attributable CTI would be 
$2,062.50 ($3,000 (CTI) X $2,200/$3,200), and the WHTC deduction would be 
14/48 of that amount or $601.56. 
 128. Because the group’s relevant CTI amount and its Group PTI would be 
identical (i.e., each $3,000), the CTI attributable to the WHTC members would equal 
the WHTC PTI or $2,000 ($1,000 for P plus $1,000 for S ($1,000 of ordinary income 
plus $200 capital gain minus $200 capital loss)).  Thus, the WHTC deduction would 
be 14/48 of that amount or $583.33. 
 129. The court described the former choice as the “aggregate method without 
losses” but never discussed the merits of that approach.  See Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 
259 n.1. 
 130. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-25(a) and (c) (in force as of December 15, 1967) 
(providing that the group’s WHTC deduction equaled a fraction of the CTI 
attributable to the group’s WHTCs, and CTI took all tax items of the WHTC 
members into account). 
 131. The group’s WHTC deduction equaled 14/48 of its CTI attributable to 
WHTCs members.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-25(a) (in force as of December 15, 1967).  
Because P and S were the only members of the P group, the portion of the CTI 
attributable to P and S had to be the entire CTI or $1,800 (i.e., P’s $2,000 income 
minus S’s $200 loss).  Thus, the P group’s WHTC deduction equaled 14/48 of 
$1,800, or $525. 
 132. P’s separate deduction would equal 14/48 of $2,000 or $583.33.  Because S 
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had contributed sufficient assets to S to shift $200 of its income to S, 
the group’s WHTC deduction would have been reduced to $525.133 
Thus, when Treasury based a group’s WHTC deduction on the 
combined income of all WHTC members, it made the location of 
assets within the group less relevant for tax purposes, promoting tax 
neutrality. 
In contrast, Treasury’s third policy choice impeded tax neutrality 
and was rejected by the Federal Circuit.  Treasury chose to compute 
the combined income of all WHTC members using a consolidated 
method rather than a subgroup method.134  Under its consolidated 
method, non-WHTC losses could offset WHTC income (or WHTC 
losses could offset non-WHTC income), results that the Federal 
Circuit found unreasonable.135 
EXAMPLE 5—THE THIRD POLICY CHOICE 
In 1968, P, S, WG, and WL were members of a consolidated group, 
and WG and WL were WHTCs.  During that year, P, S, WG, and WL had 
$1,000 of ordinary income, $400 of ordinary loss, $2,000 of ordinary 
income, and $200 of ordinary loss, respectively.  Thus, the P group’s 
CTI equaled $2,400 minus its WHTC deduction. 
If the P group computed its WHTC deduction by looking only to 
the tax items of the WHTC subgroup, its WHTC deduction would 
equal $525, an amount that would be unaffected by the location of 
                                                          
would have a net loss, it would not have a separate WHTC deduction. 
 133. P’s income would have been reduced to $1,800, and its separate deduction to 
$525 (14/48 of $1,800).  Because S would have no net income or loss, it would not 
have a separate WHTC deduction. 
 134. The American Standard court described two subgroup methods, the 
“aggregate method with losses” and the “fractional method with losses,” and one 
consolidated method, the “fractional method without losses.” Am. Standard, 602 F.2d 
at 259-60 n.1. 
Broadly speaking under either subgroup method, the CTI attributable to WHTC 
members would equal their aggregate combined income, and the group’s WHTC 
deduction would equal 14/48 of that combined amount.  The fractional method 
would produce a lower deduction, however, if the group also enjoyed the public 
utilities deduction.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-25(c) (in force as of December 15, 1967) 
(producing this result because the public utilities deduction was taken into account 
in computing CTI under (c)(1) but not in computing the taxable income amounts 
under (c)(2)); see also Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 266 n.18; Allied Corp. v. United 
States, 685 F.2d 396, 400 n. 4 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (both noting that the subgroup methods 
produced the same results, unless the consolidated group also enjoyed the public 
utilities deduction).  In effect, the public utilities deduction offset a portion of the 
WHTC members’ taxable income, arguably contrary to rationale articulated in 
American Standard.  See Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 265. 
 135. See Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 265 (concluding that having non-WHTC losses 
offset WHTC profits “clearly defeat[ed]” the purpose of the WHTC deduction); see 
also supra note 126 (providing the mechanics of the consolidated approach). 
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tax items (or assets) within either the WHTC or non-WHTC 
subgroup.136 
The location of a subgroup’s tax items would be highly relevant, 
however, with the regulatory method.  Under the facts, the group’s 
WHTC deduction was $466.67,137 but it would have been: 








(iii)  $525 if it had done both combinations.
140
 
Because the location of assets within a consolidated group 
mattered, the regulatory approach was not tax neutral and, 
consequently, raised some disquieting concerns.  First, the approach 
could frustrate a consolidated group’s non-tax economic choices.  
                                                          
 136. Regardless of the taxable income amounts of non-WHTC members, the P 
group’s CTI attributable to its WHTC members would equal $1,800 (i.e., WG’s income 
minus WL’s loss), and its WHTC deduction would equal 14/48 of that amount or 
$525.  Further, the deduction would not change if the group had transferred assets 
between its WHTC members during the year, since the same tax items would be 
taken into account in computing the relevant CTI amount. 
Note, however, that the WHTC deduction could be affected if assets were transferred 
between the subgroups (rather than just within a subgroup).  See infra note 148 
(illustrating this concept). 
 137. Under the regulations, the group’s WHTC deduction equaled 14/48 of the 
CTI attributable to the WHTC members, and that attributable CTI amount equaled 
the following: 
(WHTC PTI/Group PTI)  X CTI, where — 
WHTC PTI  =The combined taxable income of all WHTC members with 
positive taxable income, and 
Group PTI  =The combined taxable income of all members with positive 
taxable income. 
CTI was determined without regard to the WHTC deduction, and WHTC PTI and 
Group PTI were determined without regard to both the WHTC and public utilities 
deductions.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-25(c) (in force as of December 15, 1967).  Thus, 
the P group’s WHTC PTI was $2,000 (equal to WG’s $2,000 income) and its Group 
PTI was $3,000 (equal to $1,000 (for P’s income) plus $2,000 (for WG’s income)).  
Consequently, its WHTC deduction was $466.67, or 14/48 of $2,000/$3,000 times 
$2,400. 
 138. The P group’s WHTC PTI would still be $2,000 (equal to WG’s $2,000 
income) but its Group PTI would be only $2,600 (equal to $600 (for P/S’s income) 
plus $2,000 (for WG’s income)).  Thus, its WHTC deduction would be $538.46, or 
14/48 of $2,000/$2,600 times $2,400. 
 139. The P group’s WHTC PTI would be only $1,800 (equal to WG/WL’s $1,800 
income) and its Group PTI would be only $2,800 (equal to $1,000 (for P’s income) 
plus $1,800 (for WG/WL’s income)).  Thus, its WHTC deduction would be $450, or 
14/48 of $1,800/$2,800 times $2,400. 
 140. The P group’s WHTC PTI would be only $1,800 (equal to WG/WL’s $1,800 
income) and its Group PTI would be only $2,400 (equal to $600 (for P/S’s income) 
plus $1,800 (for WG/WL’s income)).  Thus, its WHTC deduction would be $525, or 
14/48 of $1,800/$2,400 times $2,400.  As this factual variation illustrates, when a 
group has no member with negative taxable income, the consolidated and subgroup 
methods reach the same result. 
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Despite sound non-tax business reasons, a group may be disinclined 
to form a new member or transfer assets between subgroup members, 
fearing it could reduce its WHTC deduction.  Further, a group may 
be encouraged to transfer assets between subgroup members to 
increase the deduction, even when those transfers would otherwise be 
ill-advised. 
Further, the regulatory approach seemed to unfairly distinguish 
among similarly situated groups.  Otherwise identical groups could 
be treated differently, based solely on the placement of assets within 
their WHTC or non-WHTC subgroups, something that may be 
entirely fortuitous.  Although the disadvantaged group might 
increase its WHTC deduction through appropriate asset transfers, the 
group would likely incur added expense to make the transfers, a cost 
avoided by the advantaged group.  More troubling, the group might 
be unable to make an appropriate asset transfer, to identify which 
assets to transfer, or even to tell whether it was disadvantaged by the 
regulatory approach (at least not until it was too late).141 
In rejecting Treasury’s third policy choice, the Federal Circuit in 
American Standard vaguely referenced those concerns.  It noted that 
the regulatory method “change[d] the conceptual basis upon which 
Congress permitted the deduction under section 922” and 
“penalize[d]” consolidated groups with WHTC members, apparently 
because it “varie[d] dramatically” from the more tax-neutral 
subgroup method.142  Thus, the Federal Circuit’s response to each 
Treasury policy choice was consistent with, and can be supported as 
promoting, tax neutrality.143 
                                                          
 141. The approach could also spark more tax disputes because the location of a 
group’s tax items would be more relevant.  For example, if a consolidated group was 
about to sell an asset, it may transfer the asset from one member to another, trying to 
shift location of the sales gain or loss and increase its WHTC deduction.  The IRS 
might assert, however, that the gain or loss must be allocated to the transferor 
member.  See Comm’r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (applying the 
substance-over-form doctrine, the Supreme Court required a liquidating corporation 
to recognize gain and loss on assets transferred to and in form sold by shareholders); 
see also I.R.C. § 482 (2000) (providing for an allocation of tax items among related 
taxpayers clearly to reflect their income). 
 142. See Am. Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 265 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (also 
noting that the regulatory method could favor consolidated groups).  In noting the 
change in conceptual basis and the penalty, the Federal Circuit necessarily assumed a 
standard of reference, which apparently was the subgroup method. 
 143. The past cases invalidating consolidated return regulations also could be 
read to promote tax neutrality.  See supra notes 52, 63 and accompanying text.  Note 
that the subgroup method was not entirely tax-neutral because a group may have 
different tax results if it transferred assets between (rather than just within) 
subgroups.  Those transfers probably were less likely to occur than intra-subgroup 
transfers because they were more likely to disqualify a member as a WHTC.  Thus, 
the subgroup method probably promoted tax neutrality more than the consolidated 
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Still, the Federal Circuit did not expressly endorse tax neutrality.  It 
rejected Treasury’s third policy choice, in part because it inexplicably 
departed from past practice and Treasury’s consolidated scheme for 
the public utility deduction.144  This rationale was less than satisfying, 
as it relied on that practice and scheme without critically examining 
them.145 Whatever its merit, the rationale highlighted some possible 
red flags for future regulations. 
First, a court may be more likely to invalidate a consolidated return 
regulation that significantly shifts how a tax item is treated, 
particularly if the regulations treat a similar item inconsistently.  The 
Federal Circuit found that, until 1966, the consolidated return 
regulations had accounted for the WHTC and public utility 
deductions using a subgroup method.146  The 1966 regulations 
retained the subgroup method for the public utility deduction but 
switched to the consolidated method for the WHTC deduction.  The 
court saw no reason for the switch.147 
Problematically, Treasury failed to explain the switch, either in 
publishing the 1966 regulations or during the litigation process.  
                                                          
method. 
 144. Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 264-65. 
 145. Note, however, that either could be amply justified as furthering tax 
neutrality. 
 146. Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 264-65.  Although this finding likely is accurate, it is 
not free from doubt.  The pre-1966 regulations provide little help, failing to describe 
whether the WHTC or public utilities deduction was computed using a subgroup or 
consolidated approach.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-31(a)(14)-(15) (in force as of 
January 1, 1965) (stating, in relevant part, that each deduction was a fraction of the 
CTI “attributable” to the WHTCs or public utilities but not specifying how the 
attributable amount was computed).  Further, administrative guidance is mixed.  A 
1958 revenue ruling seemed to follow the subgroup approach, while a 1968 ruling 
interpreting the pre-1966 regulations required the consolidated approach.  Compare 
Rev. Rul. 58-618, 1958-2 C.B. 430, with Rev. Rul. 68-395, 1968-2 C.B. 395.  Cf. Int’l Tel. 
& Tel. Corp. v. United States, 608 F.2d 462, 473 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (concluding that the 
1958 revenue ruling’s analysis of another point was “erroneous”). 
Nevertheless, the manner in which Treasury adopted the 1966 consolidated rules 
strongly suggests that the 1958 ruling accurately portrayed pre-1966 law.  Treasury 
originally proposed using the subgroup method for both the WHTC and public 
utilities deductions.  See 30 Fed. Reg. 12564, 12581 (Oct. 1, 1965) (proposing, among 
other sections, Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-25 and 1.1502-27).  In finalizing those 
regulations, Treasury adopted the subgroup method for the public utility deduction 
but reserved on the WHTC deduction.  See 31 Fed. Reg. 11794, 11810 (Sept. 8, 1966).  
In a companion package, Treasury for the first time proposed using the consolidated 
method for the WHTC deduction, the method it finally adopted.  See 31 Fed. Reg. 
11845, 11848 (Sept. 8, 1966) (the proposed rule); 31 Fed. Ref. 16694, 16697 (Dec. 
31, 1966) (providing the final rule).  The sequence of events implies that the 
consolidated method represented a change in law and, therefore, that the pre-1966 
regulations contemplated using the subgroup method for the WHTC deduction. 
 147. See also Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 266 (noting that the subgroup approach was 
also consistent with Sinclair Oil Corp. v. United States, 392 F.2d 249 (Ct. Cl. 1968), in 
which the court concluded, in a different context, that a group’s WHTC losses could 
not offset its public utility income). 
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That failure limited the deference the court gave the consolidated 
method.148  It also bound American Standard with the past court 
decisions that invalidated consolidated return regulations; in each 
case, Treasury provided no rationale for the invalid regulatory 
approach.149  Thus, if Treasury does not justify a regulatory change, a 
court is less likely to accord the change much deference or to accept 
it. 
The Federal Circuit also supported its conclusion by pointing to 
the purpose of the WHTC deduction, which was to help WHTCs 
compete with foreign corporations in the Western Hemisphere.150  
The Code tied the deduction to WHTC earnings, but under the 
consolidated method, the deduction could be reduced because of 
non-WHTC losses.  Thus, the court reasoned, the consolidated 
method “direct[ly] conflict[ed] with sections 922 and 1502,”151 even 
though the Code and legislative history were silent about how to 
consolidate the WHTC deduction.  Treasury did nothing to refine 
the court’s reasoning, offering nary a whisper of support for its 
regulatory method.  Its reticence, no doubt, weighed heavily in the 
court’s decision. 
As a footnote, the Federal Circuit briefly discussed the authority 
Congress delegated to Treasury to craft consolidated return 
regulations.  I.R.C. § 1502 authorizes Treasury to prescribe 
regulations, as necessary, to “clearly reflect” the income tax liability of 
the group and each member and “to prevent” the avoidance of that 
liability.  The court suggested that, more broadly stated, this 
                                                          
 148. Id. at 261.  Perhaps, Treasury rejected the subgroup method for the following 
reason: Under that method, if a group expected a WHTC member to generate a loss, 
it might reduce its tax by disqualifying the member as a WHTC.  (for example, the 
group might have the member engage in disqualifying activities or stuff the member 
with sufficient assets so that it failed one of the WHTC income tests.  See supra note 
108 (describing WHTC qualification.)  The consolidated method avoided that 
concern by taking the losses of the former WHTC into account.  Moreover, because a 
group seemed less free to disqualify a member as a public utility, given the utility’s 
heavy regulation, the public utility deduction seemed less likely to raise the same 
concern, arguably allowing Treasury to use different methods to compute the public 
utility and WHTC deductions. 
If Treasury had the concern noted in the previous paragraph, however, it never 
said so.  Further, the consolidated method was overbroad in addressing the concern, 
because it would take into account losses of not only former WHTCs but also any 
other non-WHTC loss members. 
 149. See supra notes 50, 63 and accompanying text; see also Am. Standard, 602 F.2d 
at 268-69 (concluding that a lack of notice also justified invalidating the regulation 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, because when Treasury first proposed the 
consolidated method, the regulatory text contained an ambiguity that Treasury did 
not explain away). 
 150. Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 265. 
 151. Id. 
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delegation gave Treasury regulatory authority “to conform the 
applicable income tax law of the Code to the special myriad problems 
resulting from the filing of consolidated income tax returns.”152  The 
consolidated group in Rite Aid read this deceptively vague refrain to 
limit Treasury’s authority, adopting the refrain as its battle cry in 
litigation.153 
II. THE CHALLENGED REGULATION 
A. The Facts of Rite Aid 
In Rite Aid v. United States,154 the Federal Circuit invalidated all or 
part of the loss disallowance rule found in Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20 
(“LDR”), concluding that Treasury exceeded its regulatory authority 
in prescribing that rule.  The relevant facts were as follows:155 
Rite Aid Corporation (“Rite Aid”), the common parent of a 
consolidated group, purchased the stock of Penn Encore Inc. 
(“Encore”), a discount book seller, acquiring eighty percent of the 
stock in 1984 and the remaining twenty percent in 1988.
156
  
Although Encore enjoyed some initial success, it proved 
unprofitable over the longer haul, piling up huge losses despite 
large cash infusions by Rite Aid.  In 1994, when Rite Aid sold the 
Encore stock to an unrelated purchaser, Lauriat’s, Inc. (“Lauriat”), 
                                                          
 152. Id. at 261; First Chi. Corp. v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 421, 440 (1991) (citing to 
American Standard and quoting the same language); cf. Regal, Inc. v. Comm’r, 53 T.C. 
261, 267 (1969), aff’d per curiam, 435 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting that Congress 
gave Treasury discretion to deal with unforeseen problems). 
 153. Ironically, the Federal Circuit in American Standard acknowledged that the 
invalid regulation dealt with a “consolidated” problem.  Am. Standard, 602 F.2d at 263 
(stating that “[t]he problem, which is the source of dispute in this case, is to find a 
reasonable method to ‘break out’ taxable income properly attributable to the 
[WHTC] subgroup to form the base for the [WHTC] deduction.”); see also id. at 265. 
 154. 255 F.2d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 155. Except as otherwise stated, these facts are culled from the opinions of the 
Federal Circuit and United States Court of Federal Claims in Rite Aid.  Id. at 1358; 
Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 500, 501-02 (2000). 
 156. Rite Aid made a § 338 election for the 1984 stock purchase.  Under I.R.C. 
§ 338, a qualified stock purchase may be treated for federal income tax purposes in 
many ways like an asset purchase.  If a § 338 election is made, the acquired 
corporation (the “target”) is deemed to sell its assets on one day and acquire them 
the next day as a newly formed subsidiary of the purchaser.  I.R.C. § 338(a) and (g).  
Immediately following the deemed asset sale, the target’s aggregate basis in its assets 
is tied to the price paid for the target stock plus the amount of target liabilities.  
I.R.C. § 338(b). 
Because of Rite Aid’s § 338 election, Encore was deemed to sell and then purchase 
its assets in a deemed asset sale in 1984.  Further, its asset bases reflected the 1984 
stock purchase price plus Encore’s liabilities immediately after the deemed sale.  
Assuming that Rite Aid paid a fair market value price for the Encore stock in 1984, 
Encore’s asset bases should have equaled (or at least approached) fair market value 
immediately after the deemed sale. 
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it recognized a $22,136,739 stock loss, which the IRS disallowed 
under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20 because Encore preserved a greater 
aggregate built-in loss in its assets.
157
 
In soliciting bids for Encore, Rite Aid had asked potential buyers to 
offer two prices for the Encore stock, one price if a § 338(h)(10) 
election was made and one if that election was not made.158  Lauriat, 
the only bidder for Encore, refused to join in making the election.159  
Because Lauriat did not make the election, Encore retained its 
historic tax attributes, including an aggregate built-in asset loss of 
$28,535,858.160 
Note that if Lauriat had joined with Rite Aid to make a 
§ 338(h)(10) election, Encore would have recognized the $28.5 
million built-in loss and the Rite Aid group would have absorbed or 
succeeded to that loss.161  Further, without regard to LDR, Rite Aid 
could not have recognized its $22.1 million stock loss.162 
                                                          
 157. Encore’s assets had an aggregate built-in loss to the extent their aggregate 
basis exceeded their value. 
 158. Brief for Appellee, Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (No. 00-5098), 2001 TNT 155-24 (¶ 6).  If a “§ 338(h)(10) election” is made, a 
sale of subsidiary stock is treated for federal income tax purposes in many ways like a 
sale of subsidiary assets followed by a liquidation of the subsidiary.  See I.R.C. 
§ 338(h)(10) (2003). 
 159. Brief for Appellant, Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (No. 00-5098), 2001 TNT 145-60 (¶ 8).  It is unclear from the facts whether 
Lauriat refused to submit a price for a § 338(h)(10) purchase or it submitted such a 
price but Rite Aid rejected it. 
 160. See Rite Aid Corp., 46 Fed. Cl. at 502 (stating that Encore calculated its 
“duplicated loss” as about $28.5 million, equal to the aggregated adjusted basis of 
Encore’s assets over the value of Encore’s stock plus its liabilities; note that this 
computation presumes that Encore had no loss carryovers). 
 161. Because of the § 338(h)(10) election, Encore would have been deemed to 
sell its assets, recognizing the built-in loss, and the Rite Aid consolidated group could 
have taken that loss into account.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1(e)(1) (in force as 
of January 1, 1994) (providing that the target is treated as recognizing deemed sale 
gain or loss as a member of the selling consolidated group); see also supra note 156 
(providing a brief description of the deemed asset sale).  Further, Encore would have 
been deemed to liquidate.  Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1(e)(2)(ii) (in force as of 
January 1, 1994) (providing that the target is deemed to distribute all of its assets in 
deemed liquidation while a member of the selling consolidated group).  Because the 
liquidation would have been described in I.R.C. § 332, the Rite Aid group would 
have succeeded to any net loss, loss carryovers or deferred deductions attributable to 
Encore.  I.R.C. § 381(a)(1), (c) (2000) (providing that in a § 332 liquidation, the 
controlling corporate shareholder succeeds to tax attributes of the liquidating 
corporation, including loss carryovers).  See id. § 332(b) (2000) (describing the 
requirements for a § 332 liquidation). 
Immediately following the deemed sale, Encore would have been treated as a new 
corporation for federal income tax purposes, taking bases in its assets equal to (or 
approaching) their fair market values.  See supra note 156 (citing the applicable law). 
 162. Because of Encore’s deemed liquidation, Rite Aid would not have recognized 
its stock loss.  See I.R.C. § 332(a) (providing that gain or loss is not recognized by the 
controlling corporate shareholder in a § 332 liquidation). 
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B. Applying LDR to Rite Aid 
The IRS disallowed Rite Aid’s stock loss under LDR (i.e., the loss 
disallowance rule of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20).  Generally under this 
section, a consolidated group was not allowed a loss deduction on its 
sale of subsidiary stock.163  This general loss disallowance was 
mitigated or limited in several ways. 
It was mitigated under a “reattribution” rule.  If a group recognized 
a loss on its sale of subsidiary stock and the loss was otherwise 
disallowed under LDR, the group’s common parent could reattribute 
to itself a portion of any net operating or capital loss carryovers 
attributable to the subsidiary (or a lower-tier subsidiary).164  
Apparently, Encore had no attributable loss amounts, and Rite Aid 
could not benefit from this reattribution rule. 
The general loss disallowance was also limited in two ways.  First, 
under a netting provision, the loss was allowed to the extent the 
group took gain into account “as a consequence of the same plan or 
arrangement [and] with respect to stock of the same subsidiary 
having the same material terms.”165  Rite Aid apparently could not use 
this netting provision. 
Second, the stock loss was allowed to the extent it exceeded the 
sum of three factors: the subsidiary’s extraordinary gain, positive 
investment adjustments, and duplicated loss.166  Because Rite Aid’s 
$22.1 million stock loss did not exceed Encore’s “duplicated” loss 
                                                          
 163. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20(a)(1) (as amended in 2002). 
 164. Id. § 1.1502-20(g)(1) (also providing that “[t]he common parent 
succeed[ed] to the reattributed losses as if the losses were succeeded to in a 
transaction described in section 381(a).”).  The reattributed amount could not 
exceed the group’s loss otherwise disallowed under LDR.  Id.; see also id. § 1.1502-
20(g)(2) (providing for a further limitation on reattribution if the subsidiary whose 
losses were reattributed or a higher-tier subsidiary was insolvent).  Further, to the 
extent of the reattributed loss, the group reduced its basis in the subsidiary stock, 
eliminating the otherwise disallowed loss.  See id. § 1.1502-20(g)(3) (treating 
reattributed losses as absorbed for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32); id. § 1.1502-
32(b)(2)(ii) (in force as of January 1, 1994) (providing a negative adjustment for 
absorbed loss carryovers attributable to a subsidiary). 
 165. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20(a)(4) (in force as of January 1, 1994). 
 166. See id. § 1.1502-20(c) (applying this “three-factor test” on a share-by-share 
basis, determining this sum separately for each share of stock sold).  “Duplicated 
loss” for a subsidiary was determined immediately after the stock disposition and, 
broadly stated, equaled the excess, if any, of: 
(i) The sum of (A) the subsidiary’s aggregate asset basis, plus (B) its loss 
carryovers to its first taxable year following the disposition, plus (C) any 
of its deferred deductions (e.g., under I.R.C. § 469), over 
(ii) The sum of (A) the total stock value of the subsidiary, plus (B) its 
liabilities, plus (C) any other relevant items. 
Id. § 1.1502-20(c)(2)(vi). 
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(i.e., its $28.5 million built-in asset loss), this second limitation also 
offered Rite Aid no relief.167 
Thus, the IRS disallowed Rite Aid’s entire stock loss under the 
duplicated loss rule of LDR.  The disallowance was proper if LDR was 
valid. 
C. Treasury’s Justification for LDR 
LDR emerged from the ashes of the General Utilities doctrine.168  
Congress repealed the doctrine in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
providing that a corporation generally must recognize gain on a 
liquidating or non-liquidating distribution of appreciated property to 
its shareholders.169  At the same time, Congress authorized Treasury 
to “issue regulations to ensure that [the purposes of the repeal] may 
not be circumvented through the use of any provision of the law or 
regulations . . . including the consolidated return regulations.”170  
Treasury responded, in part, with LDR. 
As a prelude to LDR, Treasury issued Notice 87-14,171 which 
anticipated regulations that, among other things, would target the 
“son of mirrors” transaction.  In that transaction, a consolidated 
group acquired a target corporation with built-in gain assets,172 and 
the target distributed built-in gain assets to group members, 
                                                          
 167. When a group cannot deduct its subsidiary stock loss because it does not 
exceed than the duplicated loss factor, the stock loss is said to be disallowed under 
the “duplicated loss” rule of LDR. 
 168. See Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935).  
Under this doctrine, a corporation recognized no gain or loss when it made a 
liquidating or non-liquidating distribution of property to a shareholder. 
 169. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, 2269-
75; see also I.R.C. §§  311(b), 336(a) (2003); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-841, at II-204 
(1986) (providing that “[t]he repeal of the General Utilities doctrine is designed to 
require the corporate level recognition of gain on a corporation’s sale or distribution 
of appreciated property, irrespective of whether it occurs in a liquidating or 
nonliquidating context.”). 
Even though sixteen years have elapsed since the repeal, Treasury has never 
defined its scope.  Cf. Eric M. Zolt, The General Utilities Doctrine: Examining the Scope of 
the Repeal, 65 TAXES 819, 822 (1987) (describing two possible forms of the repeal—
the weak and strong forms).  Absent an express statutory exclusion, the repeal 
should require at a minimum that a corporation recognizes gain when it disposes of 
an appreciated asset and the asset takes a stepped-up basis.  See 1990-1 C.B. 68 (in the 
preamble to the first version of LDR, stating that the “principal reason for the repeal 
of the General Utilities doctrine was that it tended to undermine the corporate income 
tax” and that the principal purpose of the repeal “was to require the payment of a 
corporate-level tax in a transaction that results in a stepped-up basis to the new 
owner”). 
 170. I.R.C. § 337(d) (2003); see also H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-841, II-204 (1986) 
(providing that Congress “expected the [the IRS] to issue those regulations”). 
 171. 1987-1 C.B. 445. 
 172. A built-in gain asset is an asset with a value exceeding its adjusted basis at the 
time of the acquisition. 
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recognizing gain.  The group took stepped-up bases in the 
distributed assets, increased its basis in the target stock under Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1502-32 to reflect the gain, and sold the target stock at a loss.  
Because the stock loss corresponded to the recognized built-in gain, 
the group could eliminate (or at least substantially reduce) the 
effective tax on the gain, inconsistent with the repeal of the General 
Utilities doctrine.173 
Notice 87-14 announced that under new or amended regulations a 
group’s stock basis adjustments would “not reflect built-in gains that 
are recognized by a target on sales of, or by reason of distributions of, 
its assets.”174  The notice’s approach revealed three apparent policy 
choices.  First, the approach disallowed investment basis adjustments 
only for built-in gain recognized on asset dispositions.175  Thus, it 
seemed to permit basis adjustments for operating income that 
reflected the built-in gain.  Second, the approach could not only 
reduce a group’s loss on a target stock disposition but also increase its 
gain.  Finally and perhaps most significantly, the approach appeared 
to require tracing: a group had to value all target assets when the 
target joined the group and then determine to what extent, if any, 
the target recognized any pre-acquisition built-in gain (or loss) as it 
disposed of any of those assets. 
Treasury reversed each of these policy choices in promulgating 
LDR, justifying and defending the rule in several extensive 
preambles.176  Most significantly, it rejected tracing, concluding “that 
it would impose tremendous administrative burdens on both 
taxpayers and the [IRS].”177  Further, in part to avoid the 
                                                          
 173. See 1990-1 C.B. 66, 67-68 (noting that LDR implements rules to prevent the 
circumvention of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine).  The character of the 
stock loss and asset gain might not match, but if the group could otherwise absorb 
the stock loss and tax rates remained constant, it would incur no net federal income 
tax cost because of the transaction.  Note, however, that the group would incur a 
time-value cost if the stock loss arose in a year that followed some or all of the asset 
sales. 
 174. 1987-1 C.B. 445 (also providing that the regulations would “be effective with 
respect to stock in a target that was acquired after January 6, 1987”). 
 175. See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2003) (providing for the recognition of gain or loss on 
the sale or exchange of property); id. § 61(a)(3) (gains derived from dealings in 
property). 
 176. LDR was developed over a short span in three regulatory packages.  See supra 
note 4 (for cites to the preambles). 
 177. 1990-1 C.B. 66, 69.  Treasury identified the following problems with tracing, 
among others: 
(i)   It would require a consolidated group to separately value a subsidiary’s 
assets whenever the group acquired subsidiary stock, often presenting 
difficult problems because of the number and nature of the subsidiary’s 
assets. 
(ii) If a subsidiary had a lower-tier subsidiary, the assets of the lower-tier 
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administrative burden of tracing and in part to limit gain duplication 
within consolidated groups, LDR generally did not increase the gain 
a consolidated group otherwise recognized on its disposition of 
subsidiary stock.178  It did, however, reduce a consolidated group’s 
loss on subsidiary stock, targeting built-in gain reflected not only in 
asset dispositions but also in operating income.179 
Although Treasury implemented LDR in large part as a response to 
the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, it tied LDR’s loss 
duplication rule to the repeal only because it simplified LDR 
generally.180  It asserted that it was “not possible to differentiate 
between loss attributable to built-in gain [in applying LDR generally] 
and duplicated loss without resort to tracing.”181  In other words, 
                                                          
subsidiary would also then have to be valued.  As a further 
complication, the group would have to compute the extent to which 
any built-in gain in an asset of a lower-tier subsidiary was reflected not 
only in the subsidiary stock but also in the stock of any intermediate 
lower-tier subsidiary and the stock of the lower-tier subsidiary itself. 
(iii)  The IRS might not audit those valuations for years, if not decades.  It 
would have great trouble determining whether a particular asset’s value 
was incorrect, a challenge that could be faced a multitude of times for a 
typical subsidiary. 
Id.; 1990-2 C.B. 696, 698; 1991-2 C.B. 43, 45; see also Michael L. Schler, Consolidated 
Return Loss Disallowance: Conceptual Issues, 95 TAX NOTES 899, 903-05 (May 6, 2002) 
(agreeing with many of these concerns with tracing). 
Treasury also discussed why it rejected other alternatives to LDR.  See 1990-1 C.B. 
66, 69-70 (rejecting built-in gain presumptions, tracing/presumption combinations, 
and loss disallowance combined with tracing); 1990-2 C.B. 696, 698-700 (explaining 
why it adopted the three-factor test but rejected rules based on rates of return or caps 
on disallowed loss); 1991-2 C.B. 43, 46-47 (rejecting certain modifications to the 
three-factor test). 
 178. See 1990-2 C.B. 696, 697-98 (justifying LDR as consistent with the single-entity 
principles reflected in the investment adjustment rules, which limit gain and loss 
duplication); see also id. at 700 (noting that the consolidated return regulations limit 
gain and loss duplication and if gain duplication is inconsistent with the principles of 
consolidated returns, loss duplication is equally inconsistent).  Thus, a basis 
adjustment for a subsidiary’s built-in gain could offset an increase in value in the 
subsidiary stock attributable to the unrecognized, post-acquisition appreciation in its 
assets.  Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20(e)(3), Ex. 5 (in force as of January 1, 1994) 
(providing for a reduction of subsidiary stock basis under an anti-avoidance rule; the 
reduction could cause a group to increase its gain on its sale of the subsidiary stock).  
But see Irving Salem, It’s Time to Creatively Deconstruct LDR, 93 TAX NOTES 1111, 1112 
(2001) [hereinafter Salem III] (labeling Treasury’s choice to allow built-in gain to 
offset an increase in subsidiary stock value a “Faustian deal”). 
 179. 1990-2 C.B. 699 (justifying the rule’s application to operating income 
because the rule would otherwise treat taxpayers in similar economic circumstances 
differently). 
 180. Id. at 700; see 1990-1 C.B. 66, 67 (stating that the loss duplication rule 
addresses a problem different from the repeal); see also id. at 68; 1991-2 C.B. 43, 46 
(suggesting that LDR balances several tax policy considerations, including 
preventing avoidance of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, permitting the 
deduction of certain economic losses under rules that are administrable for both 
taxpayers and the IRS, and furthering single-entity principles by limiting loss 
duplication). 
 181. 1990-2 C.B. 696, 700.  For example, if a group acquired a target with built-in 
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Treasury justified the duplicated loss rule in part to avoid the 
administrative burden of tracing. 
Mainly, though, it justified the rule to address the following 
concern: absent the rule, a consolidated group would recognize 
duplicated loss on subsidiary stock, but it would avoid duplicated gain 
through elective self-help measures (e.g., selling a subsidiary’s assets 
or selling its stock but making a § 338(h)(10) election for the sale).182  
That loss selectivity, it argued, was inconsistent with the core single-
entity principle of the investment adjustment rules, which was to limit 
gain and loss duplication on subsidiary stock.183  The investment 
adjustment rules prevented duplication for tax items that the 
subsidiary had already taken into account.  The loss duplication rule 
extended the core principle to built-in amounts.184 
Treasury also responded to arguments made against the rule.  
Some had argued that because non-consolidated groups may enjoy 
loss duplication, it should be eliminated only by Congress.185  
Treasury rejected the argument because it ignored the consolidated 
return regulations’ “comprehensive approach to gain and loss 
duplication,” which the loss duplication rule complemented.186 
                                                          
gain and loss assets, it would have to trace to determine the extent to which any later 
loss on target stock was attributable to recognized, pre-acquisition built-in gain or a 
decline in asset value. 
 182. 1990-1 C.B. 66, 69; 1990-2 C.B. 696, 700.  For example, disregarding loss 
carryovers, if a group sold its entire stock interest in a wholly owned subsidiary: 
(i) Its stock loss was a duplicated loss to the extent the subsidiary had an 
aggregate built-in loss in its assets; and 
(ii) Its stock gain was a duplicated gain to the extent the subsidiary had an 
aggregate built-in gain in its assets. 
Stated more broadly, a group had duplicated gain or loss on its sale of subsidiary 
stock to the extent that a corresponding gain or loss was preserved in the subsidiary’s 
asset bases. 
 183. 1990-2 C.B. 696, 700; 1991-2 C.B. 43, 46; see also 1990-2 C.B. 696, 698 
(asserting that “as the group and subsidiary operate in consolidated form, it becomes 
more appropriate to view the group’s investment in a subsidiary as an investment in 
its assets and operations rather than in its stock.”); 1991-2 C.B. 43, 46 (making the 
same point); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(a)(1) (2003) (providing that the purpose of the 
investment adjustment rules is “to treat [the group] as a single entity” and to prevent 
a subsidiary’s income, gain, loss, and deductions “from being taken into account a 
second time on [the group’s] disposition of [the subsidiary’s] stock”). 
 184. A subsidiary’s duplicated loss included not only its aggregate built-in asset 
loss but also its loss carryovers to its first taxable year following the disposition.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20(c)(2)(vi) (in force as of January 1, 1994).  Under the 
“reattribution” rule, however, those loss carryovers could be reattributed to the 
common parent to the extent of the group’s otherwise disallowed loss under LDR.  
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.  Because the group reduced its subsidiary 
stock basis under the investment adjustment rules by any reattributed loss, the 
“reattribution” rule bridged the investment adjustment and loss duplication rules. 
 185. 1990-2 C.B. 696, 700. 
 186. 1990-1 C.B. 66, 70. 
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Commentators had also argued that the rule was unnecessary 
because it overlapped with other Code and regulatory loss limitations, 
such as I.R.C. § 382 and the SRLY rules.187  Treasury found this 
argument unconvincing because the other loss limitation rules 
focused on loss trafficking, not loss duplication at the corporate level, 
and even if they “appl[ied] in a duplicated loss case, they [might] not 
significantly limit duplicated loss.”188 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF RITE AID 
A. The Decisions 
1. The Court of Federal Claims decision 
The Court of Federal Claims embraced Treasury’s justifications for 
the loss duplication rule and graced Treasury with a clear but short-
lived victory.189  In concluding that the rule was valid, the court stated 
that: 
The duplicated loss rule in [Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20(c)] prohibits 
the opportunity that would exist—without the Regulation—for the 
affiliated group to recognize a loss on a sale of stock of the subsidiary 
and for the purchaser to recognize the same loss.  By prohibiting the 
use of the same loss in the hands of the seller and purchaser, the 
Regulation assists in achieving the purpose of all regulations issued 
under I.R.C. § 1502 “clearly to reflect the income-tax liability” of both 
members and former members of the affiliated group and to 
“prevent avoidance of such tax liability.”190 
Because the court treated Rite Aid’s loss on the subsidiary stock 
and the subsidiary’s built-in loss on its assets as essentially the same 
loss, it concluded that LDR did not deny the Rite Aid group its 
economic loss.191  It noted that the group could have recognized the 
built-in loss on the Encore assets, either by selling the assets directly 
or by joining with the buyer to make a § 338(h)(10) election for the 
sale of the subsidiary stock.192  It also noted that by not making the 
                                                          
 187. 1990-2 C.B. 696, 700. 
 188. Id. at 701. 
 189. Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 500 (2000). 
 190. Id. at 505 (emphasis added); cf. Woods Inv. Co. v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 274, 282 
(1985), acq. in result, 1986-2 C.B. 1 (refusing to adopt a single-entity approach when 
regulations expressly required a different result). 
 191. But cf. I.R.C. §§  269, 382 (2003) (possibly limiting the benefit of built-in 
losses in target assets following a disposition of target stock). 
 192. Rite Aid, 46 Fed. Cl. at 505 (also pointing out that a deemed or actual asset 
sale could avoid duplicated gain but that without LDR a “regular” stock sale could 
preserve duplicated loss). 
FINALLEATHERMAN.DOC 8/15/2003  1:38 PM 
2003] WHY RITE AID IS WRONG 851 
election, Rite Aid benefited from Encore’s aggregate built-in asset 
loss, since Lauriat paid more for the Encore stock because of that 
built-in loss.193 
By giving substantial weight to Treasury’s justifications for the loss 
duplication rule, the court followed a long line of precedent 
affording the consolidated return regulations substantial 
deference.194  However, it failed to adequately confront the legitimate 
concerns raised by LDR’s denying a stock loss that was historically 
allowed under the Code and regulations. 
2. The Federal Circuit decision 
Apparently finding those concerns paramount, the Federal Circuit 
invalidated the loss duplication rule.195  Duplicated loss, the court 
asserted, was not “a problem resulting from the filing of consolidated 
[] returns,” because such a loss could also arise in a non-consolidated 
setting.196  It added that I.R.C. § 382 already dealt with the problem by 
limiting a subsidiary’s future deductions, rather than by limiting the 
group’s stock loss.197  Thus, the court found, by treating consolidated 
and non-consolidated groups differently, the loss duplication rule 
                                                          
 193. See id. (noting that Rite Aid acknowledged in oral argument that Lauriat paid 
more for the stock to account for the built-in loss but that it could not quantify how 
much more Lauriat paid).  Because of this additional payment, if the Rite Aid group 
could take the stock loss into account, it would receive two economic benefits for the 
one economic loss that the group suffered.  It would not, however, receive two tax 
benefits, although the additional payment would reflect the anticipated tax benefit 
of Encore’s built-in loss. 
The court mistakenly appeared to justify not applying I.R.C. § 165 to the group’s 
stock loss when it concluded that the additional payment “compensated” Rite Aid for 
its stock loss.  Cf. I.R.C. § 165(a) (2003) (permitting a deduction for a sustained loss 
that is “not compensated for by insurance or otherwise”).  However, the additional 
payment only decreased Rite Aid’s stock loss, it did eliminate the loss.  See Axelrod, 
supra note 4, at 814 (making this point); Silverman & Zarlenga, supra note 4, at 461 
n.57 (also making this point). 
 194. As noted in the case review in Part I.B.2 above, no court had ever invalidated 
a consolidated return regulation for which Treasury provided substantial 
justification. 
 195. See generally Rite Aid, 255 F.3d at 1360. 
 196. Id.  The court stated that: 
The loss realized on the sale of a former subsidiary’s assets after the 
consolidated group sells the subsidiary’s stock is not a problem resulting 
from the filing of consolidated income tax returns.  The scenario also arises 
where a corporate shareholder sells the stock of a non-consolidated 
subsidiary.  The corporate shareholder could realize a loss under I.R.C. 
§ 1001, and deduct the loss under I.R.C. § 165.  The subsidiary could then 
deduct any losses from a later sale of assets.  The duplicated loss factor, 
therefore, addresses a situation that arises from the sale of stock regardless of 
whether corporations file separate or consolidated returns. 
Id. 
 197. Id.  But see infra note 324 (for why § 382 should not limit Treasury’s authority 
to attack a consolidated group’s duplicated stock loss). 
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“distort[ed] rather than reflect[ed]” a consolidated group’s tax 
liability and “contravene[d] Congress’ otherwise uniform treatment 
of limiting deductions for the subsidiary’s losses.”198  The court 
therefore concluded that the rule was invalid. 
The Federal Circuit likely did not invalidate LDR in total, although 
a casual reader might believe it did when it stated that “the regulation 
[i.e., LDR] is not within the authority delegated by Congress.”199  
Despite its imprecise language, the court likely invalidated only the 
loss duplication rule.  It analyzed only that rule and neither reviewed 
LDR generally nor questioned LDR’s strong tie to the repeal of the 
General Utilities doctrine.200 
3. Gaps in the decisions 
Both Rite Aid courts deserve criticism.  The Federal Circuit offered 
only a cursory analysis, gave short shrift to Treasury’s justifications for 
the loss duplication rule and LDR,201 and never distinguished the 
lower court’s opinion, gaps that seem remarkable with the tax dollars 
at stake.202  The Court of Federal Claims failed to adequately support 
why consolidated and non-consolidated groups should be treated 
differently.  More globally, each court’s analysis suffered because it 
conflated the following three distinct issues: 
(i)  Whether Treasury had the authority to issue a consolidated 
return regulation that disallowed a group’s subsidiary stock loss; 
(ii)  Whether it had the authority to limit duplicated loss for 
consolidated groups; and 
                                                          
 198. Rite Aid, 255 F.3d at 1360 (adding that the rule was “manifestly contrary to 
the statute”). 
 199. Id. at 1358; see also id. at 1360 (adding that “[b]ecause the regulation does not 
reflect the tax liability of the consolidated group, the regulation is manifestly 
contrary to the statute”). 
 200. See Silverman & Zarlenga, supra note 4, at 444 and 474-76 (concluding that 
the Federal Circuit invalidated only the loss duplication rule); see Schler, supra note 
177, at 901 n.8 (May 6, 2002) (stating that the suggestion that Rite Aid invalidated all 
of LDR was merely “wishful thinking”). Note that, since Rite Aid, the IRS has 
conceded issues under LDR that did not implicate the duplicated loss rule, perhaps 
because of concerns about the potential breadth of the Federal Circuit’s opinion.  See 
id. at 901 n.10 (also reporting this concession). 
 201. Rite Aid, 46 Fed. Cl. at 1360 (noting Treasury’s argument that the loss 
duplication rule complemented Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32 but not noting the 
fundamental points that the rule addressed loss selectivity and was necessary to 
prevent tracing). 
The court also stated that a consolidated group had to take the “bitter with the 
sweet” in filing a consolidated return but not the “invalid.”  Id.  The statement, 
although colorful, provides no help in determining whether a particular regulation is 
valid. 
 202. See supra note 5 (for the potential dollars at stake if LDR was invalidated). 
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(iii)  Assuming that it had the authority to do both, whether the 
loss duplication rule was reasonable. 
The discussion that follows analyzes each of these issues. 
B. Authority to Disallow Subsidiary Stock Loss 
Critics have asserted that Treasury lacks authority to disallow a 
group’s recognized loss on its subsidiary stock, because the loss is 
otherwise allowed under I.R.C. § 165 and Treasury cannot override 
that section.203  The better answer, however, is that Treasury has that 
authority, an answer supported by applicable legislative history, case 
law, and past practice. 
1. “Consolidated” problems 
I.R.C. § 1502 gives Treasury the authority to prescribe consolidated 
return regulations “clearly to reflect” the income tax liability of the 
group and each member and to “prevent avoidance” of that tax 
liability.  Treasury has operated under substantially the same grant of 
regulatory authority since 1928.204 
The applicable 1928 legislative history justified this broad grant of 
authority to deal with the “difficult and complicated problems” 
related to filing consolidated income tax returns.205  In Rite Aid, the 
Federal Circuit molded this justification into a standard to define and 
limit the grant; it maintained that “in the absence of a problem 
created from the filing of consolidated returns,” Treasury could not 
change how a Code provision applied to a consolidated group.206 
Despite any superficial appeal, this standard does little to define 
Treasury’s authority, except in one exceptional circumstance.207  
Treasury should have no authority to change how a Code provision 
                                                          
 203. See, e.g., Christian M. McBurney, The Consolidated Return Regs.’ Loss 
Disallowance Rule—When is it Vulnerable?, 20 J. TAX’N 20, 25 (1999); Salem I, supra note 
4, at 211 (concluding that “[c]ertainly, the Congress issued no license to eliminate 
economic losses”).  The critics presume that the stock loss must be measured using a 
separate-corporation approach. 
 204. Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 141(b), 45 Stat. (pt. 1) 791, 831; 
cf. I.R.C. § 1502 (2003) (substantially the same grant of authority).  But see infra note 
236 (discussing stylistic differences between the two grants). 
 205. S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 15 (1928) (stating that “[m]any difficult and 
complicated problems have arisen in the administration of the provisions permitting 
the filing of consolidated returns”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 20 (1928) 
(proposing to eliminate consolidated returns, stating that consolidated filing “has 
given rise to a great many important and difficult problems”). 
 206. Rite Aid, 46 Fed. Cl. at 1359. 
 207. But see Salem II, supra note 4, at 427 (arguing that when the Federal Circuit 
stated that the IRS was delegated power to write rules which can only fix consolidated 
problems, it stated a “concept . . . that has never before been articulated so 
precisely”). 
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applies if the change cannot be justified under any single-entity, 
separate-corporation, or hybrid approach.208  For example, Treasury 
cannot impose a higher tax rate on consolidated groups.209  The 
imposition would find no support under any rationale single-entity, 
separate-corporation, or hybrid approach.210 
Typically, however, those approaches accommodate more than one 
way to apply the Code, as they would for a consolidated group’s loss 
on subsidiary stock.  Under a “pure” separate-corporation approach, 
the loss would be allowed in full.  Under a “pure” single-entity 
approach, none of the loss would be allowed (but instead the 
subsidiary would be treated as selling its assets).  Under a hybrid 
approach, some or all of the stock or asset loss could be allowed.  
LDR (and Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32) reflect a hybrid approach. 
When the various approaches abide more than one way to apply 
the Code, the Federal Circuit’s standard offers little help.  Because 
the standard presumes a comparative model or baseline, a court must 
choose one approach as its model, essentially assuming its 
conclusion.211  Typically, therefore, the standard has little utility and 
may cause more harm than good, luring a court into circular 
reasoning and diverting it from what is likely the critical inquiry—
whether the regulatory approach is reasonable. 
2. Applicable legislative history 
In any event, in the same legislative history that inspired the 
Federal Circuit’s standard, Congress stated that a subsidiary stock loss 
was a “consolidated” problem.  It listed five concerns that Treasury 
                                                          
 208. In other words, this exceptional circumstance would not involve a 
“consolidated” problem.  Cf. id. at 431 (suggesting that Treasury should be 
authorized to adopt an approach that was consistent with what would happen if the 
entities had merged); Silverman & Zarlenga, supra note 4, at 473 (following American 
Standard and suggesting that a “consolidated” problem was something that 
“(i) require[d] a mechanical or technical adjustment of individual returns to the 
consolidated return format or (ii) present[ed] a question unique to consolidated 
returns”). 
 209. However, it can treat the group as a single entity to determine what statutory 
tax rate to apply. 
 210. As another example, none of those approaches would justify a regulation 
overriding I.R.C. § 351 on a group member’s transfer of property to a non-member.  
In contrast, a single-entity theory should justify a regulation that measured control 
for purposes of I.R.C. § 351 by looking to the group as a whole.  See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1502-34 (2003) (applying that standard for control). 
 211. In fact, the Federal Circuit in Rite Aid used the separate-corporation 
approach as the comparative model and, not surprisingly, invalidated the loss 
duplication rule, which followed a hybrid approach.  See Rite Aid, 255 F.3d at 160; cf. 
Comm’r v. Gen. Mach. Corp., 95 F.2d 759, 759-60 (6th Cir. 1938) (applying a 
separate-corporation approach to define taxable years, relying on Helvering v. 
Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U.S. 121 (1934)). 
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should address in consolidated return regulations, and heading the 
list was “[t]he extent to which gain or loss shall be recognized upon 
the sale by a member of the [consolidated] group of stock issued by 
another member.”212  Pre-1928 law reveals the reason for this 
concern. 
Before 1928, the IRS and consolidated groups intensely debated 
whether (and to what extent) a consolidated group should recognize 
gain or loss on its sale of subsidiary stock to a non-member.  
Commentators often argued for a pure single-entity or separate-
corporation approach,213 and at first, Treasury opted for full 
recognition, asserting that members should be considered separate 
corporations.214 
However, H.S. Crocker Co., an influential 1926 case, articulated a 
single-entity approach and concluded that the group recognized no 
gain or loss.215  Later courts followed this approach.216 
                                                          
 212. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1882, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1928); S. REP. NO. 960, 
70th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1928); see also Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, 
§ 23(f), 45 Stat. (pt. 1) 791, 800 (the same provision as current I.R.C. § 165(a) 
(2003)).  Congress noted the following additional concerns that the regulations 
should address:  
(i) the extent to which (and the manner in which) gain or loss on 
intercompany transactions should be recognized when a member 
disaffiliates; 
(ii) the basis of property acquired in an intercompany transaction; (iii) the 
carryover of losses between separate return and consolidated return 
years; and (iv) the identification of one agent for the group to receive 
statutory notices of deficiency, refunds, and so on “as though the agent 
were the taxpayer.” 
See  S. REP. NO. 70-960, at  15 (1928). 
 213. For example, one commentator argued for the separate-corporation 
approach by asking: “How then can invested capital and incomes be consolidated, 
joined, united, or combined on a single return unless they are first found by separate 
computation in the manner approved by the statute?”  Lyle T. Alverson, Consolidated 
Returns and Invested Capital, 2 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 165, 167 (1924); see also Joseph D. 
Peeler, Apportionment of Nat’l Inc. Tax Mag. Under Consolidated Returns, 6 NAT’L INC. 
TAX MAG. 127, 128 (1928) (stating that the group is not treated as a single taxpayer 
in assessing tax or “as a group for any other purpose”).  Other commentators argued 
for a single-entity approach.  See James S. Y. Ivins, Affiliated Corporations, 4 NAT’L INC. 
TAX MAG. 131 (1926) (“In the case of affiliated corporations, the corporate entity was 
required by law to be disregarded, and the taxes on several corporations were 
computable as if they were one”); see also Ludlow S. Smyth, Consolidation of Accounts 
and Consolidated Tax Returns, 5 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 449, 449-50 (1927); J.S. Seidman, 
Consolidated Invested Capital of Affiliated Corporations, 5 NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 129, 129-
32 (1927) (each asserting that courts had adopted a single-entity approach).  But see 
J. Weldon Jones, The Consolidated Return, 55 J. ACCT. 255, 258-60 (1933) (describing 
how the regulations apply both the single-entity and separate-corporation 
approaches). 
 214. A.R.R. 8159, II-2 C.B. 256 (1924) (concluding that members retain their 
separate legal status). 
 215. Appeal of H.S. Crocker Co., 5 B.T.A. 537 (1926) (concluding that a group 
recognized no gain on its sale of subsidiary stock). 
 216. See Baker-Vawter Co. v. Comm’r, 7 B.T.A. 594, 598 (1927) (stating that the 
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Despite the prevalent view that the Crocker court adopted a single-
entity approach, it justified non-recognition primarily using a hybrid 
approach.  The court reasoned that if a group were taxed as an 
economic unit, its tax consequences should be no different than if 
the subsidiary were an unincorporated branch of the parent.217  To 
achieve this effect, the group would reduce its stock gain (or loss) to 
the extent of the subsidiary’s net undistributed profits (or net loss) 
during consolidation.218  Under this hybrid approach, a group would 
recognize gain or loss on its sale of subsidiary stock (a separate-
corporation approach), but it would adjust the gain or loss to account 
for the subsidiary’s net income or loss during consolidation 
(consistent with a single-entity approach).219 
Thus, pre-1928 law was unclear about whether a group determined 
its gain or loss on subsidiary stock under a single-entity, separate-
corporation, or hybrid approach.  That lack of clarity, illustrative of a 
more general confusion about consolidation, prompted Congress to 
grant Treasury regulatory authority broad enough to accommodate a 
single-entity, separate-corporation, or hybrid approach.220  
Consequently, Treasury had (and has) broad authority to determine 
the extent of a group’s gain or loss on its sale of subsidiary stock.221  In 
                                                          
court “relied solely upon the authority of the statute in adhering to the so-called 
single economic unit theory”); Appeal of Farmers Deposit National Bank, 5 B.T.A. 
520, 528 (1926) (stating that the subsidiary stock sale was “nothing more than the 
sale by the . . . group of its own capital stock”). 
 217. H.S. Crocker Co., 5 B.T.A. at 540-41. 
 218. Id. at 540-41 (in effect suggesting basis adjustments so that a group did not 
“account twice for the same profit or . . . be allowed a double deduction of the same 
loss”). 
 219. This hybrid approach anticipated the current regime.  See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1502-32 (2003).  Note, however, that post-1928 courts interpreting pre-1928 law 
generally adopted a pure separate-corporation approach.  See Remington Rand, Inc. 
v. Comm’r, 33 F.2d 77, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1929); Obenchain-Boyer Co. v. Comm’r, 18 
B.T.A. 293, 296-97 (1929).  But cf. Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 17 B.T.A. 615 (1929), 
aff’d, Burnet v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 57 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1932) (concluding that the 
parent could recognize a loss on a subsidiary’s liquidation but that the loss was 
reduced to take into account the subsidiary net loss included in the consolidated tax 
computation). 
 220. See S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 15 (1928) (stating that “[i]t is, obviously, of utmost 
importance that these questions [in filing consolidated returns] be answered with 
certainty and a definite rule be prescribed.  Frequently, the particular policy is 
comparatively immaterial, so long as the rule to be applied is known”). 
 221. One commentator has argued, however, that when Congress directed 
Treasury to answer how much gain or loss a consolidated group recognized on its 
sale of subsidiary stock, it authorized Treasury to defer or recognize gain or loss, but 
not to eliminate it.  See Thomas J. Sykes, Powerful New Arguments Against the Duplicated-
Loss Provisions of the LDR, 91 TAX NOTES 471-75 (2001), 2001 TNT 73-106.  His 
argument is flawed for two reasons.  First, it disregards pre-1928 law, which provides 
the context for the 1928 legislative history.  Second, it disregards that a sale of stock 
is a transfer for cash, and in a typical cash transaction, gain or loss is recognized or 
eliminated, not deferred.  Although in rare cases, gain from a cash transaction has 
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particular, it may disallow a “separate” subsidiary stock loss under a 
reasonable single-entity or hybrid approach. 
3. The regulatory response to the 1928 legislation 
In fact, in Reg. 75, the regulatory response to the 1928 legislation, 
Treasury implemented a hybrid approach for sales of subsidiary stock 
and a single-entity approach for intra-group liquidations.222  In either 
case, a group could be denied a stock loss that it otherwise would 
have recognized under a separate-corporation approach.  Courts 
approved, and Congress implicitly did as well. 
Under Reg. 75, when a member sold subsidiary stock outside the 
group, the member recognized gain or loss,223 but, in computing the 
gain or loss, it first reduced its stock basis to prevent the group’s 
benefiting twice from any subsidiary loss.224  This regulatory approach 
was universally endorsed by courts, despite distinguishing between 
consolidated and non-consolidated groups.225  Although Reg. 75 did 
not directly disallow a group’s loss on its sale of subsidiary stock, its 
required basis reduction could have the same effect.226 
For intra-group liquidations, however, Reg. 75 directly disallowed a 
consolidated group’s loss on subsidiary stock.  It provided that a 
shareholder member recognized no gain or loss on the liquidation 
and took a transferred basis in any distributed assets.227  In sharp 
contrast, absent consolidation, a shareholder corporation recognized 
any gain or loss on a liquidation and took a cost basis in any 
distributed assets.228 
                                                          
been deferred, Congress gave no indication that a group’s sale of member stock 
merited this special treatment.  Cf. I.R.C. §§ 362(c), 1033(a)(2) (each providing for 
gain deferral by tracing the use of cash); see also Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-
562, §§ 112(f) and 113(a)(10), 45 Stat. (pt. 1) 791, 817, 820 (1928) (for the 
predecessor to I.R.C. § 1033). 
 222. See Reg. 75, supra note 59, at Art. 33, 34, and 41. 
 223. Id. at Art. 33 (providing that gain or loss is recognized as if the members had 
never been consolidated). 
 224. Id. at Art. 34 (also providing that the basis reduction did not occur if the 
disposition did not break the subsidiary’s affiliation with the group). 
 225. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text (describing cases approving the 
hybrid approach (and Treasury’s later decision to provide for ELAs)).  Note that a 
non-consolidated group did not reduce its basis in subsidiary stock to compute its 
stock loss. 
 226. Its effect was even broader, since the basis reduction could not only reduce 
loss but also increase gain. 
 227. See Reg. 75, supra note 59, at Art. 37(a) (providing that a shareholder 
member recognized no gain or loss on liquidation of another member; also 
providing that any distribution was an intercompany transaction); id. at Art. 38(b) 
(providing that the basis of an asset acquired in an intercompany transaction “was 
not affected by reason of the transfer”). 
 228. See Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 115(c), 45 Stat. 791, 822 
(1928) (treating a distribution in liquidation as in full payment in exchange for 
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EXAMPLE 6—INTRA-GROUP LIQUIDATION 
In 1924, P bought all S stock for $1,000, and S’s only asset was land 
with a $100 basis and $1,000 value.  By 1930, the land had declined in 
value to $400, and P liquidated S.229 
P’s tax consequences depended on whether P and S joined in filing 
a consolidated return in 1930.230  If they did, P’s $600 “economic” 
stock loss was disallowed and P acquired the land with a $100 basis.  If 
they did not, P recognized its $600 loss and took a $400 basis in the 
land. 
Courts uniformly approved this liquidation rule, even though it 
could deny a group its “economic” loss in subsidiary stock, a loss 
otherwise allowed under the predecessor to I.R.C. § 165.231  Treasury 
                                                          
stock); id. at § 112(a), 45 Stat. 816 (requiring all gain or loss from the liquidating 
distribution to be recognized); id. at 113(a), 45 Stat. 818 (providing for a cost basis); 
cf. id. at § 112(b)(3), 45 Stat. 816 (providing non-recognition for distributions as part 
of a reorganization). 
It was not until 1935 that Congress introduced special rules for parent-subsidiary 
liquidations.  See Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, § 110(a), 49 Stat. 1014, 
1020 (1935) (providing partial non-recognition; the parent recognized realized gain 
to the extent of any cash received in the liquidation); H.R. REP. NO. 74-1885, at 8-10 
(1935) (applying the basis rules of § 113(a)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. 
No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 680, 706-07 (1934); under those rules, the parent took bases in 
subsidiary assets determined by reference to its basis in the subsidiary stock).  In 
1936, Congress provided that the parent recognized no gain or loss on a subsidiary 
liquidation and took transferred bases in any distributed subsidiary assets.  See  
Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, §§ 112(b)(6), 113(a)(15), 49 Stat. 1648, 
1679, 1684-85 (1936).  The current Code contains substantially the same rules.  See 
I.R.C. §§ 332(a), 334(b)(1) (2003). 
 229. Assume that the stock purchase and liquidation were separate steps for tax 
purposes. 
 230. Whether P and S joined in filing a consolidated return, S did not recognize 
its built-in gain on the liquidation.  See Art. 71 of Reg. 74, reprinted in 138 Internal 
Revenue Acts of the United States 1909-1950 Legislative Histories, Laws, and Administrative 
Documents (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979) (providing that a corporation 
recognized no gain or loss on a liquidating distribution, except for distributions of 
installment obligations); see also Reg. 75, supra note 59, at Art. 3 (the predecessor to 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-80, providing that general tax rules applied to the extent a 
provision in Reg. 75 did not apply). 
 231. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Comm’r, 30 B.T.A. 691, 717 (1934) (applying Art. 37(a) of 
Reg. 75 to disallow a shareholder member’s stock loss on another member’s 
liquidation, concluding that Art. 37(a) was valid even though the group suffered an 
economic loss; the court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ilfeld to support 
its conclusion that the regulation was valid); Niagara Share Corp. v. Comm’r, 30 
B.T.A. 668, 669 (1934) (disallowing a shareholder member’s stock loss on another 
member’s liquidation under Art. 37(a)); First Nat’l Corp. of Portland v. Comm’r, 2 
T.C. 549, 558-59 (1943) (to the same effect); cf. Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 
U.S. 62, 65 (1934) (disallowing a shareholder member’s stock loss on another 
member’s liquidation under Art. 37(a), but noting that “[n]o question as to validity 
[of Art. 37(a)] is raised”); Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 23(f), 45 Stat. 
(pt. 1) 791, 800 (1928) (the same provision as current I.R.C. § 165(a)).  But cf. 
Burnet v. Aluminum Goods Mfg. Co., 287 U.S. 544 (1933) (permitting a loss on a 
1917 liquidation when the applicable regulations did not expressly disallow the loss).  
See Ronald Press Co. v. Shea, 27 F. Supp. 857 (1939) (concluding that a group’s stock 
loss on a member’s 1928 liquidation would be disallowed to the extent that it 
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justified the approach for substantive and administrative reasons that 
offer striking parallels to LDR.232 
Congress implicitly approved (and perhaps even endorsed) Reg. 75 
when it reconsidered the consolidated return rules in 1932.233  In its 
reconsideration, Congress not only failed to disturb Reg. 75’s policy 
choices or question its scope, but stated that consolidated groups 
were subject to Reg. 75 until Treasury chose to amend it.234 
Taken together, this congressional action, the applicable legislative 
history, and case law compel the following conclusion:  In 1928, 
Congress granted Treasury regulatory authority to deny a 
consolidated group its “economic” loss on subsidiary stock, despite 
the predecessor to I.R.C. § 165.235  Because the 1928 grant and its 
contemporary counterpart (I.R.C. § 1502) are substantially the 
same,236 the two grants should be interpreted consistently.  
                                                          
duplicated loss the group already took into account, despite there being no 
regulatory or statutory provision providing that result); see also N. Jersey Quarry Co. v. 
Comm’r, 13 T.C. 194 (1949) (as part of a dispute regarding the excess profits tax for 
a later year, concluding that, under Art. 37(a), a shareholder member did not 
recognize its stock gain on another member’s 1930 liquidation). 
 232. Andrew W. Mellon, Consolidated Returns Regulations—Summary of Provisions, 7 
NAT’L INC. TAX MAG. 105, 106 (1929).  Mellon was the Secretary of Treasury when 
Reg. 75 was issued, and his article briefly summarized and justified Reg. 75.  He 
appeared to justify Art. 37(a), in part, because it achieved a single-entity effect.  Id.  
Although he suggested that in certain cases a member probably should recognize 
gain or loss, he rationalized the absolute disallowance rule to promote “sound 
administration” and certainty, urging that “as a practical matter” it was too hard to 
distinguish among liquidations.  Id.  As further justification, he noted that a group 
could employ self-help measures to recognize loss.  Id.  Cf. Kanawha Gas & Util. Co. v. 
Comm’r, 214 F.2d 685, 690-92 (5th Cir. 1954) (applying the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine 
to a subsidiary liquidation in a way that arguably was inconsistent with Mellon’s 
rationale). 
 233. See Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 141(c), (e), 47 Stat. 213-14 
(1932) (providing that fire insurance and life insurance companies could not join 
together in filing consolidated returns and adding a 0.75% additional tax for 
consolidated groups). 
 234. See id. § 141(a), 47 Stat. 213 (providing that groups would be subject to Reg. 
75 (to the extent not inconsistent with the 1932 Act) if Treasury did not amend the 
regulations before returns had to be filed); see also S. REP. NO. 70-665, at 9 (1932) 
(stating that “[t]he provisions for consolidated returns under present law and 
regulations recognize sound accounting practices and require tax liabilities to be 
determined on the basis of the true net income of the enterprise as a whole”). 
 235. This conclusion gains added support because Reg. 75 was issued shortly after 
the 1928 legislative grant.  A regulation is given added weight if it is a “substantially 
contemporaneous” interpretation of a statute.  See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (giving greater weight to such 
interpretations).  Thus, because of when Reg. 75 was issued, it is more likely to be 
considered within the grant’s intended scope. 
 236. The two grants differ in style, but not substance.  See Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 63 T.C. 790, 803-04 (1975) (noting the difference between the two 
standards but not suggesting that one standard is substantively different than the 
other).  The 1928 grant authorized regulations to clearly reflect the “income” of the 
group and each member.  Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 141(b), 45 Stat. 
(pt. 1) 791 (1928).  The current grant authorizes regulations to clearly reflect the 
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Consequently, I.R.C. § 1502 also authorizes Treasury to deny a group 
its subsidiary stock loss, despite I.R.C. § 165.237 
C. Authority to Limit Duplicated Loss 
In addition to questioning Treasury’s authority to deny subsidiary 
stock loss, critics challenged its authority to limit loss duplicated in a 
subsidiary’s stock and assets.  That duplicated loss raised two distinct 
concerns: “classic” loss duplication and loss selectivity.  Both concerns 
were targeted by LDR’s loss duplication rule, and Treasury has 
regulatory authority to deal with each concern. 
1. “Classic” loss duplication 
“Classic” loss duplication occurs when a consolidated group 
deducts the same economic loss more than once. 
EXAMPLE 7—”CLASSIC” LOSS DUPLICATION 
P and S form T, with P transferring $100 cash for T’s common 
stock and S transferring land with a $50 basis and $10 value for T’s 
preferred stock.238  P and S take $100 and $50 exchanged bases in the 
T stock, and T takes a $50 transferred basis in the land.239  P, S, and T 
join in filing consolidated returns. 
                                                          
“income tax liability and the various factors necessary for the determination of such 
liability” for the group and each member “both during and after the period of 
affiliation.”  I.R.C. § 1502.  The current grant reflects language first introduced in 
1942.  See Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 159(a), 56 Stat. 859 (1942). 
The 1942 change was one of style, however, and it certainly did nothing to narrow 
Treasury’s authority to prescribe consolidated return regulations.  Cf. Salem I, supra 
note 4, at 176 (arguing that the revision broadened Treasury’s regulatory authority).  
The change merely formalized the previous directives in legislative history to 
consider relevant factors in crafting the consolidated return regulations.  See supra 
note 212 and accompanying text (for those factors).  Further, the change was never 
even mentioned in the relevant legislative history, a telling silence that denotes a 
stylistic change.  See S. REP. NO. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 132-35 (1942); H.R. REP. 
NO. 77-2333, at 101-03 (1942).  Finally, it appeared that Congress made the change 
to more succinctly combine the grants for the consolidated income-tax and excess-
profits-tax regulations.  Its economy of words should not portend a substantive 
change. 
 237. Cf. Sykes, supra note 221, at 469-71 (arguing that the loss duplication rule is 
unconstitutional in denying an “economic” stock loss; the argument presumes, 
however, that the loss duplication rule “squarely conflicts” with I.R.C. § 165); Salem 
III, supra note 178, at 1112 (arguing that the loss duplication rule “probably fails the 
constitutional test of taxing income,” citing Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179 
(1920), a case that considered how “net income” should be interpreted under the 
Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909; the author cited no case considering whether a 
tax provision was constitutional under the Sixteenth Amendment); see also Salem I, 
supra note 4, at 209 (arguing that LDR is invalid because it violates a group’s 
fundamental right to claim a loss). 
 238. Assume that T’s preferred stock is described in I.R.C. § 1504(a)(4) and not in 
§ 351(g). 
 239. See I.R.C. § 351(a) (providing that persons recognize no gain or loss if they 
transfer property to a corporation solely in exchange for its stock and control the 
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In an unrelated transaction, S sells its T preferred stock for $10, 
recognizing a $40 loss.240  Subsequently, T sells the land for $10, also 
recognizing a $40 loss.  Absent any limitation, the P group takes both 
losses into account and therefore could deduct the same economic 
loss twice.241 
For at least two reasons, Treasury has regulatory authority to 
address “classic” loss duplication.  First, it has attacked this concern 
through its investment adjustment rules since 1928, and courts have 
uniformly upheld those rules.242  Second, longstanding and 
influential Supreme Court precedent, Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez,243 
gives Treasury ample authority to address the concern. 
In Ilfeld, the Supreme Court concluded that a consolidated group 
could not deduct the same economic loss twice.  Two subsidiary 
members of a consolidated group incurred losses that the group 
absorbed.244  In a subsequent year, each subsidiary sold its assets for 
cash, paid off all creditors except the common parent, and dissolved, 
distributing its remaining cash to the common parent, its sole 
shareholder and creditor.  Although the group argued that it 
recognized loss on each dissolution,245 the Court denied each loss, 
based in part on its interpretation of the existing consolidated return 
regulations.246  It also reasoned that if the losses were allowed: 
                                                          
corporation immediately after the exchange); id. § 358(a)(1) (providing that a 
person takes an exchanged basis in controlled corporation stock received in a § 351 
exchange); id. § 362(a) (providing that the controlled corporation takes a 
transferred basis in an asset received in a § 351 exchange). 
 240. T remains a P group member, because the preferred stock is not counted in 
measuring affiliation.  See I.R.C. § 1504(a)(4) (2003); see also id. § 1504(a)(1), (2) 
(for the general definition of an affiliated group). 
 241. Although P will take a reduced basis in its T stock to account for T’s loss 
(Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(2)(i)), the reduction will not affect the P group if it 
retains its T stock or liquidates T.  See I.R.C. § 332(a) (providing broadly that a 
parent recognizes no gain or loss on the liquidation of an affiliated subsidiary). 
 242. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the 
investment adjustment rule in Reg. 75). 
 243. 292 U.S. 62 (1934). 
 244. Overall, each subsidiary’s losses exceeded its gains while it was a group 
member. 
 245. Id. at 64.  The group argued that the loss for each subsidiary equaled the 
excess of (i) the common parent’s basis in the subsidiary’s stock and debt over (ii) 
the distributed cash.  Id. 
 246. Id. at 66-67; see Reg. 75, supra note 59, at Art. 37(a) (providing that no gain or 
loss was recognized on a “distribution during a consolidated return period by a 
member of [a consolidated] group to another member of the group, in cancellation 
or redemption of all or any portion of its stock”); id. at Art. 40(a) (providing that a 
group could not take a bad debt deduction during a consolidated return period on 
“obligations which are the result of intercompany transactions”); see also Charles Ilfeld 
Co., 292 U.S. at 67-68 (concluding that under Art. 37(a), a group recognized no gain 
or loss when a member sold its assets and dissolved, overturning Hernandez v. Charles 
Ilfeld Co., 67 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1933) on this point). 
The group had apparently argued that each dissolution broke (and should have 
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[It] would permit [the group] twice to use the subsidiaries’ losses 
for the reduction of its taxable income.  By means of the 
consolidated returns in earlier years it was enabled to deduct them.  
And now it claims . . . deductions for the diminution of assets 
resulting from those same losses.  If allowed, this would be the 
practical equivalent of [a] double deduction.
247
 
A double deduction would be problematic, because it would distort 
the income (and tax liability) of the group.  Since I.R.C. § 1502 
authorizes Treasury to issue consolidated return regulations clearly to 
reflect a group’s income (and tax liability), Treasury has regulatory 
authority to prevent that distortion.  Stated equivalently, it may 
address “classic” loss duplication in a consolidated return regulation. 
2. Loss selectivity 
a. The concern 
LDR’s loss duplication rule addressed not only “classic” loss 
duplication but also the following phenomenon: Absent a limitation, 
a consolidated group will likely recognize any duplicated loss on its 
sale of a subsidiary but eliminate any duplicated gain.248  This loss 
selectivity arises, because a group typically can choose to either: 
(i) Eliminate stock gain or loss but recognize gain or loss on the 
subsidiary’s assets (with the buyer taking cost bases in those assets), 
or 
(ii) Recognize stock gain or loss but not recognize gain or loss on 
the subsidiary’s assets (with the subsidiary preserving its asset 
bases). 
The group will eliminate duplicated gain by making the first choice 
but preserve duplicated loss by making the second. 
EXAMPLE 8—STRUCTURING A SUBSIDIARY’S SALE 
P and its wholly owned subsidiary S are members of a consolidated 
group, and P plans to sell S.  The tax consequences of the sale will 
depend on its structure and any relevant tax elections. 
Asset sale.  S could sell its assets and liquidate, distributing the sales 
proceeds to P.249  On the asset sale, S would recognize any gain or 
                                                          
been treated as occurring after) consolidation, so that the group took its investment 
loss into account for each subsidiary.  Cf. Reg. 75, supra note 59, at Art. 37(b) 
(providing that a liquidating or non-liquidating distribution on stock between 
members after a consolidated return period was treated as a sale); id. at Art. 34(c), 35 
(providing for adjustments to the basis of subsidiary stock and debt to account for 
post-1928 subsidiary losses during consolidation). 
 247. Charles Ilfeld Co., 292 U.S. at 68. 
 248. See supra note 182 (for a further description of duplicated gain and loss). 
 249. See Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 104 (providing that in a merger, the target 
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loss, which the group would take into account.250  On the liquidation, 
neither P nor S would recognize gain or loss.251  The buyer would take 
a cost basis in the S assets.252 
Stock sale.  If P sold the S stock and joined the buyer in making a 
§ 338(h)(10) election, the results would be essentially the same as for 
the asset sale.253  If this election was not made, P would recognize any 
gain or loss on its S stock sale, while S would retain its tax attributes, 
including its asset bases.254 
EXAMPLE 9—LOSS SELECTIVITY 
P and its wholly owned subsidiaries, SL and SG, are members of a 
consolidated group, and P plans to sell SL and SG for $100 each.  SL 
owns one asset with a $140 basis and $100 value, and P’s basis in its SL 
stock is $140.  SG owns one asset with a $60 basis and $100 value, and 
P’s basis in its SG stock is $60. 
No matter how the group structured the SL and SG sales, it would 
recognize a $40 loss for the SL sale and a $40 gain for the SG sale.  
Without a consolidated loss-selectivity rule, the group typically would 
structure the sales to preserve the extra $40 loss in SL’s asset but 
eliminate the extra $40 gain in its SG stock.  It would sell the SL stock 
but not make a § 338(h)(10) election, so that it would recognize a 
$40 stock loss but SL would preserve its $40 built-in asset loss.
255  
Further, the group would sell the SG stock but make a § 338(h)(10) 
election, or it would have SG sell its assets and liquidate.  In either 
case, the group would recognize SG’s $40 asset gain but eliminate its 
$40 built-in gain on the SG stock. 
                                                          
corporation is treated as selling its assets and then liquidating). 
 250. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11 (as amended in 1999) (providing that CTI for a 
consolidated return year includes a subsidiary’s tax items for the year). 
 251. See I.R.C. § 332(a) (providing broadly that a parent recognizes no gain or loss 
on the liquidation of an affiliated subsidiary); id. § 337(a) (providing broadly that 
the affiliated subsidiary recognizes no gain or loss on any liquidating distribution to 
the parent). 
 252. See I.R.C. § 1012. 
 253. As a member of the P group, S would be deemed to sell its assets to a newly 
formed subsidiary of the buyer and then liquidate.  See supra note 156 (for a general 
description of this deemed asset sale).  The Code and regulations have provided for 
this deemed sale and liquidation since before LDR was introduced.  See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.338(h)(10)-1T(c), (e)(1)-(3) (in force as of January 1, 1991) (as amended by 
T.D. 8940, 66 Fed. Reg. 9925, 9950 (Feb. 13, 2001)). 
 254. Note, however, that S’s use of any loss carryovers or built-in loss could be 
restricted by I.R.C. § 382. 
 255. Thus, unlike with “classic” loss duplication, a group that selectively recognizes 
loss generally would not recognize the same economic loss twice.  Instead, the group 
would recognize a stock loss but the subsidiary would preserve a corresponding asset 
loss.  Cf. I.R.C. § 1502 (authorizing Treasury to prescribe rules to clearly reflect 
income and prevent tax avoidance for the group and its members “both during and 
after the period of affiliation”). 
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Although critics did not deny that loss selectivity raised a concern, 
they argued that it was part of a broader problem that Congress must 
address, and without explicit congressional support, Treasury could 
not target consolidated groups.256  Central to their argument was the 
following point: Non-consolidated groups could also selectively 
recognize loss.257  Critics also pointed to Code rules affecting stock 
loss, essentially arguing that those rules pre-empted a special 
consolidated rule.258  Although these arguments are not without 
force, the better answer is that Treasury can address loss selectivity for 
consolidated groups, a conclusion flowing, directly or indirectly, from 
the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. 
b. Historical conformity for groups 
In arguing that Treasury should conform the treatment of 
consolidated and non-consolidated groups, critics might point to 
vintage roots.  For instance, the Supreme Court in Ilfeld supported its 
attack on “classic” loss duplication, at least in part, to treat 
consolidated groups no more favorably than non-consolidated 
groups.259  In this regard, the Court followed Treasury’s lead in Reg. 
75. 
Under this 1929 regulation, a consolidated group decreased its 
basis in subsidiary stock to account for subsidiary loss but did not 
increase its basis to account for subsidiary gain.260  Treasury reasoned 
that the basis decrease prevented a consolidated group from twice 
deducting the same loss, something, it noted, a non-consolidated 
group could not do.261  It added that a basis increase for gain was not 
justified, because an increase was denied a non-consolidated group.262  
Thus, Treasury justified both aspects of its investment adjustment 
                                                          
 256. See, e.g., 1990-2 C.B. 696, 700; McBurney, supra note 203, at 25. 
 257. In fact, since 1994, the results in EXAMPLE 9 would be similar if the P group 
were a non-consolidated group.  In 1994, Treasury first authorized a non-
consolidated group to join in making a § 338(h)(10) election on its sale of subsidiary 
stock.  See T.D. 8515, 1994-1 C.B. 89, 115, 59 Fed. Reg. 2958, 2982 (Jan. 20, 1994) 
(providing for this election for the sale of a non-consolidated subsidiary). 
 258. McBurney, supra note 203. 
 259. Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 68, 69 (1934). 
 260. Art. 34 of Reg. 75 (providing that subsidiary stock basis was reduced by any 
subsidiary loss absorbed by the group that the subsidiary would not have used if it 
had filed separate returns; the article did not provide an increase to account for 
subsidiary gain). 
 261. Mellon, supra note 232, at 105 (1929) (noting that a basis increase would be 
unavailable to an affiliated, non-consolidated group). 
 262. See id. at 105-06 (1929) (noting that a basis increase would be unavailable to a 
non-consolidated group); see also Gen. Cons. Mem. 7765, IX-1 C.B. 223, 224-25 
(1930) (concluding that a basis increase “would result in a clear discrimination in 
favor of” consolidated groups over non-consolidated groups). 
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rule to conform the treatment of consolidated and non-consolidated 
groups.263 
By 1936, however, Treasury had moved the investment adjustment 
rule toward a single-entity approach,264 and by 1966, it had adopted 
the approach in full flower, amending the rule to provide a basis 
increase for subsidiary gain.265  Thus, by 1966, Treasury had fully 
abandoned its 1929 rationale for the investment adjustment rules 
and, if its 1966 change was valid, Treasury’s 1929 explanation really 
adds nothing to the current debate about loss selectivity. 
There should be no doubt that the 1966 change was valid.  First, 
when Congress granted Treasury broad regulatory authority in 1928, 
it gave Treasury great flexibility to adopt a single-entity approach.266  
                                                          
 263. Both aspects of the rule could also be supported for the following related 
reason: Consolidation affected a group’s total tax only if at least one member had a 
net loss; if all members had net income, the group’s total tax would be the same, 
whether or not it filed consolidated returns.  Gen. Couns. Mem. 11,676, XII-1 C.B. 
75, 76-77 (1933); see also Charles Ilfeld Co., 292 U.S. at 69 (appearing to clarify an 
argument stated in Gen. Couns. Mem. 11,676). 
 264. In 1936, Congress reduced the dividends received deduction for corporate 
shareholders from 100 to 85%.  Section 26(b) of the Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. 
No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1664 (1936) (providing for the reduction); id. § 1, 49 Stat. 1652 
(providing that this amendment applied to taxable years beginning after December 
31, 1935).  Thus, a non-consolidated group included a net fifteen percent of an 
intercompany dividend in taxable income. 
Despite that statutory change, the applicable consolidated return regulations 
continued to eliminate intercompany dividends from CTI and provided no basis 
adjustment for those dividends.  See Art. 31(b) of Reg. 97, reprinted in 138 Internal 
Revenue Acts of the United States 1909-1950 Legislative Histories, Laws, and Administrative 
Documents (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979) (providing that intercompany dividends 
were eliminated); id. at Art. 37 (providing no basis adjustment for dividends).  
Treasury could have better conformed the treatment of consolidated and non-
consolidated groups in one of two ways.  It could have forced a consolidated group to 
either include fifteen percent of an intercompany dividend in CTI or reduce its 
subsidiary stock basis by fifteen percent of any intercompany dividend.  By taking 
neither step, Treasury moved toward a single-entity model for the investment 
adjustment and related rules. 
 265. See 31 Fed. Reg. 16698 (Dec. 30, 1966) (introducing positive adjustments for 
subsidiary gain in Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(1) and (c)(1)). 
 266. In authorizing the broad grant of regulatory authority, Congress gave the 
following rationale for consolidation: 
The permission to file consolidated returns by affiliated corporations merely 
recognizes the business entity as distinguished from the legal corporate 
entity of the business enterprise. . . . The failure to recognize the entire 
business enterprise means drawing technical legal distinctions, as contrasted 
with the recognition of actual facts. . . . [T]o require for tax purposes the 
breaking up of a single business into its constituent parts is just as 
unreasonable as to require a single corporation to report separately for tax 
purposes the gains from its sales department, from its manufacturing 
activities, from its investments, and from each and every one of its agencies. 
S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 14 (1928) (also stating that the members of a group “are really 
one corporation” and “no ultimate advantage under the tax laws really results” from 
filing consolidated returns). 
Although the statement quoted above seems to invite a single-entity approach, 
Congress also directed the IRS to provide definite rules in the regulations, if 
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Congress surely contemplated that Treasury might use that approach 
for its investment adjustment rule, since the most influential pre-1928 
case endorsed the approach and some contemporary commentators 
favored it.267  Second, Congress has never tied investment adjustments 
to the treatment of non-consolidated groups268 but instead has 
implicitly endorsed the 1966 change.269  Third, courts concluded that 
another aspect of the 1966 change was valid, even though it 
distinguished between consolidated and non-consolidated groups.270  
Finally, with its single-entity approach, the 1966 change promoted tax 
neutrality, making it more likely that a group would not affect its tax 
by forming a new member or transferring assets between members.271  
For all of these reasons, Treasury properly abandoned its early 
rationale for the investment adjustment rule, and its dated use of the 
rationale should provide no support for critics of the loss duplication 
rule. 
c. Repeal of the General Utilities doctrine 
Despite abandoning the rationale, Treasury did not attack loss 
selectivity systemically for consolidated groups until it prescribed the 
loss duplication rule as part of LDR.  Critics maintained that Treasury 
could not change its longstanding position on loss selectivity without 
Congressional direction. However, not only could Treasury change its 
position without Congressional direction, Congress gave Treasury 
that direction, at least implicitly, with the repeal of the General Utilities 
doctrine. 
                                                          
necessary emphasizing certainty over conceptual purity: 
It is, obviously, of utmost importance that these questions [in filing 
consolidated returns] be answered with certainty and a definite rule be 
prescribed.  Frequently, the particular policy is comparatively immaterial, so 
long as the rule to be applied is known. 
Id.  By emphasizing certainty, Congress fell short of a single-entity mandate, instead 
affording the IRS considerable leeway to develop consolidated policy through the 
consolidated return regulations. 
 267. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (for a discussion of Crocker); see 
also supra note 213 (for cites to articles discussing the various approaches). 
 268. In fact, as the quotes in second preceding footnote show, to the extent that 
Congress had a preference, it seemed to lean toward a single-entity approach. 
 269. See § 10222(a)(1) of Pub. L. No. 100-203, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1987, 101 Stat. 1330-410 (1987) (modifying the investment adjustment rule to 
better achieve a single-entity effect); see also H.R. REP. NO. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1089 (1987) (stating that a stock-basis increase “should be permitted” for subsidiary 
income or gain accrued and recognized while the subsidiary is a member of the 
consolidated group). 
 270. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text (describing cases approving the 
ELAs). 
 271. As the case review in Part I.B.2 illustrates, a consolidated return regulation is 
unlikely to be invalidated if it is tax-neutral. 
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To begin with, it should be irrelevant that Treasury’s former 
position on loss selectivity was of long standing.272  As courts have long 
recognized, Treasury can amend even interpretive regulations in 
light of administrative experience.273  Further, it can amend a 
legislative regulation like a consolidated return regulation, as long as 
it adopts a reasonable approach.274  With that freedom and despite its 
longstanding position, Treasury could attack loss selectivity in the 
consolidated return regulations if it could reasonably distinguish 
consolidated and non-consolidated groups.275 
Treasury made such a distinction in 1966 when it increased a 
group’s subsidiary stock basis to account for subsidiary gain.276  The 
change was part of a massive revision of the regulations that signaled 
a fundamental shift in Treasury’s consolidated approach.277  The shift 
                                                          
 272. Cf. Salem I, supra note 4, at 212 (arguing that courts are suspicious of abrupt 
changes in the regulations, citing American Standard; however, Treasury could not 
justify its amendment in that case, a critical point that distinguishes LDR’s loss 
duplication rule from the challenged rule in American Standard).  Note that a court 
may be more likely to approve a longstanding position, sometimes by reasoning that 
Congress has approved the position under the legislative-reenactment doctrine.  See 
Regal, Inc. v. Comm’r, 53 T.C. 261, 267-68 (1969), aff’d per curiam, 435 F.2d 922 (2d 
Cir. 1970) (essentially applying the legislative-reenactment doctrine in approving the 
continued-filing requirement).  A court’s approval of one position, however, does 
not imply its rejection of all other reasonable positions. 
 273. See, e.g.,  Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 485 
(1979) (considering interpretive regulations). 
 274. Except as limited by the applicable grant of regulatory authority, Treasury is 
free to amend a legislative regulation in the same way Congress can amend the Code.  
That freedom of choice marks the essence of a legislative regulation. 
For a consolidated return regulation, Treasury’s choice must “clearly reflect” the 
income tax liability of the group and each member, both during and after affiliation 
and “prevent avoidance” of that tax liability.  I.R.C. § 1502 (2003).  If Treasury’s 
choice achieves those goals, it is “reasonable.” 
 275. Treasury would also have to use a reasonable method in its attack, a topic 
discussed in the next section of the article. 
 276. See supra notes 266-71 and accompanying text (for why the change was a 
reasonable approach). 
 277. Among other things, the 1966 revision provided that: 
(i)  A member recognized but deferred gain or loss on an intercompany 
transaction.  See 31 Fed. Reg. 11801 (Sept. 8, 1966) (providing this rule 
in Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(c)).  Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-31(b)(1)(i) (in 
force as of Jan. 1, 1966) (eliminating gain or loss on an intercompany 
transaction). 
(ii)  A consolidated group increased its basis in subsidiary stock to account 
for subsidiary profits and could have a negative basis (or ELA) in 
subsidiary stock.  See 31 Fed. Reg. 16695-96 and 16698-99 (providing 
these rules in Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-19 and Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-
32(b)(1), (c)(1), and (e)).  Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-34(b)(2) (in force 
as of Jan. 1, 1966) (not providing a basis increase for gain or negative 
basis) 
(iii)  A group could carry back the portion of its consolidated net operating 
loss (“CNOL”) attributable to a newly formed subsidiary without 
restriction.  31 Fed. Reg. 11807 (Sept. 8, 1966) (providing this rule in 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21(b)).  Cf. Midland Mgmt. Co. v. Comm’r, 38 T.C. 
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made the regulations more tax-neutral278 and was prompted by a loss-
selectivity concern.279 
That concern was unique to consolidated groups, arguably 
differentiating the 1966 revision from LDR’s loss duplication rule.  
That argument assumes that consolidated and non-consolidated 
groups present the same loss-selectivity concern.  They don’t, in part 
because the investment adjustment rule treats a consolidated group 
more like a single entity.  Those and other “single-entity” rules justify 
a targeted consolidated response to loss selectivity, a response also 
supported, directly or indirectly, by the repeal of the General Utilities 
doctrine. 
The repeal caused a sea change in corporate taxation.  Before the 
repeal, a corporation could sometimes distribute or sell an asset 
without recognizing gain or loss.280  The non-recognition provided a 
second-best alternative to corporate integration, and Congress 
accepted its blend of corporate tax and tax on shareholders’ stock 
gain as an adequate surrogate for a broader-based corporate tax.281 
In implementing the repeal, Congress concluded that the non-
recognition undermined the corporate tax, because a corporation 
could eliminate built-in gain on an asset through the asset’s 
transfer.282  Thus, it necessarily rejected the surrogate taxation of 
                                                          
211 (1962) (concluding that a group could not carry back the portion 
of its CNOL attributable to a newly formed subsidiary to any pre-
formation consolidated return year). 
 278. See supra notes 12-26 and accompanying text (describing the regime and 
explaining why it is tax neutral).  Note that the current regulations reflect the same 
basic approach as the 1966 regulations. 
 279. Among other things, the revision corrected a gap in the pre-1966 
intercompany transaction rules that groups exploited to recognize loss but avoid gain 
on asset sales.  See Henry C. Beck Builders v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 616 (1964) (describing 
a series of steps exploiting the pre-1966 intercompany transaction rules under which 
a group could sell a built-in gain asset without gain).  The revision addressed that loss 
selectivity. 
 280. See generally I.R.C. § 311 (1968) (for non-liquidating distributions) and I.R.C. 
§§  336 and 337 (1968) (for liquidating distributions); see also Tax Reform Act of 
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 905(a), 83 Stat. 713-14 (1969) (modifying I.R.C. § 311 to 
require a corporation to recognize gain on some non-liquidating distributions).  The 
1969 change began an erosion of the General Utilities doctrine that culminated in 
1986 with its outright repeal.  See supra note 169. 
 281. See STAFF OF THE SENATE FINANCE COMM., The Subchapter C Revision Act of 
1985, S. Prt. 99-47, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter Green 
Book] (noting the linkage between the shareholder-level and corporate-level tax). 
 282. H.R. REP. NO. 426, 99th Cong, 1st Sess. 282 (1985).  It also justified the repeal 
to promote tax neutrality, arguing that the doctrine “create[d] significant distortions 
in business behavior.”  Id. at 281-82 (also noting the bias, absent the repeal, for a 
corporation to sell built-in gain assets, since they were worth more to the buyer 
because of their stepped-up bases and the seller would recognize no gain in a 
properly structured sale); see also Green Book, supra note 281, at 42-44 (noting the 
doctrine’s bias and also arguing that its repeal would eliminate the need for certain 
complex rules). 
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corporate income through a shareholder tax.283  Further, in de-
linking the shareholder and corporate tax, Congress narrowed the 
focus of the corporate tax regime, generally looking solely to a 
corporation’s income to determine its proper level of tax. 
Although the breadth of the repeal remains unclear, at a minimum 
it requires that a corporation recognize gain when it sells an 
appreciated asset and the asset takes a stepped-up basis.284  As a 
corollary, a corporation should not recognize a loss if it sells a built-in 
loss asset, the asset remains in corporate solution, but its basis is not 
stepped down (so that the basis preserves or duplicates the loss).  
Like gain elimination, this loss duplication undermines the corporate 
tax, even if later use of the built-in loss is somehow limited (e.g., 
under I.R.C. § 382). 
The corollary justifies a targeted consolidated response to loss 
selectivity.  It could probably apply only to a consolidated group and 
only if the group sold its subsidiary stock at a loss but the loss was 
duplicated in the subsidiary’s assets.285  Under a single-entity 
approach, the stock and asset losses could be viewed as the “same” 
loss.  Then, a consolidated group would violate the corollary if it 
recognized a subsidiary stock loss that was duplicated (i.e., preserved) 
in the subsidiary assets. 
Treasury should be authorized to use a single-entity approach to 
apply the corollary to a consolidated group, since it used that 
                                                          
 283. The legislative history does not explain why, but it may be because 
shareholders of publicly traded corporations increasingly were tax-exempt. 
 284. See supra note 169. 
 285. Arguably, a similar duplicated-loss concern may arise if a partner sells a 
partnership interest at a loss.  Cf. I.R.C. § 311(b)(3) (giving Treasury regulatory 
authority to compute gain on a corporation’s non-liquidating distribution of a 
partnership interest by disregarding any built-in loss in property that the corporation 
contributed to the partnership with the principal purpose of avoiding § 311 gain).  If 
the loss is duplicated in the partnership assets and the partnership has not made an 
I.R.C. § 754 election, the buyer may subsequently be allocated a corresponding 
partnership loss.  However, the buyer will reduce its outside partnership basis to 
account for the loss, increasing its gain (or reducing its loss) on a later disposition of 
its partnership interest or distributed partnership assets.  See I.R.C. § 705(a)(2)(A) 
(2003) (for a determination of basis of a partner’s interest); id. § 732 (describing 
how a partner determines its basis in distributed partnership assets).  This tax 
detriment can be postponed but not readily avoided; cf. id. § 1014 (providing that 
property acquired from a decedent generally takes a date-of-death value). 
In contrast, the corporate buyer of a “duplicated loss” subsidiary can readily avoid 
any tax detriment arising from the subsidiary’s later recognition of a duplicated loss.  
Although a consolidated buyer of the subsidiary reduces its basis in subsidiary stock 
when the subsidiary takes the loss into account, the buyer can eliminate that 
detriment by liquidating the subsidiary or by selling the subsidiary stock and joining 
in a § 338(h)(10) election for the sale.  See I.R.C. § 332(a) (providing that a parent 
recognizes no gain or loss on a subsidiary’s liquidation); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-
32(b)(2)(i) and (3)(i) (2003) (for the subsidiary basis adjustment on taxable income 
or loss); supra note 253 (for the consequences of a § 338(h)(10) election). 
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approach for the investment adjustment rule.  Both gauge the 
amount a group should recognize on its sale of subsidiary stock, and 
both attack loss duplication.286  Because the corollary complements 
the investment adjustment rule, it could likewise be applied using a 
single-entity approach.  However, the corollary should be applied 
only to consolidated groups, since non-consolidated groups generally 
do not use a single-entity approach to determine basis in subsidiary 
stock. 
Thus, the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine supports a targeted 
consolidated response to loss selectivity.287  Despite that support, 
Treasury did not treat loss selectivity as a concern directly implicated 
by the repeal.288 
d. Code changes related to the repeal 
Whether or not the repeal directly implicated loss selectivity, the 
two are intimately connected.  In concert with its response to the 
repeal, Treasury had (and has) the authority to craft a consolidated 
loss-selectivity rule.  The rule would complement both the Code 
changes related to the repeal and the investment adjustment and 
other “single-entity” rules of the consolidated return regulations. 
Loss-selectivity concerns have always been entwined with the 
General Utilities doctrine and its repeal.  Such a concern, in fact, 
provided the backdrop for the General Utilities case.289  The law at the 
time seemed to permit the following facile ploy: A corporation could 
avoid gain by declaring and making an in-kind distribution of gain 
property, while it could recognize loss by declaring a distribution of a 
stated dollar amount but satisfying the declaration with loss 
                                                          
 286. The investment adjustment rule prevents duplication for a subsidiary’s tax 
items that already have been taken into account, while the corollary applies to built-
in loss amounts. 
 287. Some may counter, however, that the repeal should not support a 
consolidated attack on loss selectivity, because Congress rejected such an attack.  
I address that argument, as more broadly stated, below. 
Others may accept the connection noted in the text between loss selectivity and 
the repeal, but argue that a consolidated attack on loss selectivity is valid only if 
consolidated gain duplication is also limited.  As I also note below, consolidated 
groups, as a practical matter, can eliminate most gain duplication that the 
regulations do not already limit.  Any vestige that remains should not require a 
regulatory response. 
 288. See T.D. 8294, 1990-1 C.B. 66, 67-68 (stating that the loss selectivity rule 
“addresses another problem”); 1991-2 C.B. 43, 46 (also differentiating loss selectivity 
as a concern separate from the repeal); see also 1990-2 C.B. 696, 700 (noting 
commentators’ assertions that loss duplication was beyond the scope of the repeal); 
Lee A. Sheppard, Federal Circuit Invalidates Loss Disallowance Rule, 92 TAX NOTES 334, 
340-41 (2001), 2001 TNT 136-3 (concluding that loss duplication was not a concern 
of the repeal). 
 289. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
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property.290  Perhaps to counter the ploy, Treasury in General Utilities 
urged that a corporation recognized gain on its in-kind distribution 
of gain property.  The Supreme Court, however, disagreed.291 
In 1954, Congress codified the Supreme Court’s holding and also 
codified and expanded the regulatory non-recognition rule for 
liquidations.292  Under the expanded rule, if a corporation liquidated 
within twelve months after adopting a plan of liquidation, it generally 
recognized no gain or loss on asset sales during that twelve-month (or 
shorter) period.293  Although the rule was intended to provide more 
certain tax results for liquidations and related asset sales,294 it also 
limited loss selectivity.  Before the change, a corporation could sell its 
loss property and recognize loss, but distribute its gain property in 
                                                          
 290. Callanan Rd. Improvement Co. v. Comm’r, 12 B.T.A. 1109 (1928), acq. VII-2 
C.B. 7 (concluding that a corporation recognized loss when it declared a distribution 
of a stated dollar amount, which it satisfied with loss property); see also Bacon-
McMillan Veneer Co. v. Comm’r, 20 B.T.A. 556 (1930) (concluding that a 
corporation recognized gain when it declared a distribution of a stated dollar 
amount, which it satisfied with appreciated property); cf. First Utah Sav. Bank v. 
Comm’r, 17 B.T.A. 804, 810-11 (1929), aff’d, First Sav. Bank of Ogden v. Burnet, 53 
F.2d 919, 920-21 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (concluding that a corporation recognized no gain 
or loss when it made an in-kind distribution of property, because the in-kind 
distribution was not a sale or other disposition). 
 291. Gen. Utilities, 296 U.S. at 206 (noting that the distribution was not a sale or 
exchange). 
 292. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, §§ 311(a), 337(a), 68A 
Stat. 95, 106 [hereinafter 1954 Code].  Applicable legislative history appeared to 
preserve the distinction between in-kind distributions and stated-dollar distributions 
satisfied with non-cash property.  See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 247 (providing that a 
“distribution of property made to a shareholder in his capacity as a creditor of the 
distributing corporation is not within the [non-recognition] rule of” I.R.C. § 311(a)); 
H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A90 (1954) (to the same effect); see also Jasper L. 
Cummings, Discontinuities in Corporate Recognition of Loss, 44 TAX LAW. 39, 48-49 
(1990) (noting that the 1954 Code preserved the distinction but that in an 
appropriate case when a stated-dollar distribution was satisfied with non-cash 
property, it could be treated in substance as an in-kind distribution). 
Beginning in 1919, Treasury provided by regulation that a corporation generally 
recognized no gain or loss on a liquidating distribution.  See § 39.22(a)-20 of Reg. 118 
(1953); § 29.22(a)-20 of Reg. 111 (1943); § 19.22(a)-21 of Reg. 103 (1940); Art. 
22(a)-21 of Regs. 101 (1939), 94 (1936), and 86 (1935); Art. 71 of Regs. 77 (1933) 
and 74 (1929); Art. 548 of Regs. 69 (1926), 65 (1924), and 62 (1922); Art. 547 of 
Reg. 45 (1919).  Although General Utilities dealt with in-kind, non-liquidating 
distributions, the doctrine bearing its name stood for the following broader 
proposition: A corporation recognized no gain or loss on liquidating and non-
liquidating distributions. 
 293. See 1954 Code, supra note 292, at § 337, 68A Stat. 106-07 (providing that the 
special rule generally did not apply to § 332 or § 333 liquidations or to certain types 
of property). 
 294. See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 258 (providing the rule to eliminate the uncertain 
tax results under prior law); H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A106 (1954) (also justifying 
the rule to eliminate a “trap for the unwary”).  Compare Comm’r v. Court Holding 
Co., 324 U.S. 451 (1945) (treating an asset sale in form made by a corporation’s 
shareholders as made by the corporation), with United States v. Cumberland Pub. 
Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 341 (1950) (under similar facts, respecting the form of the sale). 
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liquidation and avoid gain.  With the change, the liquidating 
corporation recognized loss on an asset sale only if it sold the asset 
before it adopted the liquidation plan or liquidated more than twelve 
months after the plan’s adoption. 
Even this lingering selective-loss recognition troubled Treasury,295 
illustrating that the General Utilities doctrine would likely raise loss-
selectivity concerns no matter how it was refined.296  Not surprisingly, 
then, as Congress repealed the doctrine, it addressed loss selectivity. 
In the repeal’s first phase, which began in 1969, Congress required 
that a corporation recognize gain on some non-liquidating 
distributions of appreciated property.297  It reasoned that “a 
corporation should [not] be permitted to avoid tax on any 
appreciated property” through a non-liquidating distribution.298  
Without explanation, Congress continued to disallow loss on a non-
liquidating distribution of loss property, a disallowance it likely 
justified, at least in part, to curb loss selectivity.299 
                                                          
 295. Treasury fought this loss selectivity but was rebuffed and eventually retreated.  
Compare City Bank of Wash. v. Comm’r, 38 T.C. 713, 721-22 (1962) (in which 
Treasury argued that a corporation recognized no loss on an asset sale because it 
occurred after an “informal” liquidation plan was adopted; in rejecting Treasury’s 
argument, the court looked to the date of the formal plan, reasoning that I.R.C. 
§ 337 was intended to add certainty), with Rev. Rul. 77-150, 1977-1 C.B. 88 
(concluding that I.R.C. § 337 did not apply to limit a corporation’s loss on a sale of 
assets after the corporation adopted a liquidation plan, because the corporation 
finally liquidated more than 12 months after the plan was adopted; the IRS reasoned 
that I.R.C. § 337 “was designed to operate in a mechanical fashion so that uncertainty 
would be eliminated in liquidations thereunder”); see also Virginia Ice & Freezing 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 30 T.C. 1251, 1256-58 (1958) (looking to the date that the formal 
plan of liquidation was adopted). 
 296. See, e.g., Green Book, supra note 281, at 44 (justifying the repeal in part 
because of a “mirror” transaction, which involved loss selectivity); id. at 42-44 (noting 
how the General Utilities doctrine spawned tax avoidance schemes that “required 
complex statutory and judicial responses”). 
 297. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 905, 83 Stat. 713-14 (1969) 
(adding I.R.C. § 311(d)). 
 298. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 279 (1969). 
 299. If Congress had not continued the disallowance, a corporation could 
selectively recognize loss by distributing loss property and retaining gain property.  
See George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquidations (and Related Matters) After the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, 42 TAX L. REV. 573, 623 (1987) (stating that non-recognition 
might be appropriate to curb loss selectivity). 
Congress might also have worried that allowing loss would entice some 
corporations and shareholders to understate the value of distributed property.  The 
understatement could benefit both corporations and shareholders, increasing (or 
producing) corporation-level loss while reducing shareholder-level income.  Note, 
however, that the gain-recognition rule offers a similar lure, since an understatement 
would reduce income or gain at both levels. 
Finally, loss non-recognition could offer a collateral administrative benefit—
helping to value distributed property.  Because a corporation could always sell loss 
property and recognize loss, it would give up that potential tax benefit by distributing 
such property.  Thus, a corporation might hesitate to distribute loss property, giving 
the IRS evidence against a shareholder’s claim that distributed property was worth 
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In 1986, Congress sounded the death knell for the General Utilities 
doctrine, requiring a corporation generally to recognize gain on its 
liquidating or non-liquidating distribution of appreciated property.300  
Although a liquidating corporation could also generally recognize 
loss, Congress expanded loss disallowance from a mere refrain to a 
resounding chorus.  It disallowed a corporation’s loss not only for 
non-liquidating distributions but also for distributions that were part 
of a: 
(i)  Parent-subsidiary liquidation;301 
(ii)  § 355 transaction;302 
(iii) Reorganization exchange;303 and 
(iv)  § 351 exchange.304 
Congress did not explain why it expanded loss disallowance, but 
each expansion likely arose in part to address loss-selectivity 
concerns.305 
Thus, those concerns were closely allied with the repeal of the 
General Utilities doctrine, arguably justifying Treasury’s attack on 
                                                          
less than the corporation’s basis in the property. 
 300. See  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2269-75 
(1987).  Congress retained the general non-recognition rule for parent-subsidiary 
liquidations and for § 355 distributions; I.R.C. § 337(a) (providing that an affiliated 
subsidiary recognizes no gain or loss on any liquidating distribution to the parent); 
id. § 355(a) (providing that a corporation recognizes no gain or loss on a qualified 
distribution of subsidiary stock). 
 301. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631(a), 100 Stat. 2269-75 
(1987) (providing that in a § 332 liquidation, the subsidiary recognized no gain or 
loss on distributions to its affiliated parent (I.R.C. § 337(a)) and that it recognized 
gain but not loss on distributions to other shareholders (§ 336(a) and (d)(3))); see 
also id. at 2271 (providing in I.R.C. § 337(b)(1) that a subsidiary recognized no gain 
or loss when it satisfied its debt to its affiliated parent as part of a § 332 liquidation; 
because the parent took transferred bases in the subsidiary assets, that gain or loss 
was preserved); id. at 2269-70 (adding I.R.C. § 336(d)(1) and (2), which sometimes 
disallowed a liquidating corporation’s loss on distributions to related persons or on 
distributions of recently contributed property). 
 302. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 
§ 1018(d)(5)(C), 102 Stat. 3580 (1988) (adding I.R.C. § 355(c) to provide that a 
corporation recognized gain but not loss on its distribution of non-qualified property 
as part of a § 355 distribution). 
 303. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1804(g)(1), 100 Stat. 2806 
(adding I.R.C. § 361(c) to provide that a corporation recognized gain but not loss on 
its distribution of non-qualified property under a plan of reorganization); see also  
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act, § 1018(d)(5)(A) (amending I.R.C. 
§ 361(c)). 
 304. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act, § 1018(d)(5)(G) (amending 
I.R.C. § 351(f) to provide that the controlled corporation recognized gain but not 
loss on its distribution of non-qualified property in a § 351 exchange). 
 305. See supra note 299 (for the loss selectivity and other concerns that may have 
motivated many of those changes).  But see Yin, supra note 299, at 623-24 (arguing 
that gain and loss should be recognized on distributions to minority shareholders in 
a § 332 liquidation, because gain or loss generally is recognized for non-§ 332 
liquidations). 
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consolidated loss selectivity.  Critics countered that a targeted 
consolidated response was improper, because consolidated and non-
consolidated groups shared the same concern: Either could 
recognize duplicated loss in subsidiary stock but avoid duplicated 
gain by selling subsidiary assets.306 
However, consolidated groups raise a distinct concern that merits a 
targeted response, not only because a consolidated response helps 
avoid tracing under LDR, but also for at least two other reasons.  
First, the investment adjustment and other “single-entity” rules limit 
gain and loss duplication systematically for just consolidated groups.  
The investment adjustment rule prevents duplication for a 
subsidiary’s tax items that the group takes into account.307  LDR limits 
duplication of subsidiary built-in gain.308  Both rules are 
complemented by a consolidated response to loss selectivity, because 
the response limits duplication of subsidiary built-in loss. 
Second, without any restriction, a consolidated group seems more 
likely to recognize a duplicated stock loss.  That loss could offset the 
entire group’s capital gain,309 not just the selling’s member’s as it 
would for a non-consolidated group.  Because a consolidated group 
would more likely believe that it could use a duplicated stock loss, it 
would more freely recognize the loss, warranting a targeted 
consolidated response. 
A consolidated response should also promote tax neutrality, 
although a group’s acquisition of a new member may not be tax-
neutral with or without the response.  The response might deter such 
acquisitions, since it could limit any later stock loss.  That danger 
                                                          
 306. See, e.g., 1990-2 C.B. 696, 700; McBurney, supra note 203.  Either group could 
also sell subsidiary stock but be deemed to sell subsidiary assets by joining in a 
§ 338(h)(10) election for the sale.  See supra Part III.C.2.a (for EXAMPLE 9, which 
illustrates the loss-selectivity concern).  Note that Treasury first allowed non-
consolidated groups to make those elections in 1994, an allowance that made loss 
selectivity more likely for non-consolidated groups.  See T.D. 8515, 1994-1 C.B. 89, 
115, 59 Fed. Reg. 2958, 2982 (Jan. 20, 1994) (providing for this election for the sale 
of a non-consolidated subsidiary). 
 307. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  Because a non-consolidated 
group’s basis in subsidiary stock is not adjusted to account for the subsidiary’s tax 
items, such a group is more likely to duplicate gain and (particularly) loss in 
subsidiary stock. Cf. I.R.C. § 243(a)(3), (b) (providing a 100% dividends received 
deduction for distributions between members of an affiliated group if paid out of 
affiliated earnings and profits). 
 308. A consolidated group can offset that amount with a stock-basis increase for 
any pre-affiliation built-in gain that the subsidiary recognizes.  See supra note 178 and 
accompanying text. 
 309. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-22(a) (2003) (providing that the group takes its 
capital gain and loss into account like a single entity).  The text assumes, as is likely, 
that the stock loss will be capital.  A corporation’s capital loss can offset only capital 
gain.  I.R.C. § 1211(a) (2003). 
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would be greater for a risky investment, where a later stock loss would 
be more likely, but even if such an investment turned sour, a group 
could still typically recognize loss by selling the subsidiary’s assets.310  
On the other hand, without a consolidated response, a group could 
have a tax incentive to make the risky investment, since it could 
recognize any later stock loss but, as Rite Aid shows, also receive an 
economic benefit for any inside asset loss.311  Thus, with or without a 
consolidated response, the regulations might not be tax neutral for a 
group’s acquisition of a new member. 
However, a consolidated response should promote tax neutrality in 
a group’s choice to form a subsidiary or transfer assets to a subsidiary.  
Without the response, a group might take either step to duplicate 
loss, even if the step did not otherwise make sound business sense.312  
Because the response should neither deter nor encourage either 
step, tax neutrality, on balance, should favor the response.313 
Thus, the Code changes related to the repeal of the General Utilities 
doctrine support a targeted consolidated response to loss selectivity.  
The response would complement the investment adjustment and 
                                                          
 310. See infra notes 350-51 and accompanying text (describing how the group may 
recognize asset loss).  Note that the subsidiary’s net asset loss could be less than the 
group’s stock loss if, for example, the subsidiary had built-in gain when acquired.  If 
the group’s loss is limited to the subsidiary’s asset loss, the group in effect must take 
the subsidiary’s built-in gain into account, a result arguably supported by the repeal 
of the General Utilities doctrine. 
 311. See supra note 193; see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1082 (1987) (stating that 
a principal purpose of the General Utilities doctrine was to eliminate tax biases 
favoring dispositions). 
 312. The IRS may argue that I.R.C. § 351 does not apply to any such asset transfer 
(so that the loss was not duplicated) if the transfer did not have a significant non-tax 
business purpose.  See Notice 2001-17, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730; F.S.A. 1999-05-008 (Feb. 8, 
1999) (both asserting that I.R.C. § 351 may not apply if an exchange lacks a non-tax 
business purpose).  However, it is not altogether clear absent a legislative or 
regulatory change that I.R.C. § 351 has an independent business-purpose 
requirement.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(ii) (2003) (providing, among 
other things, that the “primary” purpose of an accommodation transfer must be to 
qualify others under I.R.C. § 351; that requirement might be unnecessary if I.R.C. 
§ 351 had a business-purpose requirement).  But cf. Caruth v. United States, 688 F. 
Supp. 1129, 1140 (N.D. Tex. 1987), aff’d on another issue, 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(concluding that I.R.C. § 351 has a business-purpose requirement that parallels the 
requirement for § 368 reorganizations; it based that conclusion, in part, on the close 
historical relationship between the operative provisions; the court nonetheless 
concluded that I.R.C. § 351 applied because the exchange had a modest non-tax 
business purpose); see also Stewart v. Comm’r, 714 F.2d 977, 992 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(treating a corporation as the conduit for its shareholder when the shareholder 
contributed property to the corporation that the corporation quickly sold; there was 
no non-tax business purpose for the contribution); Rollins v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1869 (1993) (applying the same theory); Rev. Rul. 55-36, 1955-1 C.B. 340 
(recasting a transaction in part because it failed to meet a business purpose 
requirement). 
 313. As the case review in Part I.B.2 illustrates, a consolidated return regulation is 
unlikely to be invalidated if it is tax-neutral. 
FINALLEATHERMAN.DOC 8/15/2003  1:38 PM 
876 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:811 
other “single-entity” rules of the consolidated return regulations and 
better promote tax neutrality. 
e. Other Code changes 
Instead of focusing on the repeal and related changes, however, 
some commentators point to other Code changes which, they argue, 
preclude any consolidated response to loss selectivity.  Their 
arguments do not bear scrutiny. 
They urge that Congress rejected a targeted consolidated response 
because of the Green Book,314 which is an influential 1985 study by 
the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee that proposed radical 
surgery on Subchapter C of the Code.315  Among other things, the 
Green Book recommended the following broad-based approach to 
loss duplication: 
(i)  In a § 351 exchange, the transferring shareholder would take a 
fair market value basis in controlled corporation stock received in 
exchange for loss property;
316
 
(ii)  In a “qualified acquisition” of a target, a “controlling” 
corporate shareholder’s basis in the target stock could not exceed 
the stock’s fair market value;
317
 and 
(iii)  A “controlling” corporate shareholder would take a 
conforming stock basis in its controlled subsidiary.
318
 
The Green Book proposal, however, offers no help in a debate 
about Treasury’s authority to address loss selectivity for consolidated 
groups.  Because it differs so dramatically from the regime actually 
adopted, it implies next to nothing about what Congress intended 
when it implemented the actual regime.  At most, by not adopting 
the proposal, Congress implicitly rejected a broad-based solution to 
loss duplication.  Its rejection should have no bearing on any target 
                                                          
 314. See Salem I, supra note 4, at 211; see also Salem III, supra note 178, at 1111-12 
n.5 (referring to suggested legislative proposals by the Staff of the Senate Finance 
Committee found in the Green Book); Irving Salem & Richard Bress, Agency Deference 
Under the Judicial Microscope of the Supreme Court, 88 TAX NOTES 1257, 1258 n.3 (2000) 
(referring to the Green Book proposal). 
 315. Salem I, supra note 4, at 211; see also Green Book, supra note 281. 
 316. Green Book, supra note 281, at 103-04 (proposing this basis step-down in 
§ 358(a)(2)) and § 220 (explaining the proposal). 
 317. Id. at 104 (proposing § 358(c)) and § 221 (explaining the proposal).  
Broadly, a “qualified acquisition” was an acquisition of an affiliated interest in target 
stock or substantially all target assets within a 12-month period.  Id. at 50, 112-17 
(proposing § 364).  A “controlling” corporate shareholder was a corporation that 
owned an affiliated interest in the target.  Id. at 130, 132 (proposing § 366(c) and 
(g)).  Note that the Green Book proposed to make the corporate-level consequences 
of qualified acquisitions explicitly elective.  Id. at 51. 
 318. Id. at 160 (proposing § 1020) & 237-39 (describing the proposed change). 
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consolidated response to loss selectivity, since consolidated groups 
raise a unique loss-selectivity concern.319 
Commentators also point to I.R.C. § 336(d)(1) and (2) and I.R.C. 
§ 382(g)(4)(D), two provisions in which Congress addressed loss 
duplication generally.320  They argue that Congress intended those 
provisions to be the exclusive response to loss duplication, preventing 
further action by Treasury.321  The argument necessarily assumes that 
consolidated groups raise no unique loss-selectivity concerns.  
Because the assumption is wrong, the argument is flawed and 
§§ 336(d) and 382(g)(4)(D) should not limit Treasury’s regulatory 
authority to target consolidated loss selectivity. 
Moreover, both provisions treat a shareholder’s stock loss and a 
corporation’s asset loss as the “same” economic loss.322  In that way, 
the provisions apply a kind of single-entity approach, often in a classic 
separate-corporation setting.  It seems fanciful to suggest that by 
extending the single-entity approach to those cases, Congress thereby 
limited Treasury’s authority to treat duplicated losses as the same loss 
in a classic single-entity setting like consolidation.323  Accordingly, 
neither § 336(d) nor § 382(g)(4)(D) should limit Treasury’s 
regulatory authority to target consolidated loss selectivity.324 
In fact, the provisions probably expand Treasury’s authority.  With 
§ 336(d) and other related provisions, Congress labeled at least some 
duplicated loss as inappropriate.325  However, it was concerned that it 
                                                          
 319. See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text (for why consolidated groups 
raise a unique concern); cf. Green Book, supra note 281, at 237 (introducing the 
proposed conforming-basis rule and noting that consolidated groups already had a 
conforming-basis rule (i.e., the investment adjustment rule)). 
 320. See Salem I, supra note 4, at 210.  Section 336(d)(1) and (2) sometimes 
disallow a loss that a liquidating corporation otherwise would recognize on a 
distribution to a majority shareholder or a distribution of recently contributed 
property.  Section 382(g)(4)(D) limits a corporation’s use of its loss attributes after a 
majority shareholder treats the corporation’s stock as becoming worthless. 
 321. See Salem I, supra note 4, at 211. 
 322. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1096 (1987) (justifying § 382(g)(4)(D) to limit 
the deduction of the “same” economic loss). 
 323. The suggestion finds no support in any Code language or legislative history. 
 324. That authority is also not limited by I.R.C. § 382 generally, because that 
section addresses loss trafficking, a different concern.  In any case, courts have 
permitted the consolidated return regulations to supplement a loss limitation rule 
like I.R.C. § 269 or I.R.C. § 382.  See supra note 90 (for applicable cites). 
Further, despite commentators’ assertions (see, e.g., 1990-2 C.B. 696, 700), I.R.C. 
§ 382, by itself, insufficiently responds to loss duplication.  It does not apply to every 
loss-duplication case, and even when it applies, it may permit too ready a use of the 
duplicate asset loss.  See id. at 701 (making these points); cf. I.R.C. § 382(h)(6)(B) 
(2003) (providing that a deduction may be treated as a built-in loss but Treasury has 
not issued regulations describing how this provision should operate). 
 325. The legislative history supporting I.R.C. § 336(d) stated that: 
The conferees are concerned that taxpayers may utilize various means to 
avoid the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, or otherwise take advantage 
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could not identify all schemes in which loss was inappropriately 
recognized, so it gave Treasury broad authority to attack those 
schemes.326  Therefore, with § 336(d) and related provisions, 
Congress arguably broadened Treasury’s authority to attack loss 
duplication. 
As a final point, a commentator argues that Congress implicitly pre-
empted Treasury’s authority to adopt a consolidated loss disallowance 
rule by enacting the following Code provisions: I.R.C. §§ 304(b)(4), 
1059(e)(2)(B), and 1503(e)(1) and (4).327  Each provision was passed 
shortly after the 1986 repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, and each 
could affect a consolidated group’s gain or loss on its disposition of 
subsidiary stock.328  The commentator insists that Congress would not 
                                                          
of the new provisions, to recognize losses in inappropriate situations or 
inflate the amount of losses actually sustained. 
H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at II-200 (1986). 
 326. See I.R.C. § 337(d); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at II-204 (1986) (explaining 
that § 337(d) gave Treasury broad authority to prevent circumvention of the repeal 
“through the use of any provision, including the consolidated return regulations”). 
 327. See Salem I, supra note 4, at 211. 
 328. For the most part, these provisions attacked specific “artificial-gain” 
transactions (i.e., transactions that eliminated gain (or created loss) at the corporate 
level).  For example, § 304(b)(4) attacked a potential mirror transaction that 
involved § 304.  See Lawrence M. Axelrod, Section 304, Excess Loss Accounts, and Other 
Consolidated Return Gallimaufry, 36 TAX NOTES 729, 729-30 (1987) (for a description of 
the transaction). 
Section 1059(e)(2)(B) refined § 1059, a section that was introduced in 1984 and 
addressed transactions in which a corporate shareholder purchased target stock, 
received an anticipated dividend on the stock, and promptly sold the stock, 
recognizing a non-economic loss.  See  H.R. REP. NO. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1185-
86 (1983) (discussing a dividend-stripping transaction).  Section 1059 reduced the 
chance that a dividend distribution would artificially eliminate gain (or create loss) 
in subsidiary stock. 
Note that § 1059(e)(2)(B) provided that § 1059 could apply to certain qualifying 
dividends (defined in § 243(b)).  Although § 1059(e)(2)(B) did not literally apply to 
dividends between consolidated group members, legislative history extended its 
principles to those dividends.  See H.R. REP. NO. 100-795, at 42-44 (1988); S. REP. NO. 
100-445, at. 43-44 (1988); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-14(a)(1) (1988) (eliminating 
dividends between consolidated group members; thus, those dividends could not be 
qualifying dividends and § 1059(e)(2)(B) could not literally apply to them). 
Section 1503(e)(1) addressed an artificial-gain transaction highlighted by Woods 
Inv. Co. v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 274 (1985), acq. 1986-2 C.B. 1.  In Woods, the Tax Court 
applied the applicable investment adjustment rule literally, concluding that a 
subsidiary’s tax depreciation deduction could exceed the consolidated group’s 
corresponding reduction in its subsidiary stock basis.  Id. at 282.  Consequently, the 
group could artificially eliminate gain (or create loss) in its subsidiary stock.  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 100-495, at 960 (1987); H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1088 (1987).  Section 
1503(e)(1) was intended to prevent that result by requiring the stock basis reduction 
to equal the depreciation deduction. 
Addressing a different type of concern, § 1503(e)(4) prevented a consolidated 
group from reducing its basis in subsidiary debt to avoid including any portion of an 
ELA in subsidiary stock in gross income.  Congress believed that “it [was] not 
appropriate to permit deferral of gain recognition by shifting the recapture liability 
[for the ELA] to a debt instrument.”  H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1234 (1989). 
FINALLEATHERMAN.DOC 8/15/2003  1:38 PM 
2003] WHY RITE AID IS WRONG 879 
have adopted the provisions if it believed that Treasury had the 
authority to prescribe a broad loss disallowance rule.329 
This argument falls short, particularly as it relates to Treasury’s 
authority to target consolidated loss selectivity, since none of the 
noted Code provisions dealt with a loss-selectivity concern, expressly 
or impliedly.  Instead, they attacked transactions under which a 
corporation artificially eliminated (or deferred) gain. 
Perhaps, the provisions implicitly restricted Treasury’s authority to 
attack artificial-gain transactions, but even that conclusion seems 
doubtful.  The provisions responded to specific transactions, and 
Congress never suggested that its patchwork response somehow 
limited Treasury’s authority to attack similar transactions.330 
Even reading the response broadly, it did not denote a seismic shift 
in how rules for consolidated groups should be crafted.  Since 1928, 
Congress has looked to Treasury to develop the consolidated rules,331 
only occasionally adding its voice.332  Consistent with that long-
established practice, Treasury should have authority in consolidated 
return regulations to target loss selectivity and more generally loss 
duplication. 
D. A Reasonable Rule 
Although Treasury has regulatory authority both to disallow a 
consolidated group’s loss on subsidiary stock and to address loss 
duplication, it must exercise that authority reasonably.  Treasury 
should meet this requirement for any regulation that is consistent 
with the relevant Code provisions333 and applies those provisions 
rationally.  LDR’s loss duplication rule met both of those standards. 
                                                          
 329. See Salem I, supra note 4, at 211 (stating “[d]oes it make sense for Congress to 
have labored so hard to handcraft these complicated provisions potentially affecting 
losses by members filing a consolidated return if it believed [that the] IRS could or 
would adopt a blanket (or near blanket) loss disallowance rule?  Certainly not.”). 
 330. If anything, the Code expands Treasury’s authority to attack artificial-gain 
transactions (e.g., newly created mirror transactions).  See § 337(d) (giving Treasury 
broad authority to implement the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 100-495, at 970 (1987) (stating that “[n]o inference is intended as to the 
Treasury Department’s authority to amend the consolidated return regulations 
consistent with the purposes of [§ 304(b)(4)]”); H.R. REP. NO. 100-495, at 962 (1986) 
(in discussing § 1503(e)(1), stating that “[t]here is no intention, however, to 
preclude the Treasury Department from accomplishing this result directly, by 
requiring a member to increase its earnings and profits without regard to basis 
adjustments”). 
 331. S. REP. NO. 70-760, at 15 (1928) (justifying the broad delegation of regulatory 
authority because it was “impracticable to attempt by legislation to prescribe the 
various detailed and complicated rules necessary to meet the many differing and 
complicated situations”). 
 332. See supra note 29 (for applicable Code provisions). 
 333. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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1. Consistency with the Code 
For reasons aired at length above, the loss duplication rule was 
consistent with relevant Code provisions and principles.  In attacking 
“classic” loss duplication, the rule followed longstanding Supreme 
Court precedent,334 and in attacking consolidated loss selectivity, it 
was consistent with (if not mandated by) the repeal of the General 
Utilities doctrine.335  Moreover, the rule deserved added weight, 
because it promptly responded to the repeal.336  Thus, the rule met 
the first standard for a reasonable regulation. 
2. Rational application 
LDR’s loss duplication rule also met the second standard (i.e., it 
applied the relevant Code provisions rationally).  A regulation may 
meet this standard even if it fails to adopt the best possible 
approach337 or produces inequitable outcomes in some 
circumstances.338  Thus, Treasury often has great flexibility to craft a 
“rational” regulation. 
Despite that flexibility, Treasury arguably had to attack loss 
duplication by eliminating the subsidiary’s duplicate built-in asset 
loss, rather than by disallowing the group’s subsidiary stock loss.  
Eliminating the asset loss arguably would better promote single-entity 
treatment, as the loss duplication rule is intended to do.339  That 
approach would also follow how Congress and Treasury chose to curb 
loss trafficking.340  Finally, the approach might be fairer than 
                                                          
 334. See supra  Part  III.C.1 (discussing “classic” loss duplication). 
 335. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing loss selectivity and the repeal of the General 
Utilities doctrine). 
 336. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) 
(stating that a factor in testing a regulation’s reasonableness was whether it was a 
substantially contemporaneous interpretation of the statute); cf. Salem I, supra note 
4, at 212 (arguing that the response was not contemporaneous because it was 
unrelated to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine). 
 337. See supra note 35 (for relevant cites that a regulation need not adopt the best 
possible approach); see also Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 790, 803 (1975) 
(considering the investment adjustment rule and concluding that Treasury has 
discretion to choose among reasonable alternatives). 
 338. See supra note 45 (for relevant cites). 
 339. 1990-2 C.B. 700 (noting the general policy shift in favor of single-entity 
treatment); see Salem I, supra note 4, at 212-13 (noting that a pure single-entity 
approach would require the asset loss to be recognized by the consolidated group). 
 340. See Silverman & Zarlenga, supra note 4, at 468-69 (noting that historically, 
Congress and Treasury has limited the use of a loss corporation’s attributes, citing to 
I.R.C. §§ 269, 382, 383(b), and 384). 
Note, however, that loss duplication arises in different contexts and raises different 
concerns than loss trafficking.  The loss trafficking rules are aimed at making sales of 
loss corporations more tax-neutral.  See H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at II-188 (1986) (using 
this reason to justify why § 382 uses a rate lower than the long-term Federal rate).  A 
loss-duplication rule might share that goal but should have a broader reach.  It 
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disallowing stock loss.  If stock loss were disallowed, it might mean 
that no portion of the duplicated loss could be deducted, since the 
corresponding asset loss could practically be disallowed by I.R.C. 
§ 382.341 
a. Subsidiary remains in the group 
These arguments have little appeal when a consolidated group sells 
subsidiary stock but the subsidiary remains in the group.  Then, the 
group’s sale is unlikely to implicate § 382 (or other loss-trafficking 
rules),342 so that the group can likely still take any subsidiary asset loss 
into account, consistent with a single-entity approach.  Further, if 
Treasury disallowed the asset loss rather than the stock loss, it would 
fail to address another significant concern—the group’s acceleration 
of loss in the “classic” loss-duplication transaction. 
EXAMPLE 10—LOSS ACCELERATION343 
P and S form T, with P transferring $100 cash for T’s common 
stock and S transferring land with a $50 basis and $10 value for T 
stock described in I.R.C. § 1504(a)(4) (but not in I.R.C. § 351(g)).  P 
and S take $100 and $50 exchanged bases in the T stock, and T takes 
                                                          
should also promote tax neutrality for the transfer of assets between subsidiaries, 
protect against an artificial acceleration of loss (e.g., in the “classic” loss duplication 
transaction) and, arguably, further the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.  See 
supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text (for why the repeal should support an 
attack on loss duplication). 
 341. See, e.g., Axelrod, supra note 4, at 814-15 (arguing that because of I.R.C. § 382, 
no one may take the loss into account, instead of the loss being taking into account 
twice). 
The Federal Circuit apparently raised another concern in oral argument, posing 
the following hypothetical to government counsel: 
Would all benefit from an economic loss be eliminated if (i) a consolidated 
group sold subsidiary stock at a loss, (ii) the loss was disallowed as a 
duplicated loss, (iii) the duplicated-loss assets appreciated in value, 
eliminating their built-in loss, and (iv) the buyer sold the subsidiary stock? 
See Sheppard, supra note 288, at 336; see also Sykes, supra note 221, at 473 (posing a 
similar hypothetical).  The answer is no, because the subsidiary would eventually 
benefit from the built-in asset loss by selling the assets at a reduced gain, a reduction 
in no way limited by § 382.  See Sheppard, supra note 288, at 336 (making a similar 
point). 
Apparently, the government botched the answer in oral argument and sent the 
court a letter explaining its answer.  Id. at 336-37.  That unusual step may have irked 
the court, perhaps contributing to the government’s loss in Rite Aid. 
 342. Section 382 applies when a loss corporation undergoes an ownership change, 
which broadly occurs upon a disposition of fifty percent of the loss corporation’s 
stock over a three-year period.  See I.R.C. § 382(g)(1) (2003).  In measuring this 
change, stock described in I.R.C. § 1504(a)(4) (i.e., non-convertible, non-voting 
preferred stock) is disregarded.  I.R.C. § 382(k)(6)(A) (2003).  Note that in the 
“classic” loss duplication transaction, a consolidated group is likely to sell subsidiary 
stock described in § 1502(a)(4). 
 343. EXAMPLE 10 is essentially the same as EXAMPLE 7.  See supra Part III.C.2.a. For a 
justification of the tax consequences in this example, see EXAMPLE 7. 
FINALLEATHERMAN.DOC 8/15/2003  1:38 PM 
882 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:811 
a $50 transferred basis in the land.  P, S, and T join in filing 
consolidated returns. 
In an unrelated transaction but before the group sells the land, S 
sells its T preferred stock for $10, recognizing a $40 loss.344  Unless 
the stock loss is disallowed, the P group accelerates its $40 loss 
through S’s asset contribution and stock sale.  Further, the P group 
can duplicate the loss when S later sells the land. 
By disallowing stock loss, LDR’s loss duplication rule rationally 
addresses concerns with both loss duplication and loss acceleration 
when the subsidiary remains in the group. 
The loss duplication rule applies rationally, even though it may 
eliminate the benefit of a cost-basis purchase of subsidiary stock, a 
consolidated benefit that Treasury (and Congress) had taken care 
generally to preserve before LDR.345  Congress disregarded that 
benefit in an analogous situation when it enacted I.R.C. § 358(h).346  
Like LDR’s loss duplication rule, that provision was intended to 
prevent loss acceleration and duplication.347  Because Congress 
                                                          
 344. T remains a P group member, because the preferred stock is not counted in 
measuring affiliation, and the sale does not implicate § 382, because the stock sold is 
§ 1504(a)(4) stock. 
 345. In EXAMPLE 10, if T later sold the land and recognized a $40 loss, P would 
take a reduced basis in its T stock to account for T’s loss.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-
32(b)(2)(i).  However, the reduction would not affect the P group if it retained its T 
stock or liquidated T.  See I.R.C. § 332(a) (providing broadly that a parent recognizes 
no gain or loss on the liquidation of an affiliated subsidiary).  Note that Treasury 
might have added a supplemental rule that would have limited the $40 negative 
adjustment on P’s T stock when T sold the land, but such a rule would have required 
administratively complex tracing. 
 346. See Community Renewal Tax Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 309  
(Appendix G),  114 Stat. 2763A-638 (2000)(requiring a basis reduction, in certain 
cases, to account for § 357(c)(3) liabilities assumed as part of a § 351 exchange).  
The next footnote describes a situation in which § 358(h) should apply. 
 347. The Senate used the following example to help justify § 358(h): 
As one example of a transaction that concerns the Committee, a transferor 
corporation may transfer assets with a fair market value basis . . . in exchange 
for preferred stock of the transferee corporation, plus the transferee’s 
assumption of a contingent liability that is deductible in the future, but 
capable of current valuation.  The transferor claims a high basis for the stock 
of the transferee held with respect to this transfer, because the basis of the 
assets is taken into account, while the taxpayer contends that the assumed 
liability does not reduce stock basis under current law.  [See I.R.C. 
§ 357(d)(2).]  However, the value of the transferee stock in the hands of the 
transferor is nominal, because of the liability that offsets virtually all the 
value of the assets.  The transferor may then attempt to accelerate the 
deduction that would be attributable to the liability, by selling or exchanging 
the transferee stock at a loss.  Furthermore, the transferee (which may still 
be a member of the consolidated group filing a tax return with the 
transferor) might take the position that it is entitled to deduct the payments 
on the liability, effectively duplicating the deduction attributable to the liability. 
S. REP. NO. 106-120, at 214-15 (1999) (emphasis added); see also Notice 2001-17, 2001-
9 I.R.B. 730 (in which the IRS discussed how it may attack this “contingent liability” 
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disregarded the benefit of a cost-basis purchase in enacting 
§ 358(h),348 Treasury should be able to do so as well in crafting a loss 
duplication rule. 
b. Subsidiary leaves the group 
Such a rule also applies rationally when a consolidated group sells 
subsidiary stock but the subsidiary leaves the group.  Although the 
rule could be challenged because it might preserve an unusable asset 
loss while disallowing the duplicate stock loss,349 the challenge should 
fall short for at least three reasons.  First, it improperly discounts a 
group’s likely option to recognize the asset loss as part of the 
subsidiary’s sale.  Second, it dismisses legitimate administrative 
concerns with eliminating the asset loss.  Finally, it disregards 
Congress’s telling silence on LDR’s loss duplication rule. 
Typically, when a consolidated group sells a subsidiary with 
duplicated loss, it can recognize the duplicate asset loss by: 
(i)     Selling the subsidiary assets instead of the subsidiary stock; 
(ii)  Selling the subsidiary stock and making a § 338(h)(10) 
election with the buyer;
350
 or 
                                                          
transaction). 
 348. Congress never suggested that the benefit should be protected when it 
enacted § 358(h), even though it might be easier to trace § 357(c)(3) liabilities than 
built-in asset losses. 
 349. See supra notes 339-41 and accompanying text (for this argument and related 
arguments). 
 350. See EXAMPLE 8, supra Part III.C.2.a (discussing the tax consequences of an 
asset sale or a stock sale with a § 338(h)(10) election).  Although LDR’s loss 
duplication rule may increase the utility of a § 338(h)(10) election, it does not 
eliminate the election’s benefit, as some have suggested.  See Axelrod, supra note 4, at 
813-14 (making this suggestion but focusing on the different treatment of 
consolidated and non-consolidated groups because of LDR).  By making the 
election, a group can still sell subsidiary stock but treat the transaction as if the 
subsidiary sold its assets and liquidated. 
Making a tangentially related point, Rite Aid asserted that when a group sold the 
stock of a subsidiary with a duplicated loss, LDR’s loss duplication rule could 
practically compel it to make a § 338(h)(10) election to recognize the asset loss.  See 
Brief for Appellant, Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357, at ¶¶ 25 and 68 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5098).  Rite Aid argued that the compulsion negated 
§ 338(h)(10)’s elective feature, but its argument was misguided for several reasons.  
First, a group could recognize asset loss without making the election.  See infra note 
351 and accompanying text.  Second, the loss duplication rule would not practically 
compel a § 338(h)(10) election for most qualified subsidiary stock sales, only for some 
in which the rule would otherwise limit the group’s stock loss.  Finally, Rite Aid 
misconstrued the essential nature of a tax election.  It is almost always true that one 
elective choice is more favorable than another, but that characteristic does not 
negate the elective feature of either choice. 
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(iii)  Selling the subsidiary stock without making a § 338(h)(10) 




LDR’s loss duplication rule invites groups to sell (or distribute) 
assets to avoid disallowed stock loss, much as the Code repeatedly 
invites corporations to sell rather than distribute loss assets.352  
Although there may be a few instances where a group has no real 
option to recognize the asset loss,353 a rule may apply rationally even if 
it produces inequitable results in scattered cases. 
In any event, it seems better to disallow stock loss than to eliminate 
asset loss, since the latter approach could not only be unfair but 
would also raise greater administrative concerns.354  Under the latter 
                                                          
 351. If the subsidiary distributes loss assets in connection with the sale, the loss will 
be recognized and deferred on the distribution but taken into account on the sale.  
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(f)(2)(iii) (2003) (providing that for intercompany 
distributions, the principles of I.R.C. § 311(b) apply to loss as well as gain); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1502-13(d)(1)(i) (discussing the timing of intercompany items under the 
acceleration rule); § 1.267(f)-1(c)(1) (providing that losses between controlled 
group members are taken into account under the timing principles of the matching 
and acceleration rules of § 1.1502-13); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(f)(7) (2003), Ex. 1(d) 
(illustrating an intercompany distribution of loss property where the group later sells 
the distributed property, triggering the loss); Don Leatherman, Current Developments 
for Consolidated Groups, 486 PLI/tax 406-09 (2000) (discussing F.S.A. 2000-12-046). 
If the subsidiary in substance sells a loss asset to an unrelated person, it can 
recognize the loss.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.338-8(d)(2)(iv) (added by T.D. 8858, 2001 
C.B. 333, 344, 65 Fed. Reg. 1236, 1246 (Jan. 7, 2000)) (providing that the § 338 asset-
consistency rule does not apply to the sale of a loss asset); Treas. Reg. § 1.338-
4(d)(2)(iv) (introduced by T.D. 8515, 1994-1 C.B. 89, 106, 59 Fed. Reg. 2958, 2973 
(Jan. 20, 1994)) (to the same effect); § 1.338-4T(f)(5), A(i) (in force as of Jan. 1, 
1991) (to the same effect). 
In either case, if the subsidiary recognizes a loss that the group absorbs, the group 
will correspondingly reduce its subsidiary stock basis, eliminating any duplicate stock 
loss.  § 1.1502-32(b)(2)(i) (providing negative adjustments for losses); § 1.1502-
32(b)(3)(i) (providing that a loss is taken into account (i) when absorbed if it is not 
carried back or (ii) when it arises if it is carried back and absorbed). 
 352. See I.R.C. §§ 311, 336(d)(3), 351(f), 355(c), 361(c) (2003) (each disallowing 
loss on a corporation’s distribution to its shareholder); see also supra notes 300-06 and 
accompanying text (for a discussion of these sections, each introduced in connection 
with the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine). 
 353. For example, a subsidiary stock sale may not qualify for a § 338(h)(10) 
election (e.g., because the buyer is an individual or the group sells less than an 
affiliated interest in the subsidiary).  Further, even if the sale qualifies, the election 
may be unwise for other reasons.  See, e.g., Salem I, supra note 4, at 209 n.27 (stating 
that a § 338(h)(10) election may be practically unavailable for a stock sale because of 
potentially adverse state tax consequences). 
Note that although Rite Aid did not make a § 338(h)(10) election for its sale of 
Encore stock, the election could have been made if the buyer had joined in the 
election.  The buyer refused to join in the election, perhaps because Rite Aid did not 
agree to a lower sales price.  See supra note 159 (noting that it is unclear why the 
buyer refused to join in the election). 
 354. It seems rational to use administrative considerations to choose among 
otherwise reasonable alternatives.  See also Salem I, supra note 4, at 214 (arguing that 
other aspects of LDR still raised administrative concerns); cf. Thomas D. Sykes, 
Chevron Deference Not Due for Overbroad Loss Disallowance Rules, 92 TAX NOTES 1609, 
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approach, a selling group would recognize duplicate stock loss but 
correspondingly reduce the basis of built-in loss assets of the disposed 
subsidiary.355  Presumably, the group would choose which asset bases 
it reduced,356 but it might need costly asset valuations to make the 
choice and would no doubt try to eliminate the least useful basis.357  
The process would inevitably spark disputes with the IRS, adding 
deadweight cost.358  Further, because of the subjective nature of 
valuations (and the audit process), similarly situated groups could be 
treated differently.359  To avoid those concerns, Treasury sensibly 
disallowed stock loss rather than eliminating asset loss.360 
Finally, Congress’s silence on LDR’s loss duplication rule seems 
noteworthy, given the avalanche of criticism the rule generated.361  
Despite the criticism, Congress left the rule intact, and it implicitly 
                                                          
1610 (2001) (arguing that a regulation cannot be based solely on administrative 
convenience and incorrectly implying that LDR was such a rule). 
 355. Under this rule, it should not reduce the subsidiary’s basis in stock of a lower-
tier subsidiary but instead should reduce the basis of the lower-tier subsidiary’s assets, 
appropriately “tiering-up” the write-down.  Special “tiering-up” rules could be 
required under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32 for a lower-tier subsidiary not wholly owned 
by the disposed subsidiary. 
 356. The group could instead reduce the bases of all relevant built-in loss assets 
proportionately, but that alternative would require the group to value every asset of 
the disposed subsidiary (and its lower-tier subsidiaries).  The alternative should be 
dismissed because its required valuations would likely have an unwarranted cost. 
 357. Eliminating the least useful basis would reduce the present-value cost of the 
basis reduction.  1991-2 C.B. 43, 49 (preamble to the final LDR, noting that “it would 
be necessary to identify the extent to which the stock loss is attributable to particular 
assets with a basis in excess of value rather than to built-in gain assets or assets whose 
basis is unlikely to be recovered in the near term”).  Note that a group could achieve 
a similar effect if the subsidiary sold or distributed the relevant loss asset to another 
member (although that option may be unavailable for non-tax reasons). 
 358. In contrast, a rule that shifted net operating loss (or loss carryovers) would 
not raise these concerns, and LDR permitted that loss “reattribution.”  See supra note 
164 and accompanying text (describing the reattribution rule). 
 359. It is also likely that groups with greater resources could better exploit the 
process, raising vertical-equity concerns. 
 360. LDR’s loss duplication rule also offered striking parallels to Treasury’s 1929 
loss-disallowance rule for liquidations.  See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text 
(for a discussion of the 1929 rule).  Treasury supported both rules, in part, for 
administrative reasons and also justified the loss disallowance in both cases because it 
could generally be avoided through self-help.  See supra note 232 (for a discussion of 
the 1929 rule); 1990-1 C.B. 71 and 1991-2 C.B. 49 (for discussions of the loss 
duplication rule).  Treasury’s approach in the 1929 rule should merit deference as a 
nearly contemporaneous application of the 1928 regulatory grant.  Cf. Nat’l Muffler 
Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (describing factors 
considered in testing the reasonableness of a regulation).  Because the 1928 grant of 
regulatory authority is substantially the same as the current grant, Treasury’s 
approach in the loss duplication rule has a solid historical base.  See supra note 236 
(for why the grants are substantially the same). 
 361. See supra note 4 (for cites related to that criticism). 
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endorsed the rule’s approach when it enacted a related provision 
using a consistent scheme.362 
For all of these reasons, LDR’s loss duplication rule applied the 
Code rationally.  It represented a valid and elegant solution to a 
difficult “consolidated” problem. 
IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF RITE AID 
With Rite Aid’s dearth of reasoning, it is difficult to predict how a 
future court will use the case.  It may affect the model a court uses to 
test a consolidated return regulation, the deference it gives such a 
regulation, and its conclusion about the regulation’s validity. 
A. A Separate-Corporation Model 
Rite Aid could be read to mandate use of a separate-corporation 
model to test any consolidated return regulation.363  That reading 
should be rejected, because the regulations adopt a hybrid approach, 
so that a separate-corporation model could not adequately reflect 
each provision in the regulations.364  Instead, the appropriate model 
for any provision should depend on context, a standard supported by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in United Dominion Indus. Inc. v. 
Commissioner.365 
                                                          
 362. See supra notes 345-48 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. 358(h)). 
 363. See Sheppard, supra note 288, at 337-38 (suggesting that the Federal Circuit 
would test the validity of a consolidated return regulation by comparing the 
treatment of consolidated and non-consolidated groups); see also Salem, supra note 6, 
at 600 (arguing that American Standard did not rely on the difference between the 
consolidated return rule and the separate-return result in reaching its conclusion 
and that the Federal Circuit in Rite Aid weakened its flawed “reasoning” by 
overlooking that point). 
 364. See Silverman & Zarlenga, supra note 4, at 470-71 (discussing how the 
regulations use a hybrid approach); see also Axelrod, supra note 4, at 812 (arguing 
that the single-entity approach is a result, not a justification for a result). 
 365. See 532 U.S. 822 (2001).  In fact, in United Dominion, the Supreme Court 
probably rejected a single-entity or separate-corporation default rule.  First, it 
appeared to reject a separate-corporation default rule, because it adopted a single-
entity approach even though the regulations did not expressly consider the relevant 
issue.  Cf. id. at 841 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing to H Enter. Int’l, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
105 T.C. 71, 85 (1995), and quoting in a parenthetical reference language from H 
Enterprises that supported a separate-corporation default rule).  Further, it implicitly 
rejected a single-entity default rule when it failed to cite Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-80(a) to 
support its single-entity approach, a telling omission since the Sixth Circuit in 
Intermet had concluded that Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-80(a) created a single-entity default 
rule.  Cf. Intermet Corp. v. Comm’r, 209 F.3d 901, 905-06 (6th Cir. 2000); see also 
Leatherman, supra note 8, at 690-93 (discussing why neither a separate-corporation 
nor single-entity default rule should be adopted and encouraging a balance of the 
two approaches that promoted tax neutrality). 
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B. Deference 
Rite Aid could also be read to support giving little deference to 
Treasury’s choices in crafting a consolidated return regulation.366  
That approach should be rejected for the following compelling 
reasons. 
First, the approach would make the application of the regulations 
less certain.367  The uncertainty would have two likely effects: It would 
aid the more aggressive groups, hurting the fisc and making the tax 
system less fair, and it would prompt Congress to pass more detailed 
tax legislation, further complicating the Code. 
Second, the approach would encourage litigation, creating 
deadweight cost and likely frustrating courts by asking them to 
perform a task that Treasury with its tax expertise is better equipped 
to handle.  Treasury was granted its broad authority for the 
consolidated return regulations, because Congress “believe[d] it to 
be impracticable to attempt by legislation to meet the many differing 
and complicated situations” facing consolidated groups.368  Courts 
would likely find the task even more daunting than Congress.369 
Finally, the suggested approach is inconsistent with the separation 
of powers doctrine, essentially requiring courts to make the law, 
rather than merely to interpret it (i.e., ”saying what the law is”).  
Legislative power is vested in Congress or its delegate (e.g., Treasury 
through legislative regulations), not in the courts.370 
C. Threatened Consolidated Provisions 
Rite Aid could also threaten the validity of several existing 
consolidated return regulations.  The following is a non-inclusive list 
of regulations that may be vulnerable in Rite Aid’s aftermath, because 
they may apply less favorably to consolidated groups than non-
                                                          
 366. Cf. Salem I, supra note 4, at 174 (suggesting that a court should engage in a de 
novo analysis and give little deference to Treasury’s choice in crafting a consolidated 
return regulation). 
 367. See Coverdale, supra note 27, at 68 (applauding deference because it 
contributes to the “uniform application of the tax laws”). 
 368. S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 15 (1928). 
 369. Cf. United States v. Cleveland, Painseville & E. R.R. Co., 42 F.2d 413, 414 (6th 
Cir. 1930) (in discussing pre-1929 law in which courts were asked to develop many of 
the tax rules for consolidated groups, the court stated that “[f]ew provisions of the 
income tax statutes . . . have required a greater amount of litigation and judicial 
labor”). 
 370. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in 
a Congress of the United States”); see Salem I, supra note 4, at 174 n.16 
(acknowledging this argument as “another view”). 
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consolidated groups, they arguably do not deal with consolidated 
“problems,” or they are arguably inconsistent with the Code:371 
(i)    Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(f)(6)
372
 
(ii)   Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-30;
373
 
(iii)  Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-31;
374
 
(iv)  Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32, at least for certain basis reductions 
relating to subsidiary loss;
375
 and 
                                                          
 371. Other commentators have identified these and other provisions as vulnerable 
in Rite Aid’s aftermath.  See, e.g., Silverman & Zarlenga, supra note 4, at 478; Schler, 
supra note 177, at 922; Sheppard, supra note 288, at 338-39; Salem II, supra note 4, at 
438. 
 372. This provision denies a consolidated group any loss on its sale of common 
parent stock even though a similar non-consolidated group’s loss would not be 
disallowed.  Note, if a consolidated group recognizes loss on common parent stock, 
the loss could offset the common parent’s income, an offset that seems inconsistent 
with I.R.C. § 1032. 
 373. This regulation deals with stock basis after triangular reorganizations and 
may result in a consolidated group having an ELA in target stock even though a 
similar non-consolidated group would take a $0 basis in the stock.  Compare Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1502-30(b)(3) (2003) (providing that the negative adjustments under Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1502-30 could create an ELA), with Treas. Reg. § 1.358-6(c)(1)(ii) (2003) 
(preventing a negative-basis result outside of consolidation). 
 374. This section may adjust a consolidated group’s basis in subsidiary stock 
following a group structure change.  There is no similar provision for a comparable 
non-consolidated transaction. 
 375. The IRS first provided for basis adjustments for subsidiary stock in 1928, but 
until 1966, it provided negative adjustments only for certain losses and provided no 
positive adjustments for gain.  See, e.g., Art. 34(c)(2) and (e) of Reg. 75 (providing a 
stock basis reduction for subsidiary loss absorbed by the group that the subsidiary 
would not have used if it had filed separate returns).  The IRS justified the limited 
adjustment for loss to conform the treatment of consolidated and non-consolidated 
groups.  See supra note 261 and accompanying text (for a discussion of that 
rationale). 
For the first time in 1967, the IRS required a basis reduction for all subsidiary loss 
absorbed by the group, even if the subsidiary could have used the loss if it had filed a 
separate return.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(1)(ii) and (2)(i) and (ii) (1967), 
1967-1 C.B. 248-49.  As a result, consolidated groups could be treated worse than 
non-consolidated groups, as the following example shows: 
A consolidated group acquires all T stock for $100.  After the acquisition, the 
group has a consolidated net operating loss (a “CNOL”), $10 of which is 
attributable to T.  T carries back that portion of the CNOL and offsets its 
income in a separate return year.  The group reduces its basis in the T stock 
by $10, from $100 to $90.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(3)(i)(B); see also 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(2)(i) (1967) (reaching the essentially same 
result).  If the group had not filed a consolidated return, T still could have 
offset its $10 of income with the $10 loss carryback, but the group would 
have retained a $100 basis in the T stock. 
See 1990-2 C.B. 700 (preamble to Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-20, noting this case and 
also noting the negative adjustment under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32 for dividends paid 
out of pre-affiliation earnings and profits, another potentially problematic case).  
Under Rite Aid, Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32 may be invalid to the extent it authorizes the 
basis reduction in the example, because the reduction arguably is not connected 
with any problem created by filing consolidated returns. 
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v)  Various subsections of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-80, which provide 
that certain Code sections do not apply to transactions between 
members of a consolidated group.
376
 
Probably nothing short of legislation will assure that each of those 
provisions is valid. 
CONCLUSION 
In Rite Aid, the Federal Circuit dealt a death blow to LDR’s loss 
duplication rule.  In its rush to invalidate the rule, the court bypassed 
relevant precedent and substantial arguments that supported the 
rule’s validity.  Its sparse reasoning added uncertainty to an already 
complex area of the tax law. 
The court gave little or no deference to the rule, even though it 
was part of a legislative regulation, a type traditionally meriting great 
deference.  In the past, courts had been reluctant to invalidate 
consolidated return regulations, and in the rare case when such a 
regulation was invalidated, it had the following two flaws: It was not 
tax-neutral and Treasury could not justify the regulatory approach.  
LDR’s loss duplication rule suffered from neither flaw. 
The rule attacked two consolidated concerns, “classic” loss 
duplication and loss selectivity.  It disallowed a consolidated group’s 
loss on subsidiary stock to the extent the loss was duplicated in the 
subsidiary’s tax attributes (including its built-in asset loss).  The 
Federal Circuit concluded that the rule was invalid, because it could 
disallow a group’s economic loss. 
In reaching this conclusion, the court conflated three distinct 
issues: (i) whether Treasury had authority to disallow stock loss, 
(ii) whether it had authority to target consolidated loss duplication, 
and (iii) assuming that it had the authority to do both, whether its 
approach was reasonable.  A detailed analysis of these issues reveals 
that the loss duplication rule was valid.  First, Treasury had authority 
to disallow stock loss, based on explicit legislative history, case law, 
and past practice.  Second, it had authority to target consolidated loss 
duplication, following well-respected Supreme Court precedent and 
                                                          
 376. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-80(b) (2003) (providing that I.R.C. § 304 does not 
apply to the acquisition of stock in an intercompany transaction), (d) (providing that 
I.R.C. § 357(c) does not apply to an intercompany transaction), (e) (providing that 
I.R.C. § 163(e)(5) does not apply to an intercompany obligation), and (f) (providing 
that I.R.C. § 1031 does not apply to an intercompany transaction).  Each of those 
provisions would apply to a similar transaction between members of an affiliated, 
non-consolidated group.  But see H.R. REP. NO. 100-495, at 970 (1987) (stating that 
“[n]o inference is intended as to the Treasury Department’s authority to amend the 
consolidated return regulations consistent with the purpose of “[I.R.C. 
§ 304(b)(4)]”). 
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in concert with (or as an aspect of) the repeal of the General Utilities 
doctrine.  Finally, its approach (i.e., to disallow stock loss) was 
reasonable, since it was consistent with the Code and raised fewer 
administrative concerns than the alternative (i.e., to eliminate asset 
loss). 
In practically every sense, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Rite Aid 
was wrong.  The decision deserves to become a forgotten (albeit 
expensive) footnote.  
